Distributional Outcomes of a Decentralized Welfare Program
It is common for central governments, to delegate authority over the targeting of welfare programs to local community organizations - which may be better informed about who is poor, though possibly less accountable for getting the money to the loca...
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2015
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/04/437760/distributional-outcomes-decentralized-welfare-program http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22184 |
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okr-10986-221842021-04-23T14:04:06Z Distributional Outcomes of a Decentralized Welfare Program Galasso, Emanuela Ravallion, Martin COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMUNITY SURVEY CONFLICT CORRUPTION DECISION MAKING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DROUGHT GINI INDEX HEADCOUNT INDEX IMPERFECT INFORMATION INCIDENCE OF POVERTY INCOME INCOME INEQUALITY INEQUALITY INFORMAL TRANSFERS INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES LIVING STANDARDS LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL COMMUNITIES LOCAL COMMUNITY LOCAL INSTITUTIONS LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS NATIONAL LEVEL PARTICIPATORY POVERTY ASSESSMENTS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INFLUENCE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POOR POVERTY INCIDENCE POVERTY LINES POVERTY PROGRAMS POVERTY RATES POVERTY REDUCTION PRIMARY SCHOOL PROGRAM BENEFICIARIES PROGRAM COVERAGE PROGRAM EXPANSION PUBLIC SPENDING SOCIAL PROGRAMS TARGETING It is common for central governments, to delegate authority over the targeting of welfare programs to local community organizations - which may be better informed about who is poor, though possibly less accountable for getting the money to the local poor - while the center retains control over how much goes to each local region. The authors outline a theoretical model of the interconnected behavior of the various actors in such a setting. The models information structure provides scope for econometric identification. Applying data for a specific program in Bangladesh, they find that overall targeting was mildly pro-poor, mostly because of successful targeting within villages. But this varied across villages. Although some village characteristics promoted better targeting, these were generally not the same characteristics that attracted resources from the center. The authors observe that the centers desire for broad geographic coverage, appears to have severely constrained the scope for pro-poor village targeting. However, poor villages tended not to be better at reaching their poor. They find some evidence that local institutions matter. The presence of cooperatives for farmers and the landless, appears to be associated with more pro-poor program targeting. The presence of recreational clubs has the opposite effect. Sometimes the benefits of decentralized social programs are captured by local elites, depending on the type of spending being decentralized. When public spending us on private (excludable) good, and there is no self-targeting mechanism to ensure that only the poor participate, there is ample scope for local mistargeting. 2015-07-16T21:23:05Z 2015-07-16T21:23:05Z 2000-04 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/04/437760/distributional-outcomes-decentralized-welfare-program http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22184 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2316 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper South Asia Bangladesh |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMUNITY SURVEY CONFLICT CORRUPTION DECISION MAKING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DROUGHT GINI INDEX HEADCOUNT INDEX IMPERFECT INFORMATION INCIDENCE OF POVERTY INCOME INCOME INEQUALITY INEQUALITY INFORMAL TRANSFERS INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES LIVING STANDARDS LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL COMMUNITIES LOCAL COMMUNITY LOCAL INSTITUTIONS LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS NATIONAL LEVEL PARTICIPATORY POVERTY ASSESSMENTS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INFLUENCE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POOR POVERTY INCIDENCE POVERTY LINES POVERTY PROGRAMS POVERTY RATES POVERTY REDUCTION PRIMARY SCHOOL PROGRAM BENEFICIARIES PROGRAM COVERAGE PROGRAM EXPANSION PUBLIC SPENDING SOCIAL PROGRAMS TARGETING |
| spellingShingle |
COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMUNITY SURVEY CONFLICT CORRUPTION DECISION MAKING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DROUGHT GINI INDEX HEADCOUNT INDEX IMPERFECT INFORMATION INCIDENCE OF POVERTY INCOME INCOME INEQUALITY INEQUALITY INFORMAL TRANSFERS INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES LIVING STANDARDS LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL COMMUNITIES LOCAL COMMUNITY LOCAL INSTITUTIONS LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS NATIONAL LEVEL PARTICIPATORY POVERTY ASSESSMENTS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INFLUENCE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POOR POVERTY INCIDENCE POVERTY LINES POVERTY PROGRAMS POVERTY RATES POVERTY REDUCTION PRIMARY SCHOOL PROGRAM BENEFICIARIES PROGRAM COVERAGE PROGRAM EXPANSION PUBLIC SPENDING SOCIAL PROGRAMS TARGETING Galasso, Emanuela Ravallion, Martin Distributional Outcomes of a Decentralized Welfare Program |
| geographic_facet |
South Asia Bangladesh |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2316 |
| description |
It is common for central governments, to
delegate authority over the targeting of welfare programs to
local community organizations - which may be better informed
about who is poor, though possibly less accountable for
getting the money to the local poor - while the center
retains control over how much goes to each local region. The
authors outline a theoretical model of the interconnected
behavior of the various actors in such a setting. The models
information structure provides scope for econometric
identification. Applying data for a specific program in
Bangladesh, they find that overall targeting was mildly
pro-poor, mostly because of successful targeting within
villages. But this varied across villages. Although some
village characteristics promoted better targeting, these
were generally not the same characteristics that attracted
resources from the center. The authors observe that the
centers desire for broad geographic coverage, appears to
have severely constrained the scope for pro-poor village
targeting. However, poor villages tended not to be better at
reaching their poor. They find some evidence that local
institutions matter. The presence of cooperatives for
farmers and the landless, appears to be associated with more
pro-poor program targeting. The presence of recreational
clubs has the opposite effect. Sometimes the benefits of
decentralized social programs are captured by local elites,
depending on the type of spending being decentralized. When
public spending us on private (excludable) good, and there
is no self-targeting mechanism to ensure that only the poor
participate, there is ample scope for local mistargeting. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
Galasso, Emanuela Ravallion, Martin |
| author_facet |
Galasso, Emanuela Ravallion, Martin |
| author_sort |
Galasso, Emanuela |
| title |
Distributional Outcomes of a Decentralized Welfare Program |
| title_short |
Distributional Outcomes of a Decentralized Welfare Program |
| title_full |
Distributional Outcomes of a Decentralized Welfare Program |
| title_fullStr |
Distributional Outcomes of a Decentralized Welfare Program |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Distributional Outcomes of a Decentralized Welfare Program |
| title_sort |
distributional outcomes of a decentralized welfare program |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2015 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/04/437760/distributional-outcomes-decentralized-welfare-program http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22184 |
| _version_ |
1764449824824885248 |