Electoral Rules and Political Selection : Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan

Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This paper explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representat...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Beath, Andrew, Christia, Fotini, Egorov, Georgy, Enikolopov, Ruben
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2015
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/07/24775055/electoral-rules-political-selection-theory-evidence-field-experiment-afghanistan
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22446
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Summary:Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This paper explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representative bodies and policy outcomes. The paper shows formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single-member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates. Results from a unique field experiment in Afghanistan are consistent with these predictions. Specifically, representatives elected in elections with a single multi-member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences.