Oil and Civil Conflict : Can Public Spending Have a Mitigation Effect?
This paper explores the conditions under which public spending could minimize violent conflict related to oil wealth. Previous work suggests that oil can lead to violent conflict because it increases the value of the state as a prize or because it...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank Group, Washington, DC
2014
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/11/20366887/oil-civil-conflict-can-public-spending-mitigation-effect-oil-civil-conflict-can-public-spending-mitigation-effect http://hdl.handle.net/10986/20607 |
| Summary: | This paper explores the conditions under
which public spending could minimize violent conflict
related to oil wealth. Previous work suggests that oil can
lead to violent conflict because it increases the value of
the state as a prize or because it undermines the
state's bureaucratic penetration. Yet, little has been
said on how oil wealth could be used to prevent the onset of
violent conflict through public spending by buying off
citizens and elites, increasing state legitimacy by
providing basic services, or strengthening the military and
security apparatus. The empirical analysis (148 countries
over 1960-2009) shows that higher levels of military
spending are associated with lower risk of small- and
large-scale conflict onset in countries rich in oil and gas.
By contrast, in economies with little natural resources,
increases in military spending are associated with a higher
risk of conflict. Welfare expenditure is associated with
lower risk of small-scale conflict, irrespective of the
level of oil revenue. However, general government spending
does not appear to have any robust mitigating effects. |
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