High-Powered Incentives and Communication Failure

This paper uses a donor-provider-agent framework to study the role of provider incentives for the delivery of developmental goods like aid, credit, or technology transfer to the poor. The paper considers a situation where credible communication by...

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Main Authors:	Mishra, Ajit, Sarangi, Sudipta
Format:	Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2015
Subjects:	TRADITIONAL TECHNOLOGY TECHNOLOGY KNOWING RISK NEUTRAL MOTIVATION PRODUCTION WAGES BASIC PARTICIPATION INCOME KNOW-HOW VALUE GOVERNMENT CREDIT PROGRAMS INFORMATION TEXT SERVICES AGRICULTURE
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/06/24728266/high-powered-incentives-communication-failure http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22225

id	okr-10986-22225
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-222252021-04-23T14:04:07Z High-Powered Incentives and Communication Failure Mishra, Ajit Sarangi, Sudipta TRADITIONAL TECHNOLOGY TECHNOLOGY KNOWING RISK NEUTRAL MOTIVATION PRODUCTION WAGES BASIC PARTICIPATION INCOME KNOW-HOW VALUE GOVERNMENT CREDIT PROGRAMS INFORMATION TEXT SERVICES AGRICULTURE This paper uses a donor-provider-agent framework to study the role of provider incentives for the delivery of developmental goods like aid, credit, or technology transfer to the poor. The paper considers a situation where credible communication by the provider is the key to successful delivery. The study shows that the use of high-powered incentives can lead to breakdown of communication between providers and agents, leading to undesirable outcomes. The paper studies the interplay between incentives and communication in the presence of typical and motivated providers and finds that in certain situations incentivization leads to worse outcomes. 2015-07-17T20:55:45Z 2015-07-17T20:55:45Z 2015-06 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/06/24728266/high-powered-incentives-communication-failure http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22225 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7345 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	TRADITIONAL TECHNOLOGY TECHNOLOGY KNOWING RISK NEUTRAL MOTIVATION PRODUCTION WAGES BASIC PARTICIPATION INCOME KNOW-HOW VALUE GOVERNMENT CREDIT PROGRAMS INFORMATION TEXT SERVICES AGRICULTURE
spellingShingle	TRADITIONAL TECHNOLOGY TECHNOLOGY KNOWING RISK NEUTRAL MOTIVATION PRODUCTION WAGES BASIC PARTICIPATION INCOME KNOW-HOW VALUE GOVERNMENT CREDIT PROGRAMS INFORMATION TEXT SERVICES AGRICULTURE Mishra, Ajit Sarangi, Sudipta High-Powered Incentives and Communication Failure
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7345
description	This paper uses a donor-provider-agent framework to study the role of provider incentives for the delivery of developmental goods like aid, credit, or technology transfer to the poor. The paper considers a situation where credible communication by the provider is the key to successful delivery. The study shows that the use of high-powered incentives can lead to breakdown of communication between providers and agents, leading to undesirable outcomes. The paper studies the interplay between incentives and communication in the presence of typical and motivated providers and finds that in certain situations incentivization leads to worse outcomes.
format	Working Paper
author	Mishra, Ajit Sarangi, Sudipta
author_facet	Mishra, Ajit Sarangi, Sudipta
author_sort	Mishra, Ajit
title	High-Powered Incentives and Communication Failure
title_short	High-Powered Incentives and Communication Failure
title_full	High-Powered Incentives and Communication Failure
title_fullStr	High-Powered Incentives and Communication Failure
title_full_unstemmed	High-Powered Incentives and Communication Failure
title_sort	high-powered incentives and communication failure
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2015
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/06/24728266/high-powered-incentives-communication-failure http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22225
_version_	1764450472569077760

High-Powered Incentives and Communication Failure

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