Nash Equilibria of Games When Players' Preferences Are Quasi-Transitive
Much of game theory is founded on the assumption that individual players are endowed with preferences that can be represented by a real-valued utility function. However, in reality human preferences are often not transitive. This is especially true...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank Group, Washington, DC
2014
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/09/20211385/nash-equilibria-games-players-preferences-quasi-transitive http://hdl.handle.net/10986/20373 |
| id |
okr-10986-20373 |
|---|---|
| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| spelling |
okr-10986-203732021-04-23T14:03:55Z Nash Equilibria of Games When Players' Preferences Are Quasi-Transitive Basu, Kaushik Pattanaik, Prasanta K. CALL DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY ECONOMIC THEORY ETHICS GAME THEORY INTERVENTIONS LET LOTTERIES LOTTERY NASH EQUILIBRIUM NOTATION ORDERING ORDERINGS PAPERS PREFERENCES PRESERVES PROBABILITIES PROBABILITY UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY FUNCTIONS Much of game theory is founded on the assumption that individual players are endowed with preferences that can be represented by a real-valued utility function. However, in reality human preferences are often not transitive. This is especially true for the indifference relation, which can lead an individual to make a series of choices which in their totality would be viewed as erroneous by the same individual. There is a substantial literature that raises intricate questions about individual liberty and the role of government intervention in such contexts. The aim of this paper is not to go into these ethical matters but to provide a formal structure for such analysis by characterizing games where individual preferences are quasi-transitive. The paper identifies a set of axioms which are sufficient for the existence of Nash equilibria in such 'games.' 2014-10-06T20:33:26Z 2014-10-06T20:33:26Z 2014-09 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/09/20211385/nash-equilibria-games-players-preferences-quasi-transitive http://hdl.handle.net/10986/20373 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7037 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Group, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
CALL DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY ECONOMIC THEORY ETHICS GAME THEORY INTERVENTIONS LET LOTTERIES LOTTERY NASH EQUILIBRIUM NOTATION ORDERING ORDERINGS PAPERS PREFERENCES PRESERVES PROBABILITIES PROBABILITY UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY FUNCTIONS |
| spellingShingle |
CALL DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY ECONOMIC THEORY ETHICS GAME THEORY INTERVENTIONS LET LOTTERIES LOTTERY NASH EQUILIBRIUM NOTATION ORDERING ORDERINGS PAPERS PREFERENCES PRESERVES PROBABILITIES PROBABILITY UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY FUNCTIONS Basu, Kaushik Pattanaik, Prasanta K. Nash Equilibria of Games When Players' Preferences Are Quasi-Transitive |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7037 |
| description |
Much of game theory is founded on the
assumption that individual players are endowed with
preferences that can be represented by a real-valued utility
function. However, in reality human preferences are often
not transitive. This is especially true for the indifference
relation, which can lead an individual to make a series of
choices which in their totality would be viewed as erroneous
by the same individual. There is a substantial literature
that raises intricate questions about individual liberty and
the role of government intervention in such contexts. The
aim of this paper is not to go into these ethical matters
but to provide a formal structure for such analysis by
characterizing games where individual preferences are
quasi-transitive. The paper identifies a set of axioms which
are sufficient for the existence of Nash equilibria in such 'games.' |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Basu, Kaushik Pattanaik, Prasanta K. |
| author_facet |
Basu, Kaushik Pattanaik, Prasanta K. |
| author_sort |
Basu, Kaushik |
| title |
Nash Equilibria of Games When Players' Preferences Are Quasi-Transitive |
| title_short |
Nash Equilibria of Games When Players' Preferences Are Quasi-Transitive |
| title_full |
Nash Equilibria of Games When Players' Preferences Are Quasi-Transitive |
| title_fullStr |
Nash Equilibria of Games When Players' Preferences Are Quasi-Transitive |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Nash Equilibria of Games When Players' Preferences Are Quasi-Transitive |
| title_sort |
nash equilibria of games when players' preferences are quasi-transitive |
| publisher |
World Bank Group, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/09/20211385/nash-equilibria-games-players-preferences-quasi-transitive http://hdl.handle.net/10986/20373 |
| _version_ |
1764445186417491968 |