Drivers of Corruption : A Brief Review
Corruption is motivated by the possibility of securing something of value for oneself and one s allies. The desire to secure benefits is a human trait and generally positive for development; various forms of rewards drive humans to get up in the mo...
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Washington, DC: World Bank
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/01/20307084/ http://hdl.handle.net/10986/20457 |
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okr-10986-204572021-04-23T14:03:56Z Drivers of Corruption : A Brief Review Søreide, Tina ABSENCE OF CORRUPTION ACCESS TO CREDIT ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ACTIONS ACTS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ALLOCATION OF RIGHTS ANTI-BRIBERY ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTIBRIBERY ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION CAMPAIGNS ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS ANTICORRUPTION LEGISLATION ANTICORRUPTION POLICY ANTICORRUPTION REFORM ANTICORRUPTION STRATEGIES ANTICORRUPTION STRATEGY ASSETS AUDITORS AUTHORITY BANK FINANCING BENEFICIARIES BEST PRACTICE BIDDING BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBERY CONVENTION BRIBES CAPITAL FLOWS CHEAP LOANS CIVIL SERVANT CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SOCIETY CODES COLLUSION COMPENSATION COMPETITION LAWS CONCESSIONS CONFIDENCE CONFIDENTIALITY CONTRACTUAL TERMS COPYRIGHT CORRUPT CORRUPT ACT CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX COURT COURT SYSTEM COURTS CPI CRIME CRIME CONTROL CRIMINAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE CRIMINAL LAW CRIMINALIZATION CRIMINALS CRONY CULTURAL NORMS DEMOCRACY DEPENDENT DISCRETIONARY POWER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EMBEZZLEMENT ESTATE EU EXTORTION FACILITATION PAYMENT FACILITATION PAYMENTS FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL SERVICE FINANCIAL SITUATION FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FRAUD GENERAL COUNSEL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GRAND CORRUPTION HOME IMPRISONMENT INDIRECT COSTS INEQUALITY INITIATIVE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM INVESTIGATION INVESTIGATIONS INVESTIGATORS INVESTMENT BANK JUDGMENT JURISDICTION JURISDICTIONS JUSTICE JUSTICE SYSTEM JUSTICE SYSTEMS KICKBACK KLEPTOCRACY LAW ENFORCEMENT LAWS LAWYERS LEADERSHIP LEGAL FORMS LEGAL STATUS LEGITIMACY LIABILITY LITIGATION LOBBYING MALFEASANCE MARKET FAILURE MARKET FAILURES MARKET MECHANISMS MEDIA MONEY LAUNDERING MONOPOLIES MORTGAGE MORTGAGE HOLDERS MULTINATIONAL OFFENDER OFFENSE ORGANIZED CRIME OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES PATRONAGE PENALTIES PENSION PERSONAL GAIN POLICE POLICE CORRUPTION POLICE OFFICER POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICIANS PRIORITIES PRISON PRIVATIZATION PROCUREMENT PROSECUTION PROSTITUTION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUNISHMENT QUALITY OF LAWS RECIPIENT COUNTRY REFUGEE REORGANIZATION REPRESSION RULE OF LAW SANCTION SANCTIONS SCANDAL SECRECY SERVICE DELIVERY STEALING TAX HAVENS TAX REVENUES TAXATION THEFT TRANSPARENCY VIOLATIONS WHISTLE-BLOWER WHISTLE-BLOWERS WILL WILLINGNESS TO PAY Corruption is motivated by the possibility of securing something of value for oneself and one s allies. The desire to secure benefits is a human trait and generally positive for development; various forms of rewards drive humans to get up in the morning, do a good job, and act responsibly. The discussion now turns to the opportunity to secure more benefits than are entitled to within the existing rules of the game ; specifically, the opportunity to grab at the expense of society. A decision maker has the authority to influence an outcome that matters to the briber. For steering a decision in the briber s direction, the decision maker is compensated with a bribe. The steered decision and the bribe now become assets that usually exceed what at least one of the players would have obtained without the corrupt act. The opportunity to seize assets through some form of power misuse differs across sectors, organizations, and decision-making situations. This chapter describes the circumstances in which the risk of corruption is particularly high in other words, where the drivers of corruption can be found. 2014-10-20T16:45:47Z 2014-10-20T16:45:47Z 2014-10-15 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/01/20307084/ 978-1-4648-0401-4 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/20457 English en_US World Bank Study; CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ Washington, DC: World Bank Publications & Research :: Publication |
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Digital Repository |
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Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ABSENCE OF CORRUPTION ACCESS TO CREDIT ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ACTIONS ACTS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ALLOCATION OF RIGHTS ANTI-BRIBERY ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTIBRIBERY ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION CAMPAIGNS ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS ANTICORRUPTION LEGISLATION ANTICORRUPTION POLICY ANTICORRUPTION REFORM ANTICORRUPTION STRATEGIES ANTICORRUPTION STRATEGY ASSETS AUDITORS AUTHORITY BANK FINANCING BENEFICIARIES BEST PRACTICE BIDDING BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBERY CONVENTION BRIBES CAPITAL FLOWS CHEAP LOANS CIVIL SERVANT CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SOCIETY CODES COLLUSION COMPENSATION COMPETITION LAWS CONCESSIONS CONFIDENCE CONFIDENTIALITY CONTRACTUAL TERMS COPYRIGHT CORRUPT CORRUPT ACT CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX COURT COURT SYSTEM COURTS CPI CRIME CRIME CONTROL CRIMINAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE CRIMINAL LAW CRIMINALIZATION CRIMINALS CRONY CULTURAL NORMS DEMOCRACY DEPENDENT DISCRETIONARY POWER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EMBEZZLEMENT ESTATE EU EXTORTION FACILITATION PAYMENT FACILITATION PAYMENTS FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL SERVICE FINANCIAL SITUATION FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FRAUD GENERAL COUNSEL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GRAND CORRUPTION HOME IMPRISONMENT INDIRECT COSTS INEQUALITY INITIATIVE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM INVESTIGATION INVESTIGATIONS INVESTIGATORS INVESTMENT BANK JUDGMENT JURISDICTION JURISDICTIONS JUSTICE JUSTICE SYSTEM JUSTICE SYSTEMS KICKBACK KLEPTOCRACY LAW ENFORCEMENT LAWS LAWYERS LEADERSHIP LEGAL FORMS LEGAL STATUS LEGITIMACY LIABILITY LITIGATION LOBBYING MALFEASANCE MARKET FAILURE MARKET FAILURES MARKET MECHANISMS MEDIA MONEY LAUNDERING MONOPOLIES MORTGAGE MORTGAGE HOLDERS MULTINATIONAL OFFENDER OFFENSE ORGANIZED CRIME OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES PATRONAGE PENALTIES PENSION PERSONAL GAIN POLICE POLICE CORRUPTION POLICE OFFICER POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICIANS PRIORITIES PRISON PRIVATIZATION PROCUREMENT PROSECUTION PROSTITUTION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUNISHMENT QUALITY OF LAWS RECIPIENT COUNTRY REFUGEE REORGANIZATION REPRESSION RULE OF LAW SANCTION SANCTIONS SCANDAL SECRECY SERVICE DELIVERY STEALING TAX HAVENS TAX REVENUES TAXATION THEFT TRANSPARENCY VIOLATIONS WHISTLE-BLOWER WHISTLE-BLOWERS WILL WILLINGNESS TO PAY |
| spellingShingle |
ABSENCE OF CORRUPTION ACCESS TO CREDIT ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ACTIONS ACTS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ALLOCATION OF RIGHTS ANTI-BRIBERY ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTIBRIBERY ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION CAMPAIGNS ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS ANTICORRUPTION LEGISLATION ANTICORRUPTION POLICY ANTICORRUPTION REFORM ANTICORRUPTION STRATEGIES ANTICORRUPTION STRATEGY ASSETS AUDITORS AUTHORITY BANK FINANCING BENEFICIARIES BEST PRACTICE BIDDING BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBERY CONVENTION BRIBES CAPITAL FLOWS CHEAP LOANS CIVIL SERVANT CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SOCIETY CODES COLLUSION COMPENSATION COMPETITION LAWS CONCESSIONS CONFIDENCE CONFIDENTIALITY CONTRACTUAL TERMS COPYRIGHT CORRUPT CORRUPT ACT CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX COURT COURT SYSTEM COURTS CPI CRIME CRIME CONTROL CRIMINAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE CRIMINAL LAW CRIMINALIZATION CRIMINALS CRONY CULTURAL NORMS DEMOCRACY DEPENDENT DISCRETIONARY POWER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EMBEZZLEMENT ESTATE EU EXTORTION FACILITATION PAYMENT FACILITATION PAYMENTS FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL SERVICE FINANCIAL SITUATION FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FRAUD GENERAL COUNSEL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GRAND CORRUPTION HOME IMPRISONMENT INDIRECT COSTS INEQUALITY INITIATIVE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM INVESTIGATION INVESTIGATIONS INVESTIGATORS INVESTMENT BANK JUDGMENT JURISDICTION JURISDICTIONS JUSTICE JUSTICE SYSTEM JUSTICE SYSTEMS KICKBACK KLEPTOCRACY LAW ENFORCEMENT LAWS LAWYERS LEADERSHIP LEGAL FORMS LEGAL STATUS LEGITIMACY LIABILITY LITIGATION LOBBYING MALFEASANCE MARKET FAILURE MARKET FAILURES MARKET MECHANISMS MEDIA MONEY LAUNDERING MONOPOLIES MORTGAGE MORTGAGE HOLDERS MULTINATIONAL OFFENDER OFFENSE ORGANIZED CRIME OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES PATRONAGE PENALTIES PENSION PERSONAL GAIN POLICE POLICE CORRUPTION POLICE OFFICER POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICIANS PRIORITIES PRISON PRIVATIZATION PROCUREMENT PROSECUTION PROSTITUTION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUNISHMENT QUALITY OF LAWS RECIPIENT COUNTRY REFUGEE REORGANIZATION REPRESSION RULE OF LAW SANCTION SANCTIONS SCANDAL SECRECY SERVICE DELIVERY STEALING TAX HAVENS TAX REVENUES TAXATION THEFT TRANSPARENCY VIOLATIONS WHISTLE-BLOWER WHISTLE-BLOWERS WILL WILLINGNESS TO PAY Søreide, Tina Drivers of Corruption : A Brief Review |
| relation |
World Bank Study; |
| description |
Corruption is motivated by the
possibility of securing something of value for oneself and
one s allies. The desire to secure benefits is a human trait
and generally positive for development; various forms of
rewards drive humans to get up in the morning, do a good
job, and act responsibly. The discussion now turns to the
opportunity to secure more benefits than are entitled to
within the existing rules of the game ; specifically, the
opportunity to grab at the expense of society. A decision
maker has the authority to influence an outcome that matters
to the briber. For steering a decision in the briber s
direction, the decision maker is compensated with a bribe.
The steered decision and the bribe now become assets that
usually exceed what at least one of the players would have
obtained without the corrupt act. The opportunity to seize
assets through some form of power misuse differs across
sectors, organizations, and decision-making situations. This
chapter describes the circumstances in which the risk of
corruption is particularly high in other words, where the
drivers of corruption can be found. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Publication |
| author |
Søreide, Tina |
| author_facet |
Søreide, Tina |
| author_sort |
Søreide, Tina |
| title |
Drivers of Corruption : A Brief Review |
| title_short |
Drivers of Corruption : A Brief Review |
| title_full |
Drivers of Corruption : A Brief Review |
| title_fullStr |
Drivers of Corruption : A Brief Review |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Drivers of Corruption : A Brief Review |
| title_sort |
drivers of corruption : a brief review |
| publisher |
Washington, DC: World Bank |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/01/20307084/ http://hdl.handle.net/10986/20457 |
| _version_ |
1764445422487601152 |