Safety Nets and Safety Ropes : Who Benefited from Two Indonesian Crisis Programs—The "Poor" or the "Shocked"?

Imagine several mountain climbers, scaling a cliff face, who want protection from falling. One way to protect them would be to place a net at the bottom of the cliff to catch any climber just before he hits the ground. Another would be to provide a rope, and a set of movable devices that can be atta...

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Main Authors: Sumarto, Sudarno, Suryahadi, Asep, Pritchett, Lant
Format: Publications & Research
Language:en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2015
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21354
id okr-10986-21354
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-213542021-04-23T14:04:01Z Safety Nets and Safety Ropes : Who Benefited from Two Indonesian Crisis Programs—The "Poor" or the "Shocked"? Sumarto, Sudarno Suryahadi, Asep Pritchett, Lant adverse selection beneficiaries cities communities consumption expenditures CPI districts economic activity economics economists employment expenditures forestry geographic targeting health care health care services households income infrastructure projects living standards moral hazard participation rates policy research political economy poverty rates PRA programs purchasing power risk aversion rural areas rural economy safety safety nets savings self-help social development social insurance social monitoring social services social welfare targeting unemployment urban areas utility functions villages wages welfare function safety net policies guarantees poverty incidence poverty line risk management social protection systems social insurance programs household expenditure surveys economic shocks expenditure patterns financial crises performance indicators social impact subsidies consumption statistics job creation Imagine several mountain climbers, scaling a cliff face, who want protection from falling. One way to protect them would be to place a net at the bottom of the cliff to catch any climber just before he hits the ground. Another would be to provide a rope, and a set of movable devices that can be attached to the cliff; as the climbers scale the cliff, they attach the rope at higher levels, so that if a climber falls, he falls only by the length of the rope. In this paper, the :safety net" guarantees against a fall past an absolute level; the "safety rope" guarantees against a fall of more than a given distance. The safety net is concerned with an increase in poverty; the safety rope mitigates risk through social insurance, or social protection. Calculations of the benefit incidence, and targeting effectiveness of safety net programs, typically examine only the relationship between a household's current expenditures, and program participation. But in programs that respond to an economic shock, or intend to mitigate household risk, it is not only the current level of expenditures that matters, but also changes in expenditures. Safety net programs may intend to benefit only the currently poor; programs to mitigate shocks ("safety rope" programs) may intend to provide transfers to those whose incomes have fallen, even if they have not fallen below an absolute poverty threshold. The authors examine the targeting performance of tow programs, created to respond to the social impacts of Indonesia's crisis. They find strong evidence that one program, subsidized sales of rice targeted to the permanently poor, was only weakly related to the shock in consumption spending. A job creation program was much more responsive to changes in spending. A Household that started in the third quintile in expenditures in 1997, and fell to the lowest quintile between 1997, and 1998, was four times as likely to have participated in the job creation program as a household starting in the third quintile in 1997, but experiencing a positive shock. But the household experiencing a negative shock, was only fifty percent more likely to have received subsidized rice, than a household experiencing a positive shock. 2015-01-28T16:12:55Z 2015-01-28T16:12:55Z 2000-09 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21354 en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2436 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper East Asia and Pacific Asia Southeast Asia World Indonesia
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language en_US
topic adverse selection
beneficiaries
cities
communities
consumption expenditures
CPI
districts
economic activity
economics
economists
employment
expenditures
forestry
geographic targeting
health care
health care services
households
income
infrastructure projects
living standards
moral hazard
participation rates
policy research
political economy
poverty rates
PRA
programs
purchasing power
risk aversion
rural areas
rural economy
safety
safety nets
savings
self-help
social development
social insurance
social monitoring
social services
social welfare
targeting
unemployment
urban areas
utility functions
villages
wages
welfare function
safety net policies
guarantees
poverty incidence
poverty line
risk management
social protection systems
social insurance programs
household expenditure surveys
economic shocks
expenditure patterns
financial crises
performance indicators
social impact
subsidies
consumption statistics
job creation
spellingShingle adverse selection
beneficiaries
cities
communities
consumption expenditures
CPI
districts
economic activity
economics
economists
employment
expenditures
forestry
geographic targeting
health care
health care services
households
income
infrastructure projects
living standards
moral hazard
participation rates
policy research
political economy
poverty rates
PRA
programs
purchasing power
risk aversion
rural areas
rural economy
safety
safety nets
savings
self-help
social development
social insurance
social monitoring
social services
social welfare
targeting
unemployment
urban areas
utility functions
villages
wages
welfare function
safety net policies
guarantees
poverty incidence
poverty line
risk management
social protection systems
social insurance programs
household expenditure surveys
economic shocks
expenditure patterns
financial crises
performance indicators
social impact
subsidies
consumption statistics
job creation
Sumarto, Sudarno
Suryahadi, Asep
Pritchett, Lant
Safety Nets and Safety Ropes : Who Benefited from Two Indonesian Crisis Programs—The "Poor" or the "Shocked"?
geographic_facet East Asia and Pacific
Asia
Southeast Asia
World
Indonesia
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2436
description Imagine several mountain climbers, scaling a cliff face, who want protection from falling. One way to protect them would be to place a net at the bottom of the cliff to catch any climber just before he hits the ground. Another would be to provide a rope, and a set of movable devices that can be attached to the cliff; as the climbers scale the cliff, they attach the rope at higher levels, so that if a climber falls, he falls only by the length of the rope. In this paper, the :safety net" guarantees against a fall past an absolute level; the "safety rope" guarantees against a fall of more than a given distance. The safety net is concerned with an increase in poverty; the safety rope mitigates risk through social insurance, or social protection. Calculations of the benefit incidence, and targeting effectiveness of safety net programs, typically examine only the relationship between a household's current expenditures, and program participation. But in programs that respond to an economic shock, or intend to mitigate household risk, it is not only the current level of expenditures that matters, but also changes in expenditures. Safety net programs may intend to benefit only the currently poor; programs to mitigate shocks ("safety rope" programs) may intend to provide transfers to those whose incomes have fallen, even if they have not fallen below an absolute poverty threshold. The authors examine the targeting performance of tow programs, created to respond to the social impacts of Indonesia's crisis. They find strong evidence that one program, subsidized sales of rice targeted to the permanently poor, was only weakly related to the shock in consumption spending. A job creation program was much more responsive to changes in spending. A Household that started in the third quintile in expenditures in 1997, and fell to the lowest quintile between 1997, and 1998, was four times as likely to have participated in the job creation program as a household starting in the third quintile in 1997, but experiencing a positive shock. But the household experiencing a negative shock, was only fifty percent more likely to have received subsidized rice, than a household experiencing a positive shock.
format Publications & Research
author Sumarto, Sudarno
Suryahadi, Asep
Pritchett, Lant
author_facet Sumarto, Sudarno
Suryahadi, Asep
Pritchett, Lant
author_sort Sumarto, Sudarno
title Safety Nets and Safety Ropes : Who Benefited from Two Indonesian Crisis Programs—The "Poor" or the "Shocked"?
title_short Safety Nets and Safety Ropes : Who Benefited from Two Indonesian Crisis Programs—The "Poor" or the "Shocked"?
title_full Safety Nets and Safety Ropes : Who Benefited from Two Indonesian Crisis Programs—The "Poor" or the "Shocked"?
title_fullStr Safety Nets and Safety Ropes : Who Benefited from Two Indonesian Crisis Programs—The "Poor" or the "Shocked"?
title_full_unstemmed Safety Nets and Safety Ropes : Who Benefited from Two Indonesian Crisis Programs—The "Poor" or the "Shocked"?
title_sort safety nets and safety ropes : who benefited from two indonesian crisis programs—the "poor" or the "shocked"?
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2015
url http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21354
_version_ 1764448022592225280