Dividing the Spoils : Pensions, Privatization, and Reform in Russia's Transition
The authors present a political economy model in which policy is the outcome of an interaction between three actors: government (G), managers and workers (W), and transfer recipients (P). The government's objective is to stay in power, for whi...
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2015
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/03/438329/dividing-spoils-pensions-privatization-reform-russias-transition http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22313 |
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okr-10986-22313 |
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| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
AGENCY PROBLEMS ASSET STRIPPING AUTHORITY BANKING SYSTEMS BOOK VALUE BUDGETARY ALLOCATIONS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL GAIN CAPITAL MARKETS CITIZENS COMMUNISM COMMUNIST COMMUNIST PARTY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORRUPTION DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACY DEVELOPMENT DISTRICTS ECONOMIC REFORM ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION ELECTED OFFICIALS ELECTORAL SYSTEM EMPLOYMENT ENTERPRISE REFORM ENTERPRISE RESTRUCTURING FISCAL FISCAL POLICY FISCAL STANCE FOREIGN INVESTORS FOREIGN LOANS GDP GINI COEFFICIENT GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES HEADACHES HUMAN RESOURCES HUMAN RESOURCES IMPOTENCE INCOME INDEXATION INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS INFLATION INFORMAL SECTOR INTEREST RATES LOBBYING MACROECONOMIC POLICIES MACROECONOMIC PROBLEMS MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION MANAGERS MARKET VALUE PAYMENT ARREARS PAYROLL TAXES PENSIONS POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM POLITICAL ELITE POLITICIANS PRESIDENCY PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATIZATION PRIVATIZATION AGENCY PROFESSIONS PROFIT SEEKING PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SPENDING REGRESSION ANALYSIS RENT SEEKING RETIREMENT SAVINGS SCHOOLS SMALL BUSINESS SOCIAL POLICY SOCIAL PROTECTION SOCIAL SAFETY SOCIAL SAFETY NET SOCIAL SECURITY SOCIAL TRANSFERS SOCIAL WELFARE STATE ASSETS STATE ENTERPRISES STATE PROPERTY STATE REVENUES STATE SECTOR STATE SUBSIDIES STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES TAX COLLECTION TAX EXEMPTIONS TAX PAYMENTS TAX RATES TAX REVENUES TAXATION TOTAL EXPENDITURES TRANSITION ECONOMIES VOTERS VOTING VOUCHER PRIVATIZATION WAGES WEALTH WORKERS WORLD POLITICS |
| spellingShingle |
AGENCY PROBLEMS ASSET STRIPPING AUTHORITY BANKING SYSTEMS BOOK VALUE BUDGETARY ALLOCATIONS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL GAIN CAPITAL MARKETS CITIZENS COMMUNISM COMMUNIST COMMUNIST PARTY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORRUPTION DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACY DEVELOPMENT DISTRICTS ECONOMIC REFORM ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION ELECTED OFFICIALS ELECTORAL SYSTEM EMPLOYMENT ENTERPRISE REFORM ENTERPRISE RESTRUCTURING FISCAL FISCAL POLICY FISCAL STANCE FOREIGN INVESTORS FOREIGN LOANS GDP GINI COEFFICIENT GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES HEADACHES HUMAN RESOURCES HUMAN RESOURCES IMPOTENCE INCOME INDEXATION INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS INFLATION INFORMAL SECTOR INTEREST RATES LOBBYING MACROECONOMIC POLICIES MACROECONOMIC PROBLEMS MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION MANAGERS MARKET VALUE PAYMENT ARREARS PAYROLL TAXES PENSIONS POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM POLITICAL ELITE POLITICIANS PRESIDENCY PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATIZATION PRIVATIZATION AGENCY PROFESSIONS PROFIT SEEKING PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SPENDING REGRESSION ANALYSIS RENT SEEKING RETIREMENT SAVINGS SCHOOLS SMALL BUSINESS SOCIAL POLICY SOCIAL PROTECTION SOCIAL SAFETY SOCIAL SAFETY NET SOCIAL SECURITY SOCIAL TRANSFERS SOCIAL WELFARE STATE ASSETS STATE ENTERPRISES STATE PROPERTY STATE REVENUES STATE SECTOR STATE SUBSIDIES STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES TAX COLLECTION TAX EXEMPTIONS TAX PAYMENTS TAX RATES TAX REVENUES TAXATION TOTAL EXPENDITURES TRANSITION ECONOMIES VOTERS VOTING VOUCHER PRIVATIZATION WAGES WEALTH WORKERS WORLD POLITICS Kapstein, Ethan B. Milanovic, Branko Dividing the Spoils : Pensions, Privatization, and Reform in Russia's Transition |
| geographic_facet |
Europe and Central Asia Commonwealth of Independent States Eastern Europe Poland Russian Federation |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2292 |
| description |
The authors present a political economy
model in which policy is the outcome of an interaction
between three actors: government (G), managers and workers
(W), and transfer recipients (P). The government's objective
is to stay in power, for which it needs the support of
either P or W. It can choose slow privatization with little
asset stripping and significant taxation, thus protecting
the fiscal base out of which it pays pensioners relatively
well (as in Poland). Or it can give away assets and tax
exemptions to managers and workers, who then bankroll it and
deliver the vote, but it thereby loses taxes and pays little
to pensioners (as in Russia). The authors apply this model
to Russia for the period 1992-96. An empirical analysis of
electoral behavior in the 1996 presidential election shows
that the likelihood of someone voting for Yeltsin did not
depend on that person's socioeconomic group per se. Those who
tended to vote for Yeltsin were richer, younger, and better
educated and had more favorable expectations for the future.
Entrepreneurs, who had more of these characteristics, tended
to vote for Yeltsin as a result, while pensioners, who had
almost none, tended to vote against Yeltsin. Unlike Poland,
Russia failed to create pluralist politics in the early
years of the transition, so no effective counterbalance
emerged to offset managerial rent-seeking and the state was
easily captured by well-organized industrial interests. The
political elite were reelected because industrial interests
bankrolled their campaign in return for promises that
government largesse would continue to flow. Russia shows
vividly how political economy affects policymaking, because
of how openly and flagrantly government granted favors in
return for electoral support. Bur special interests, venal
bureaucrats, and the exchange of favors tend to be the rule,
not the exemption, elsewhere as well. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
Kapstein, Ethan B. Milanovic, Branko |
| author_facet |
Kapstein, Ethan B. Milanovic, Branko |
| author_sort |
Kapstein, Ethan B. |
| title |
Dividing the Spoils : Pensions, Privatization, and Reform in Russia's Transition |
| title_short |
Dividing the Spoils : Pensions, Privatization, and Reform in Russia's Transition |
| title_full |
Dividing the Spoils : Pensions, Privatization, and Reform in Russia's Transition |
| title_fullStr |
Dividing the Spoils : Pensions, Privatization, and Reform in Russia's Transition |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Dividing the Spoils : Pensions, Privatization, and Reform in Russia's Transition |
| title_sort |
dividing the spoils : pensions, privatization, and reform in russia's transition |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2015 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/03/438329/dividing-spoils-pensions-privatization-reform-russias-transition http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22313 |
| _version_ |
1764450606581284864 |
| spelling |
okr-10986-223132021-04-23T14:04:07Z Dividing the Spoils : Pensions, Privatization, and Reform in Russia's Transition Kapstein, Ethan B. Milanovic, Branko AGENCY PROBLEMS ASSET STRIPPING AUTHORITY BANKING SYSTEMS BOOK VALUE BUDGETARY ALLOCATIONS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL GAIN CAPITAL MARKETS CITIZENS COMMUNISM COMMUNIST COMMUNIST PARTY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORRUPTION DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACY DEVELOPMENT DISTRICTS ECONOMIC REFORM ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION ELECTED OFFICIALS ELECTORAL SYSTEM EMPLOYMENT ENTERPRISE REFORM ENTERPRISE RESTRUCTURING FISCAL FISCAL POLICY FISCAL STANCE FOREIGN INVESTORS FOREIGN LOANS GDP GINI COEFFICIENT GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES HEADACHES HUMAN RESOURCES HUMAN RESOURCES IMPOTENCE INCOME INDEXATION INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS INFLATION INFORMAL SECTOR INTEREST RATES LOBBYING MACROECONOMIC POLICIES MACROECONOMIC PROBLEMS MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION MANAGERS MARKET VALUE PAYMENT ARREARS PAYROLL TAXES PENSIONS POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM POLITICAL ELITE POLITICIANS PRESIDENCY PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATIZATION PRIVATIZATION AGENCY PROFESSIONS PROFIT SEEKING PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SPENDING REGRESSION ANALYSIS RENT SEEKING RETIREMENT SAVINGS SCHOOLS SMALL BUSINESS SOCIAL POLICY SOCIAL PROTECTION SOCIAL SAFETY SOCIAL SAFETY NET SOCIAL SECURITY SOCIAL TRANSFERS SOCIAL WELFARE STATE ASSETS STATE ENTERPRISES STATE PROPERTY STATE REVENUES STATE SECTOR STATE SUBSIDIES STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES TAX COLLECTION TAX EXEMPTIONS TAX PAYMENTS TAX RATES TAX REVENUES TAXATION TOTAL EXPENDITURES TRANSITION ECONOMIES VOTERS VOTING VOUCHER PRIVATIZATION WAGES WEALTH WORKERS WORLD POLITICS The authors present a political economy model in which policy is the outcome of an interaction between three actors: government (G), managers and workers (W), and transfer recipients (P). The government's objective is to stay in power, for which it needs the support of either P or W. It can choose slow privatization with little asset stripping and significant taxation, thus protecting the fiscal base out of which it pays pensioners relatively well (as in Poland). Or it can give away assets and tax exemptions to managers and workers, who then bankroll it and deliver the vote, but it thereby loses taxes and pays little to pensioners (as in Russia). The authors apply this model to Russia for the period 1992-96. An empirical analysis of electoral behavior in the 1996 presidential election shows that the likelihood of someone voting for Yeltsin did not depend on that person's socioeconomic group per se. Those who tended to vote for Yeltsin were richer, younger, and better educated and had more favorable expectations for the future. Entrepreneurs, who had more of these characteristics, tended to vote for Yeltsin as a result, while pensioners, who had almost none, tended to vote against Yeltsin. Unlike Poland, Russia failed to create pluralist politics in the early years of the transition, so no effective counterbalance emerged to offset managerial rent-seeking and the state was easily captured by well-organized industrial interests. The political elite were reelected because industrial interests bankrolled their campaign in return for promises that government largesse would continue to flow. Russia shows vividly how political economy affects policymaking, because of how openly and flagrantly government granted favors in return for electoral support. Bur special interests, venal bureaucrats, and the exchange of favors tend to be the rule, not the exemption, elsewhere as well. 2015-07-28T18:27:01Z 2015-07-28T18:27:01Z 2000-03 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/03/438329/dividing-spoils-pensions-privatization-reform-russias-transition http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22313 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2292 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Europe and Central Asia Commonwealth of Independent States Eastern Europe Poland Russian Federation |