The Buenos Aires Water Concession
The signing of a concession contract for the Buenos Aires water and sanitation system in December 1992, attracted worldwide attention, and caused considerable controversy in Argentina. It was one of the worlds largest concessions, but the case was...
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2015
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/04/437846/buenos-aires-water-concession http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21922 |
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okr-10986-219222021-04-23T14:04:06Z The Buenos Aires Water Concession Alcázar, Lorena Abdala, Manuel A. Shirley, Mary M. CONCESSION AGREEMENT CONCESSION AREA CONCESSION CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION CONSUMER SURPLUS CONTAMINATION OF GROUNDWATER COST OF WATER CPI CREEKS CUBIC METER CUBIC METER OF WATER DEBT DECISION MAKING DEFICIT SPENDING DISCHARGE DIVIDENDS DOWNSTREAM USERS DRINKING WATER ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POLICIES EFFLUENT EMPLOYMENT EXCHANGE RATE EXTERNAL COSTS EXTERNALITIES GAS GROUNDWATER HEALTH PROBLEMS HOUSEHOLDS INCOME INFLATION INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES LITERS PER CAPITA PER DAY MAINTENANCE COSTS MARGINAL COST MUNICIPAL SYSTEM MUNICIPALITIES NATURAL WATER RESOURCES NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS NUMBER OF CONNECTIONS OIL PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS PERVERSE INCENTIVES PIPED WATER POLITICAL ECONOMY POLLUTION POOR WATER QUALITY POPULATION GROWTH POPULATION GROWTH RATE POTENTIAL INVESTORS PRIVATE PARTICIPATION PRODUCTIVITY PROFIT MARGIN PROGRAMS PROVINCIAL WATER PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC TRUST PUBLIC WORKS RAW WATER REGULATORY FRAMEWORK RIVERS SANITATION COVERAGE SCARCE WATER SEPTIC TANKS SEWERAGE SERVICES SEWERAGE SYSTEM TRANSPARENCY UNEMPLOYMENT URBAN WATER URBAN WATER SUPPLY WAGES WATER COMPANIES WATER COMPANY WATER CONNECTIONS WATER CONSUMPTION WATER COVERAGE WATER NEEDS WATER PRICES WATER PRODUCTION WATER RESOURCES WATER SECTOR WATER SECTOR REFORM WATER SHORTAGES WATER SUPPLIES WATER SYSTEM WATER SYSTEMS WATER TARIFF WATER TARIFFS WATER USAGE WATER UTILITY WELLS The signing of a concession contract for the Buenos Aires water and sanitation system in December 1992, attracted worldwide attention, and caused considerable controversy in Argentina. It was one of the worlds largest concessions, but the case was also interesting for other reasons. The concession was implemented rapidly, in contrast with slow implementation of privatization in Santiago, for example. And reform generated major improvements in the sector, including wider coverage, better service, more efficient company operations, and reduced waste. Moreover, the winning bid brought an immediate 26.9 percent reduction in water system tariffs. Consumers benefited from the systems expansion and from the immediate drop in real prices, which was only partly reversed by subsequent changes in tariffs, and access charges. And these improvements would probably not have occurred under public administration of the system. Still, the authors show information asymmetries, perverse incentives, and weak regulatory institutions could threaten the concessions sustainability. Opportunities for the company to act opportunistically - and the regulator, arbitrarily - exist, because of politicized regulation, a poor information base, serious flaws in the concession contract, a lumpy and ad hoc tariff system, and a general lack of transparency in the regulatory process. Because of these circumstances, public confidence in the process has eroded. The Buenos Aires concession shows how important transparent, rule-based decision-making is to maintain public trust in regulated infrastructure. 2015-05-20T15:28:20Z 2015-05-20T15:28:20Z 2000-04-30 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/04/437846/buenos-aires-water-concession http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21922 English en_US Policy Research Working Papers;No. 2311 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Latin America & Caribbean Argentina |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English en_US |
topic |
CONCESSION AGREEMENT CONCESSION AREA CONCESSION CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION CONSUMER SURPLUS CONTAMINATION OF GROUNDWATER COST OF WATER CPI CREEKS CUBIC METER CUBIC METER OF WATER DEBT DECISION MAKING DEFICIT SPENDING DISCHARGE DIVIDENDS DOWNSTREAM USERS DRINKING WATER ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POLICIES EFFLUENT EMPLOYMENT EXCHANGE RATE EXTERNAL COSTS EXTERNALITIES GAS GROUNDWATER HEALTH PROBLEMS HOUSEHOLDS INCOME INFLATION INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES LITERS PER CAPITA PER DAY MAINTENANCE COSTS MARGINAL COST MUNICIPAL SYSTEM MUNICIPALITIES NATURAL WATER RESOURCES NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS NUMBER OF CONNECTIONS OIL PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS PERVERSE INCENTIVES PIPED WATER POLITICAL ECONOMY POLLUTION POOR WATER QUALITY POPULATION GROWTH POPULATION GROWTH RATE POTENTIAL INVESTORS PRIVATE PARTICIPATION PRODUCTIVITY PROFIT MARGIN PROGRAMS PROVINCIAL WATER PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC TRUST PUBLIC WORKS RAW WATER REGULATORY FRAMEWORK RIVERS SANITATION COVERAGE SCARCE WATER SEPTIC TANKS SEWERAGE SERVICES SEWERAGE SYSTEM TRANSPARENCY UNEMPLOYMENT URBAN WATER URBAN WATER SUPPLY WAGES WATER COMPANIES WATER COMPANY WATER CONNECTIONS WATER CONSUMPTION WATER COVERAGE WATER NEEDS WATER PRICES WATER PRODUCTION WATER RESOURCES WATER SECTOR WATER SECTOR REFORM WATER SHORTAGES WATER SUPPLIES WATER SYSTEM WATER SYSTEMS WATER TARIFF WATER TARIFFS WATER USAGE WATER UTILITY WELLS |
spellingShingle |
CONCESSION AGREEMENT CONCESSION AREA CONCESSION CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION CONSUMER SURPLUS CONTAMINATION OF GROUNDWATER COST OF WATER CPI CREEKS CUBIC METER CUBIC METER OF WATER DEBT DECISION MAKING DEFICIT SPENDING DISCHARGE DIVIDENDS DOWNSTREAM USERS DRINKING WATER ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POLICIES EFFLUENT EMPLOYMENT EXCHANGE RATE EXTERNAL COSTS EXTERNALITIES GAS GROUNDWATER HEALTH PROBLEMS HOUSEHOLDS INCOME INFLATION INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES LITERS PER CAPITA PER DAY MAINTENANCE COSTS MARGINAL COST MUNICIPAL SYSTEM MUNICIPALITIES NATURAL WATER RESOURCES NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS NUMBER OF CONNECTIONS OIL PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS PERVERSE INCENTIVES PIPED WATER POLITICAL ECONOMY POLLUTION POOR WATER QUALITY POPULATION GROWTH POPULATION GROWTH RATE POTENTIAL INVESTORS PRIVATE PARTICIPATION PRODUCTIVITY PROFIT MARGIN PROGRAMS PROVINCIAL WATER PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC TRUST PUBLIC WORKS RAW WATER REGULATORY FRAMEWORK RIVERS SANITATION COVERAGE SCARCE WATER SEPTIC TANKS SEWERAGE SERVICES SEWERAGE SYSTEM TRANSPARENCY UNEMPLOYMENT URBAN WATER URBAN WATER SUPPLY WAGES WATER COMPANIES WATER COMPANY WATER CONNECTIONS WATER CONSUMPTION WATER COVERAGE WATER NEEDS WATER PRICES WATER PRODUCTION WATER RESOURCES WATER SECTOR WATER SECTOR REFORM WATER SHORTAGES WATER SUPPLIES WATER SYSTEM WATER SYSTEMS WATER TARIFF WATER TARIFFS WATER USAGE WATER UTILITY WELLS Alcázar, Lorena Abdala, Manuel A. Shirley, Mary M. The Buenos Aires Water Concession |
geographic_facet |
Latin America & Caribbean Argentina |
relation |
Policy Research Working Papers;No. 2311 |
description |
The signing of a concession contract for
the Buenos Aires water and sanitation system in December
1992, attracted worldwide attention, and caused considerable
controversy in Argentina. It was one of the worlds largest
concessions, but the case was also interesting for other
reasons. The concession was implemented rapidly, in contrast
with slow implementation of privatization in Santiago, for
example. And reform generated major improvements in the
sector, including wider coverage, better service, more
efficient company operations, and reduced waste. Moreover,
the winning bid brought an immediate 26.9 percent reduction
in water system tariffs. Consumers benefited from the
systems expansion and from the immediate drop in real
prices, which was only partly reversed by subsequent changes
in tariffs, and access charges. And these improvements would
probably not have occurred under public administration of
the system. Still, the authors show information asymmetries,
perverse incentives, and weak regulatory institutions could
threaten the concessions sustainability. Opportunities for
the company to act opportunistically - and the regulator,
arbitrarily - exist, because of politicized regulation, a
poor information base, serious flaws in the concession
contract, a lumpy and ad hoc tariff system, and a general
lack of transparency in the regulatory process. Because of
these circumstances, public confidence in the process has
eroded. The Buenos Aires concession shows how important
transparent, rule-based decision-making is to maintain
public trust in regulated infrastructure. |
format |
Working Paper |
author |
Alcázar, Lorena Abdala, Manuel A. Shirley, Mary M. |
author_facet |
Alcázar, Lorena Abdala, Manuel A. Shirley, Mary M. |
author_sort |
Alcázar, Lorena |
title |
The Buenos Aires Water Concession |
title_short |
The Buenos Aires Water Concession |
title_full |
The Buenos Aires Water Concession |
title_fullStr |
The Buenos Aires Water Concession |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Buenos Aires Water Concession |
title_sort |
buenos aires water concession |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2015 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/04/437846/buenos-aires-water-concession http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21922 |
_version_ |
1764449798648233984 |