The Buenos Aires Water Concession

The signing of a concession contract for the Buenos Aires water and sanitation system in December 1992, attracted worldwide attention, and caused considerable controversy in Argentina. It was one of the worlds largest concessions, but the case was...

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Main Authors: Alcázar, Lorena, Abdala, Manuel A., Shirley, Mary M.
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2015
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/04/437846/buenos-aires-water-concession
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21922
id okr-10986-21922
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-219222021-04-23T14:04:06Z The Buenos Aires Water Concession Alcázar, Lorena Abdala, Manuel A. Shirley, Mary M. CONCESSION AGREEMENT CONCESSION AREA CONCESSION CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION CONSUMER SURPLUS CONTAMINATION OF GROUNDWATER COST OF WATER CPI CREEKS CUBIC METER CUBIC METER OF WATER DEBT DECISION MAKING DEFICIT SPENDING DISCHARGE DIVIDENDS DOWNSTREAM USERS DRINKING WATER ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POLICIES EFFLUENT EMPLOYMENT EXCHANGE RATE EXTERNAL COSTS EXTERNALITIES GAS GROUNDWATER HEALTH PROBLEMS HOUSEHOLDS INCOME INFLATION INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES LITERS PER CAPITA PER DAY MAINTENANCE COSTS MARGINAL COST MUNICIPAL SYSTEM MUNICIPALITIES NATURAL WATER RESOURCES NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS NUMBER OF CONNECTIONS OIL PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS PERVERSE INCENTIVES PIPED WATER POLITICAL ECONOMY POLLUTION POOR WATER QUALITY POPULATION GROWTH POPULATION GROWTH RATE POTENTIAL INVESTORS PRIVATE PARTICIPATION PRODUCTIVITY PROFIT MARGIN PROGRAMS PROVINCIAL WATER PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC TRUST PUBLIC WORKS RAW WATER REGULATORY FRAMEWORK RIVERS SANITATION COVERAGE SCARCE WATER SEPTIC TANKS SEWERAGE SERVICES SEWERAGE SYSTEM TRANSPARENCY UNEMPLOYMENT URBAN WATER URBAN WATER SUPPLY WAGES WATER COMPANIES WATER COMPANY WATER CONNECTIONS WATER CONSUMPTION WATER COVERAGE WATER NEEDS WATER PRICES WATER PRODUCTION WATER RESOURCES WATER SECTOR WATER SECTOR REFORM WATER SHORTAGES WATER SUPPLIES WATER SYSTEM WATER SYSTEMS WATER TARIFF WATER TARIFFS WATER USAGE WATER UTILITY WELLS The signing of a concession contract for the Buenos Aires water and sanitation system in December 1992, attracted worldwide attention, and caused considerable controversy in Argentina. It was one of the worlds largest concessions, but the case was also interesting for other reasons. The concession was implemented rapidly, in contrast with slow implementation of privatization in Santiago, for example. And reform generated major improvements in the sector, including wider coverage, better service, more efficient company operations, and reduced waste. Moreover, the winning bid brought an immediate 26.9 percent reduction in water system tariffs. Consumers benefited from the systems expansion and from the immediate drop in real prices, which was only partly reversed by subsequent changes in tariffs, and access charges. And these improvements would probably not have occurred under public administration of the system. Still, the authors show information asymmetries, perverse incentives, and weak regulatory institutions could threaten the concessions sustainability. Opportunities for the company to act opportunistically - and the regulator, arbitrarily - exist, because of politicized regulation, a poor information base, serious flaws in the concession contract, a lumpy and ad hoc tariff system, and a general lack of transparency in the regulatory process. Because of these circumstances, public confidence in the process has eroded. The Buenos Aires concession shows how important transparent, rule-based decision-making is to maintain public trust in regulated infrastructure. 2015-05-20T15:28:20Z 2015-05-20T15:28:20Z 2000-04-30 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/04/437846/buenos-aires-water-concession http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21922 English en_US Policy Research Working Papers;No. 2311 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Latin America & Caribbean Argentina
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic CONCESSION AGREEMENT
CONCESSION AREA
CONCESSION CONTRACT
CONSTRUCTION
CONSUMER SURPLUS
CONTAMINATION OF GROUNDWATER
COST OF WATER
CPI
CREEKS
CUBIC METER
CUBIC METER OF WATER
DEBT
DECISION MAKING
DEFICIT SPENDING
DISCHARGE
DIVIDENDS
DOWNSTREAM USERS
DRINKING WATER
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC POLICIES
EFFLUENT
EMPLOYMENT
EXCHANGE RATE
EXTERNAL COSTS
EXTERNALITIES
GAS
GROUNDWATER
HEALTH PROBLEMS
HOUSEHOLDS
INCOME
INFLATION
INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES
LITERS PER CAPITA PER DAY
MAINTENANCE COSTS
MARGINAL COST
MUNICIPAL SYSTEM
MUNICIPALITIES
NATURAL WATER RESOURCES
NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS
NUMBER OF CONNECTIONS
OIL
PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS
PERVERSE INCENTIVES
PIPED WATER
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLLUTION
POOR WATER QUALITY
POPULATION GROWTH
POPULATION GROWTH RATE
POTENTIAL INVESTORS
PRIVATE PARTICIPATION
PRODUCTIVITY
PROFIT MARGIN
PROGRAMS
PROVINCIAL WATER
PUBLIC HEALTH
PUBLIC TRUST
PUBLIC WORKS
RAW WATER
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
RIVERS
SANITATION COVERAGE
SCARCE WATER
SEPTIC TANKS
SEWERAGE SERVICES
SEWERAGE SYSTEM
TRANSPARENCY
UNEMPLOYMENT
URBAN WATER
URBAN WATER SUPPLY
WAGES
WATER COMPANIES
WATER COMPANY
WATER CONNECTIONS
WATER CONSUMPTION
WATER COVERAGE
WATER NEEDS
WATER PRICES
WATER PRODUCTION
WATER RESOURCES
WATER SECTOR
WATER SECTOR REFORM
WATER SHORTAGES
WATER SUPPLIES
WATER SYSTEM
WATER SYSTEMS
WATER TARIFF
WATER TARIFFS
WATER USAGE
WATER UTILITY
WELLS
spellingShingle CONCESSION AGREEMENT
CONCESSION AREA
CONCESSION CONTRACT
CONSTRUCTION
CONSUMER SURPLUS
CONTAMINATION OF GROUNDWATER
COST OF WATER
CPI
CREEKS
CUBIC METER
CUBIC METER OF WATER
DEBT
DECISION MAKING
DEFICIT SPENDING
DISCHARGE
DIVIDENDS
DOWNSTREAM USERS
DRINKING WATER
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC POLICIES
EFFLUENT
EMPLOYMENT
EXCHANGE RATE
EXTERNAL COSTS
EXTERNALITIES
GAS
GROUNDWATER
HEALTH PROBLEMS
HOUSEHOLDS
INCOME
INFLATION
INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES
LITERS PER CAPITA PER DAY
MAINTENANCE COSTS
MARGINAL COST
MUNICIPAL SYSTEM
MUNICIPALITIES
NATURAL WATER RESOURCES
NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS
NUMBER OF CONNECTIONS
OIL
PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS
PERVERSE INCENTIVES
PIPED WATER
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLLUTION
POOR WATER QUALITY
POPULATION GROWTH
POPULATION GROWTH RATE
POTENTIAL INVESTORS
PRIVATE PARTICIPATION
PRODUCTIVITY
PROFIT MARGIN
PROGRAMS
PROVINCIAL WATER
PUBLIC HEALTH
PUBLIC TRUST
PUBLIC WORKS
RAW WATER
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
RIVERS
SANITATION COVERAGE
SCARCE WATER
SEPTIC TANKS
SEWERAGE SERVICES
SEWERAGE SYSTEM
TRANSPARENCY
UNEMPLOYMENT
URBAN WATER
URBAN WATER SUPPLY
WAGES
WATER COMPANIES
WATER COMPANY
WATER CONNECTIONS
WATER CONSUMPTION
WATER COVERAGE
WATER NEEDS
WATER PRICES
WATER PRODUCTION
WATER RESOURCES
WATER SECTOR
WATER SECTOR REFORM
WATER SHORTAGES
WATER SUPPLIES
WATER SYSTEM
WATER SYSTEMS
WATER TARIFF
WATER TARIFFS
WATER USAGE
WATER UTILITY
WELLS
Alcázar, Lorena
Abdala, Manuel A.
Shirley, Mary M.
The Buenos Aires Water Concession
geographic_facet Latin America & Caribbean
Argentina
relation Policy Research Working Papers;No. 2311
description The signing of a concession contract for the Buenos Aires water and sanitation system in December 1992, attracted worldwide attention, and caused considerable controversy in Argentina. It was one of the worlds largest concessions, but the case was also interesting for other reasons. The concession was implemented rapidly, in contrast with slow implementation of privatization in Santiago, for example. And reform generated major improvements in the sector, including wider coverage, better service, more efficient company operations, and reduced waste. Moreover, the winning bid brought an immediate 26.9 percent reduction in water system tariffs. Consumers benefited from the systems expansion and from the immediate drop in real prices, which was only partly reversed by subsequent changes in tariffs, and access charges. And these improvements would probably not have occurred under public administration of the system. Still, the authors show information asymmetries, perverse incentives, and weak regulatory institutions could threaten the concessions sustainability. Opportunities for the company to act opportunistically - and the regulator, arbitrarily - exist, because of politicized regulation, a poor information base, serious flaws in the concession contract, a lumpy and ad hoc tariff system, and a general lack of transparency in the regulatory process. Because of these circumstances, public confidence in the process has eroded. The Buenos Aires concession shows how important transparent, rule-based decision-making is to maintain public trust in regulated infrastructure.
format Working Paper
author Alcázar, Lorena
Abdala, Manuel A.
Shirley, Mary M.
author_facet Alcázar, Lorena
Abdala, Manuel A.
Shirley, Mary M.
author_sort Alcázar, Lorena
title The Buenos Aires Water Concession
title_short The Buenos Aires Water Concession
title_full The Buenos Aires Water Concession
title_fullStr The Buenos Aires Water Concession
title_full_unstemmed The Buenos Aires Water Concession
title_sort buenos aires water concession
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2015
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/04/437846/buenos-aires-water-concession
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21922
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