Public Sector Size and Performance Management : A Case Study of Post-Revolution Tunisia
This paper examines public sector size and performance management in post-revolution Tunisia, drawing on macro-empirical, legal, and qualitative analyses. The paper first shows that public sector employment figures and the wage bill have increased...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank Group, Washington, DC
2015
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/01/23179114/public-sector-size-performance-management-case-study-post-revolution-tunisia http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21145 |
| Summary: | This paper examines public sector size
and performance management in post-revolution Tunisia,
drawing on macro-empirical, legal, and qualitative analyses.
The paper first shows that public sector employment figures
and the wage bill have increased significantly since the
2011 revolution, but that this represents merely an
acceleration of the previous trend. The paper then examines
de jure and de facto performance management in
Tunisia's public sector, covering incentives through
recruitment, evaluation, compensation, and promotion. The
examination shows that Tunisia's legal framework is
well-designed for recruiting the most skilled candidates
into the public sector and promoting the most
high-performing employees. De facto, the link between an
employee's performance and evaluation, compensation,
and promotion is weak. Performance evaluation is virtually
nonexistent and promotions are automatic or awarded through
a process that emphasizes seniority over performance. This
is particularly true during the post-revolution period, in
which a number of ad-hoc arrangements multiplied divergences
between the legal basis for performance management and its
application. These ad-hoc changes allowed the state to act
as employer of last resort, significantly increasing direct
(noncompetitive) recruitment and regularizing temporary
staff. The increase in and proliferation of allowances have
added to the complexity of the compensation system. In a
qualitative review of past reform attempts, the paper
demonstrates that reformers had identified the weaknesses of
Tunisia's public sector performance system as early as
1989, but failed to achieve major change. |
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