Formulas for Failure? : Were the Doha Tariff Formulas Too Ambitious for Success?

This paper views tariff-cutting formulas as a potential solution to the free-rider problem that arises when market opening is negotiated bilaterally and extended on a most-favored-nation basis. The negotiators in the Doha Agenda chose formulas that...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Laborde, David, Martin, Will
Format:	Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2015
Subjects:	TARIFFS TRADE VOLUMES MULTILATERAL TRADE POLITICAL-SUPPORT TARIFF RATES WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION TRADE NEGOTIATIONS BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS INTEREST TARIFF NEGOTIATION ECONOMIC WELFARE AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS TRADE BARRIERS EXCHANGE OPTION TARIFF CHANGES EXPORTS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES EXPORTERS POLITICAL ECONOMY DEMAND ELASTICITIES AGRICULTURAL INTERESTS REVENUES WELFARE FUNCTION TARIFF CONCESSIONS ECONOMIC POLICY PROTECTION FOR SALE MARKET ACCESS OPPORTUNITIES PRICE HIGH TARIFFS MARKET ACCESS BENEFICIARIES INTERNATIONAL BANK TRADE EXPANSION DEVELOPING COUNTRY BORDER MEASURES AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION AGRICULTURAL TARIFF LACK OF TRANSPARENCY AGRICULTURAL MARKETS REDUCTION IN TARIFFS AVERAGE TARIFFS PRODUCTS TRADING FREE ACCESS OPTIONS TARIFF REVENUES DEMAND CURVES COMMERCIAL POLICY MARKETS TARIFF REDUCTIONS WORLD PRICES CUTTING ACCESS INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS WELFARE GAINS IMPORTS RATE QUOTAS TRADE POLICY PRODUCT MARKET ACCESS NEGOTIATIONS MULTILATERAL REFORMS VOLUME PRICE CHANGE EXPENDITURE APPLIED TARIFF TRADE VOLUME MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS GOOD AGRICULTURAL TARIFFS TRANSPARENCY TARIFF STRUCTURE VALUE CONCESSIONS TRADE ORGANIZATION DEMAND TRADE PROTECTION PRICE EFFECTS TRADE REFORM AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AGRICULTURE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY SALE MARKET TRADE LIBERALIZATION AGRICULTURAL MARKET COTTON MARKET ACCESS CONCESSIONS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS INTERESTS TRADE GOODS TARIFF ESCALATION GLOBAL TRADE AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS HOUSEHOLDS SHARE IMPORT VOLUMES INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT TARIFF REVENUE SINGLE TARIFF EXPORT WORLD TRADE COMMODITIES TARIFF RATE INSTRUMENT AGRICULTURAL AGREEMENT MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS TRADING PARTNERS AGRICULTURAL TRADE GUARANTEE PRICES
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/06/24619553/formulas-failure-doha-tariff-formulas-too-ambitious-success http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22176

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recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-221762021-04-23T14:04:07Z Formulas for Failure? : Were the Doha Tariff Formulas Too Ambitious for Success? Laborde, David Martin, Will TARIFFS TRADE VOLUMES MULTILATERAL TRADE POLITICAL-SUPPORT TARIFF RATES WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION TRADE NEGOTIATIONS BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS INTEREST TARIFF NEGOTIATION ECONOMIC WELFARE AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS TRADE BARRIERS EXCHANGE OPTION TARIFF CHANGES EXPORTS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES EXPORTERS POLITICAL ECONOMY DEMAND ELASTICITIES AGRICULTURAL INTERESTS REVENUES WELFARE FUNCTION TARIFF CONCESSIONS ECONOMIC POLICY PROTECTION FOR SALE MARKET ACCESS OPPORTUNITIES PRICE HIGH TARIFFS MARKET ACCESS BENEFICIARIES INTERNATIONAL BANK TRADE EXPANSION DEVELOPING COUNTRY BORDER MEASURES AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION AGRICULTURAL TARIFF LACK OF TRANSPARENCY AGRICULTURAL MARKETS REDUCTION IN TARIFFS AVERAGE TARIFFS PRODUCTS TRADING FREE ACCESS OPTIONS TARIFF REVENUES DEMAND CURVES COMMERCIAL POLICY MARKETS TARIFF REDUCTIONS WORLD PRICES CUTTING ACCESS INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS WELFARE GAINS IMPORTS RATE QUOTAS TRADE POLICY PRODUCT MARKET ACCESS NEGOTIATIONS MULTILATERAL REFORMS VOLUME PRICE CHANGE EXPENDITURE APPLIED TARIFF TRADE VOLUME MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS GOOD AGRICULTURAL TARIFFS TRANSPARENCY TARIFF STRUCTURE VALUE CONCESSIONS TRADE ORGANIZATION DEMAND TRADE PROTECTION PRICE EFFECTS TRADE REFORM AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AGRICULTURE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY SALE MARKET TRADE LIBERALIZATION AGRICULTURAL MARKET COTTON MARKET ACCESS CONCESSIONS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS INTERESTS TRADE GOODS TARIFF ESCALATION GLOBAL TRADE AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS TARIFF STRUCTURE HOUSEHOLDS SHARE IMPORT VOLUMES INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT TARIFF REVENUE SINGLE TARIFF EXPORT WORLD TRADE COMMODITIES TARIFF RATE INSTRUMENT AGRICULTURAL AGREEMENT MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS TRADING PARTNERS AGRICULTURAL TRADE GUARANTEE PRICES This paper views tariff-cutting formulas as a potential solution to the free-rider problem that arises when market opening is negotiated bilaterally and extended on a most-favored-nation basis. The negotiators in the Doha Agenda chose formulas that are ideal from an economic efficiency viewpoint in that they most sharply reduce the highest and most economically-costly tariffs. When the political support that gave rise to the original tariffs is considered, however, this approach appears to generate very high political costs per unit of gain in economic efficiency. The political costs associated with the formulas appear to have led to strong pressure for many, complex exceptions, which both lowered and increased uncertainty about members’ market access gains. Where tariff cuts focus on applied rates, it seems likely that a proportional cut rule would reduce the political costs of securing agreements. However, detailed examination of the Doha proposals with their product exceptions suggests that negotiators are likely to find cuts with exceptions politically attractive but economically costly when cuts are based on bound tariffs with different degrees of binding overhang. 2015-07-16T15:27:59Z 2015-07-16T15:27:59Z 2015-06 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/06/24619553/formulas-failure-doha-tariff-formulas-too-ambitious-success http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22176 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7303 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	TARIFFS TRADE VOLUMES MULTILATERAL TRADE POLITICAL-SUPPORT TARIFF RATES WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION TRADE NEGOTIATIONS BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS INTEREST TARIFF NEGOTIATION ECONOMIC WELFARE AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS TRADE BARRIERS EXCHANGE OPTION TARIFF CHANGES EXPORTS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES EXPORTERS POLITICAL ECONOMY DEMAND ELASTICITIES AGRICULTURAL INTERESTS REVENUES WELFARE FUNCTION TARIFF CONCESSIONS ECONOMIC POLICY PROTECTION FOR SALE MARKET ACCESS OPPORTUNITIES PRICE HIGH TARIFFS MARKET ACCESS BENEFICIARIES INTERNATIONAL BANK TRADE EXPANSION DEVELOPING COUNTRY BORDER MEASURES AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION AGRICULTURAL TARIFF LACK OF TRANSPARENCY AGRICULTURAL MARKETS REDUCTION IN TARIFFS AVERAGE TARIFFS PRODUCTS TRADING FREE ACCESS OPTIONS TARIFF REVENUES DEMAND CURVES COMMERCIAL POLICY MARKETS TARIFF REDUCTIONS WORLD PRICES CUTTING ACCESS INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS WELFARE GAINS IMPORTS RATE QUOTAS TRADE POLICY PRODUCT MARKET ACCESS NEGOTIATIONS MULTILATERAL REFORMS VOLUME PRICE CHANGE EXPENDITURE APPLIED TARIFF TRADE VOLUME MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS GOOD AGRICULTURAL TARIFFS TRANSPARENCY TARIFF STRUCTURE VALUE CONCESSIONS TRADE ORGANIZATION DEMAND TRADE PROTECTION PRICE EFFECTS TRADE REFORM AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AGRICULTURE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY SALE MARKET TRADE LIBERALIZATION AGRICULTURAL MARKET COTTON MARKET ACCESS CONCESSIONS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS INTERESTS TRADE GOODS TARIFF ESCALATION GLOBAL TRADE AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS TARIFF STRUCTURE HOUSEHOLDS SHARE IMPORT VOLUMES INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT TARIFF REVENUE SINGLE TARIFF EXPORT WORLD TRADE COMMODITIES TARIFF RATE INSTRUMENT AGRICULTURAL AGREEMENT MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS TRADING PARTNERS AGRICULTURAL TRADE GUARANTEE PRICES
spellingShingle	TARIFFS TRADE VOLUMES MULTILATERAL TRADE POLITICAL-SUPPORT TARIFF RATES WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION TRADE NEGOTIATIONS BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS INTEREST TARIFF NEGOTIATION ECONOMIC WELFARE AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS TRADE BARRIERS EXCHANGE OPTION TARIFF CHANGES EXPORTS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES EXPORTERS POLITICAL ECONOMY DEMAND ELASTICITIES AGRICULTURAL INTERESTS REVENUES WELFARE FUNCTION TARIFF CONCESSIONS ECONOMIC POLICY PROTECTION FOR SALE MARKET ACCESS OPPORTUNITIES PRICE HIGH TARIFFS MARKET ACCESS BENEFICIARIES INTERNATIONAL BANK TRADE EXPANSION DEVELOPING COUNTRY BORDER MEASURES AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION AGRICULTURAL TARIFF LACK OF TRANSPARENCY AGRICULTURAL MARKETS REDUCTION IN TARIFFS AVERAGE TARIFFS PRODUCTS TRADING FREE ACCESS OPTIONS TARIFF REVENUES DEMAND CURVES COMMERCIAL POLICY MARKETS TARIFF REDUCTIONS WORLD PRICES CUTTING ACCESS INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS WELFARE GAINS IMPORTS RATE QUOTAS TRADE POLICY PRODUCT MARKET ACCESS NEGOTIATIONS MULTILATERAL REFORMS VOLUME PRICE CHANGE EXPENDITURE APPLIED TARIFF TRADE VOLUME MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS GOOD AGRICULTURAL TARIFFS TRANSPARENCY TARIFF STRUCTURE VALUE CONCESSIONS TRADE ORGANIZATION DEMAND TRADE PROTECTION PRICE EFFECTS TRADE REFORM AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AGRICULTURE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY SALE MARKET TRADE LIBERALIZATION AGRICULTURAL MARKET COTTON MARKET ACCESS CONCESSIONS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS INTERESTS TRADE GOODS TARIFF ESCALATION GLOBAL TRADE AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS TARIFF STRUCTURE HOUSEHOLDS SHARE IMPORT VOLUMES INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT TARIFF REVENUE SINGLE TARIFF EXPORT WORLD TRADE COMMODITIES TARIFF RATE INSTRUMENT AGRICULTURAL AGREEMENT MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS TRADING PARTNERS AGRICULTURAL TRADE GUARANTEE PRICES Laborde, David Martin, Will Formulas for Failure? : Were the Doha Tariff Formulas Too Ambitious for Success?
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7303
description	This paper views tariff-cutting formulas as a potential solution to the free-rider problem that arises when market opening is negotiated bilaterally and extended on a most-favored-nation basis. The negotiators in the Doha Agenda chose formulas that are ideal from an economic efficiency viewpoint in that they most sharply reduce the highest and most economically-costly tariffs. When the political support that gave rise to the original tariffs is considered, however, this approach appears to generate very high political costs per unit of gain in economic efficiency. The political costs associated with the formulas appear to have led to strong pressure for many, complex exceptions, which both lowered and increased uncertainty about members’ market access gains. Where tariff cuts focus on applied rates, it seems likely that a proportional cut rule would reduce the political costs of securing agreements. However, detailed examination of the Doha proposals with their product exceptions suggests that negotiators are likely to find cuts with exceptions politically attractive but economically costly when cuts are based on bound tariffs with different degrees of binding overhang.
format	Working Paper
author	Laborde, David Martin, Will
author_facet	Laborde, David Martin, Will
author_sort	Laborde, David
title	Formulas for Failure? : Were the Doha Tariff Formulas Too Ambitious for Success?
title_short	Formulas for Failure? : Were the Doha Tariff Formulas Too Ambitious for Success?
title_full	Formulas for Failure? : Were the Doha Tariff Formulas Too Ambitious for Success?
title_fullStr	Formulas for Failure? : Were the Doha Tariff Formulas Too Ambitious for Success?
title_full_unstemmed	Formulas for Failure? : Were the Doha Tariff Formulas Too Ambitious for Success?
title_sort	formulas for failure? : were the doha tariff formulas too ambitious for success?
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2015
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/06/24619553/formulas-failure-doha-tariff-formulas-too-ambitious-success http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22176
_version_	1764450356062846976

Formulas for Failure? : Were the Doha Tariff Formulas Too Ambitious for Success?

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