id okr-10986-22332
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-223322021-04-23T14:04:07Z Incentives for Pollution Control : Regulation and Public Disclosure Foulon, Jérôme Lanoie, Paul Laplante, Benoît AIR AIR POLLUTION CAPITAL MARKETS CHEMICAL PROCESSES DIOXINS ECONOMIC ACTIVITY EFFLUENT TREATMENT EFFLUENTS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS LEVELS EMISSIONS STANDARDS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS FISH FISHERIES GASES HIGH LEVELS INDUSTRIAL OPERATIONS INTERVENTION LANDFILL LEACHATE LAWS MANUFACTURING PROCESSES MINING OXYGEN OXYGEN DEMAND PAPER INDUSTRY POLLUTERS POLLUTION POLLUTION CONTROL POLLUTION LEVELS PRODUCTION COSTS PRODUCTION PROCESS PRODUCTION PROCESSES SECONDARY WASTEWATER TREATMENT STOCKHOLDERS STREAMS SUSPENDED SOLIDS WASHING WASTE WASTE MANAGEMENT WASTEWATER WASTEWATER TREATMENT WATER POLLUTION WATER POLLUTION CONTROL An increasing number of regulators have adopted public disclosure programs to create incentives for pollution control. Previous empirical analyses of monitoring and enforcement issues have focused strictly on the impact of such traditional practices as monitoring (inspections) and enforcement (fines and penalties) on polluters' environmental performance. Other analyses have separately focused on the impact of public disclosure programs. But can these programs create incentives in addition to the normal incentives of fines and penalties? The authors study the impact of both traditional enforcement and information strategies in the context of a single program, to gain insights into the relative impact of traditional (fines and penalties) and emerging (public disclosure) enforcement strategies. Their results suggest that the public disclosure strategy adopted by the province of British Columbia, Canada, has a greater impact on both emission levels and compliance status than do orders, fines, and penalties traditionally imposed by the courts and the Ministry of the Environment. But their results also demonstrate that adopting stricter standards and higher penalties also significantly affected emission levels. Policymakers, take note: 1) The presence of strong, clear standards together with a significant, credible penalty system sends appropriate signals to the regulated community, which responds by lowering pollution emissions. 2) The public disclosure of environmental performance creates strong additional incentives to control pollution. 2015-07-29T15:23:51Z 2015-07-29T15:23:51Z 2000-02 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/02/438330/incentives-pollution-control-regulation-public-disclosure http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22332 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2291 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper North America Canada
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic AIR
AIR POLLUTION
CAPITAL MARKETS
CHEMICAL PROCESSES
DIOXINS
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
EFFLUENT TREATMENT
EFFLUENTS
EMISSIONS
EMISSIONS LEVELS
EMISSIONS STANDARDS
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
FISH
FISHERIES
GASES
HIGH LEVELS
INDUSTRIAL OPERATIONS
INTERVENTION
LANDFILL LEACHATE
LAWS
MANUFACTURING PROCESSES
MINING
OXYGEN
OXYGEN DEMAND
PAPER INDUSTRY
POLLUTERS
POLLUTION
POLLUTION CONTROL
POLLUTION LEVELS
PRODUCTION COSTS
PRODUCTION PROCESS
PRODUCTION PROCESSES
SECONDARY WASTEWATER TREATMENT
STOCKHOLDERS
STREAMS
SUSPENDED SOLIDS
WASHING
WASTE
WASTE MANAGEMENT
WASTEWATER
WASTEWATER TREATMENT
WATER POLLUTION
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
spellingShingle AIR
AIR POLLUTION
CAPITAL MARKETS
CHEMICAL PROCESSES
DIOXINS
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
EFFLUENT TREATMENT
EFFLUENTS
EMISSIONS
EMISSIONS LEVELS
EMISSIONS STANDARDS
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
FISH
FISHERIES
GASES
HIGH LEVELS
INDUSTRIAL OPERATIONS
INTERVENTION
LANDFILL LEACHATE
LAWS
MANUFACTURING PROCESSES
MINING
OXYGEN
OXYGEN DEMAND
PAPER INDUSTRY
POLLUTERS
POLLUTION
POLLUTION CONTROL
POLLUTION LEVELS
PRODUCTION COSTS
PRODUCTION PROCESS
PRODUCTION PROCESSES
SECONDARY WASTEWATER TREATMENT
STOCKHOLDERS
STREAMS
SUSPENDED SOLIDS
WASHING
WASTE
WASTE MANAGEMENT
WASTEWATER
WASTEWATER TREATMENT
WATER POLLUTION
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
Foulon, Jérôme
Lanoie, Paul
Laplante, Benoît
Incentives for Pollution Control : Regulation and Public Disclosure
geographic_facet North America
Canada
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2291
description An increasing number of regulators have adopted public disclosure programs to create incentives for pollution control. Previous empirical analyses of monitoring and enforcement issues have focused strictly on the impact of such traditional practices as monitoring (inspections) and enforcement (fines and penalties) on polluters' environmental performance. Other analyses have separately focused on the impact of public disclosure programs. But can these programs create incentives in addition to the normal incentives of fines and penalties? The authors study the impact of both traditional enforcement and information strategies in the context of a single program, to gain insights into the relative impact of traditional (fines and penalties) and emerging (public disclosure) enforcement strategies. Their results suggest that the public disclosure strategy adopted by the province of British Columbia, Canada, has a greater impact on both emission levels and compliance status than do orders, fines, and penalties traditionally imposed by the courts and the Ministry of the Environment. But their results also demonstrate that adopting stricter standards and higher penalties also significantly affected emission levels. Policymakers, take note: 1) The presence of strong, clear standards together with a significant, credible penalty system sends appropriate signals to the regulated community, which responds by lowering pollution emissions. 2) The public disclosure of environmental performance creates strong additional incentives to control pollution.
format Working Paper
author Foulon, Jérôme
Lanoie, Paul
Laplante, Benoît
author_facet Foulon, Jérôme
Lanoie, Paul
Laplante, Benoît
author_sort Foulon, Jérôme
title Incentives for Pollution Control : Regulation and Public Disclosure
title_short Incentives for Pollution Control : Regulation and Public Disclosure
title_full Incentives for Pollution Control : Regulation and Public Disclosure
title_fullStr Incentives for Pollution Control : Regulation and Public Disclosure
title_full_unstemmed Incentives for Pollution Control : Regulation and Public Disclosure
title_sort incentives for pollution control : regulation and public disclosure
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2015
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/02/438330/incentives-pollution-control-regulation-public-disclosure
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22332
_version_ 1764450614483353600