A New Model for Market-Based Regulation of Subnational Borrowing : The Mexican Approach

A New Model for Market-Based Regulation of Subnational Borrowing : The Mexican Approach

Faced with weak sub-national finances that pose a risk to macroeconomic stability, Mexico's federal government in April 2000 established an innovative incentive framework to bring fiscal discipline to state and municipal governments. That framework is based on two pillars: an explicit renunciat...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Giugale, Marcelo, Korobow, Adam, Webb, Steven
Format: Publications & Research
Language:en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2015
Subjects:
accounting
bank capital
bank lending
bank loans
banking supervision
banking system
bankruptcy
bankruptcy laws
banks
borrowing
business cycles
capital formation
collateralization
commercial banks
competitive markets
contingent liabilities
cost of capital
credit markets
credit ratings
current expenditures
debt
Decentralization
demand curve
demand elasticity
deposits
development banks
disposable income
equilibrium
expected value
externalities
externality
financial markets
financial performance
foreign exchange
GDP
gross revenue
Inelastic Demand
institutional development
interest rate
interest rate effect
interest rates
macroeconomic stability
mandates
marginal cost
marginal revenue
market forces
moral hazard
municipal governments
municipalities
negative externalities
oil
opportunity cost
profit maximization
public debt
public good
public services
rating agencies
regulatory framework
regulatory regimes
return on equity
revenue sharing
risk assessments
risk of default
subnational finances
subnational governments
technical assistance
transparency
voters
zero elasticity
risk management
incentives
local officials
federal funds markets
creditworthiness
institutional framework
credibility
capital adequacy
default rates
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21456

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