Mongolia : The Politics of Public Investment
Why do politicians distort public investments? And given that public investments are poor, because presumably that is what is politically rational, what types of reforms are likely to be both Efficiency improving and compatible with the interests o...
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| Format: | Public Investment Review |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/01/23068831/mongolia-politics-public-investment http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21050 |
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okr-10986-210502021-04-23T14:04:00Z Mongolia : The Politics of Public Investment Hasnain, Zahid ACCOUNTING BID BIDDING BIDS BUDGETING CHECKS COLLUSION CORRUPTION CREDIBILITY DEBTS DEFICITS ENROLLMENT EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXTERNALITY GDP INCOME INEFFICIENCY INFLATION INVENTORY INVESTING INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LIABILITY PORTFOLIO PUBLIC PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC INVESTMENTS PUBLIC SECTOR RENTS REPAYMENT RETURN TAKEOVER TAX TENDERING TRANSPARENCY URBANIZATION VOTERS WAGES WEALTH Why do politicians distort public investments? And given that public investments are poor, because presumably that is what is politically rational, what types of reforms are likely to be both Efficiency improving and compatible with the interests of politicians? This chapter explores these two questions in the context of Mongolia. It argues that Mongolian members of parliament MPs have an incentive to over spend on smaller projects that bring benefits to specific geographical localities and to under spend on large infrastructure that will bring economic benefits to Mongolia on the whole. The incentive for the former is that MPs internalize the political benefits from the provision of particular, targeted benefits to specific communities. This chapter is inductive in its structure. First, the broader public expenditure patterns in Mongolia are analyzed in order to identify policy maker s priorities that are, revealed preferences. Then the public investment management system is examined in depth, identifying the main Technical and structural weaknesses in the system. Following that is an analysis of the interests of Key political actors that are served by poor investments. Given these political incentives, the final section proposes some incentive compatible reform options. 2014-12-31T16:00:39Z 2014-12-31T16:00:39Z 2014 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/01/23068831/mongolia-politics-public-investment http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21050 English en_US CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Economic & Sector Work :: Public Investment Review East Asia and Pacific Mongolia |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCOUNTING BID BIDDING BIDS BUDGETING CHECKS COLLUSION CORRUPTION CREDIBILITY DEBTS DEFICITS ENROLLMENT EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXTERNALITY GDP INCOME INEFFICIENCY INFLATION INVENTORY INVESTING INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LIABILITY PORTFOLIO PUBLIC PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC INVESTMENTS PUBLIC SECTOR RENTS REPAYMENT RETURN TAKEOVER TAX TENDERING TRANSPARENCY URBANIZATION VOTERS WAGES WEALTH |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTING BID BIDDING BIDS BUDGETING CHECKS COLLUSION CORRUPTION CREDIBILITY DEBTS DEFICITS ENROLLMENT EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXTERNALITY GDP INCOME INEFFICIENCY INFLATION INVENTORY INVESTING INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LIABILITY PORTFOLIO PUBLIC PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC INVESTMENTS PUBLIC SECTOR RENTS REPAYMENT RETURN TAKEOVER TAX TENDERING TRANSPARENCY URBANIZATION VOTERS WAGES WEALTH Hasnain, Zahid Mongolia : The Politics of Public Investment |
| geographic_facet |
East Asia and Pacific Mongolia |
| description |
Why do politicians distort public
investments? And given that public investments are poor,
because presumably that is what is politically rational,
what types of reforms are likely to be both Efficiency
improving and compatible with the interests of politicians?
This chapter explores these two questions in the context of
Mongolia. It argues that Mongolian members of parliament MPs
have an incentive to over spend on smaller projects that
bring benefits to specific geographical localities and to
under spend on large infrastructure that will bring economic
benefits to Mongolia on the whole. The incentive for the
former is that MPs internalize the political benefits from
the provision of particular, targeted benefits to specific
communities. This chapter is inductive in its structure.
First, the broader public expenditure patterns in Mongolia
are analyzed in order to identify policy maker s priorities
that are, revealed preferences. Then the public investment
management system is examined in depth, identifying the main
Technical and structural weaknesses in the system. Following
that is an analysis of the interests of Key political actors
that are served by poor investments. Given these political
incentives, the final section proposes some incentive
compatible reform options. |
| format |
Economic & Sector Work :: Public Investment Review |
| author |
Hasnain, Zahid |
| author_facet |
Hasnain, Zahid |
| author_sort |
Hasnain, Zahid |
| title |
Mongolia : The Politics of Public Investment |
| title_short |
Mongolia : The Politics of Public Investment |
| title_full |
Mongolia : The Politics of Public Investment |
| title_fullStr |
Mongolia : The Politics of Public Investment |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Mongolia : The Politics of Public Investment |
| title_sort |
mongolia : the politics of public investment |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/01/23068831/mongolia-politics-public-investment http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21050 |
| _version_ |
1764447621997395968 |