Does India's Employment Guarantee Scheme Quarantee Employment?
In 2005 India introduced an ambitious national anti-poverty program, now called the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. The program offers up to 100 days of unskilled manual labor per year on public works projects for any rur...
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Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/03/15958094/indias-employment-guarantee-scheme-guarantee-employment http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19877 |
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okr-10986-198772021-04-23T14:03:52Z Does India's Employment Guarantee Scheme Quarantee Employment? Dutta, Puja Murgai, Rinku Ravallion, Martin van de Walle, Dominique AGGREGATE DEMAND AGRICULTURAL LABORERS ANTI-POVERTY ANTI-POVERTY PROGRAM ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAM AVERAGE WAGE AVERAGE WAGES BARGAINING POWER CASH TRANSFERS CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES CONSUMPTION QUINTILES EGS EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE SCHEME EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE SCHEMES EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS FLEXIBILITY FORCED LABOR HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IMPACT ON POVERTY INCIDENCE OF POVERTY INCOME INEQUALITY INSURANCE JOBS LABOR ECONOMICS LABOR FORCE LABORERS LABOUR LANDHOLDINGS MANPOWER MANUAL LABOR MARKET WAGES MINIMUM WAGE MINIMUM WAGES NATIONAL POVERTY OCCUPATION PARTICIPATION RATES PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION POLITICAL ECONOMY POOR POOR AREAS POOR FAMILIES POOR HOUSEHOLDS POOR INDIVIDUALS POOR PEOPLE POOR WOMEN POORER FAMILIES POORER HOUSEHOLDS POVERTY ALLEVIATION POVERTY ALLEVIATION PROGRAMS POVERTY IMPACTS POVERTY LINE POVERTY LINES POVERTY PROGRAMS POVERTY RATE POVERTY RATES POVERTY STATUS PROGRAM COSTS PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC SPENDING PUBLIC WORKS PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMS PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS RIGHT TO WORK RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL DEVELOPMENT RURAL EMPLOYMENT RURAL HEADCOUNT RURAL HEADCOUNT INDEX RURAL HOUSEHOLD RURAL HOUSEHOLDS RURAL LABOR RURAL LABOR MARKET RURAL LABOR MARKETS RURAL POOR RURAL POPULATION RURAL POVERTY RURAL PUBLIC SCHOOLING SEASONAL LABOR SOCIAL PROTECTION SUBSTITUTION EFFECT TARGETING TRANSFER BENEFITS UNEMPLOYMENT UNSKILLED LABOR WAGE EFFECT WAGE INCREASE WAGE RATE WAGE RATES WORKER WORKERS In 2005 India introduced an ambitious national anti-poverty program, now called the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. The program offers up to 100 days of unskilled manual labor per year on public works projects for any rural household member who wants such work at the stipulated minimum wage rate. The aim is to dramatically reduce poverty by providing extra earnings for poor families, as well as empowerment and insurance. If the program worked in practice the way it is designed, then anyone who wanted work on the scheme would get it. However, analysis of data from India's National Sample Survey for 2009/10 reveals considerable un-met demand for work in all states. The authors confirm expectations that poorer families tend to have more demand for work on the scheme, and that (despite the un-met demand) the self-targeting mechanism allows it to reach relatively poor families and backward castes. The extent of the un-met demand is greater in the poorest states -- ironically where the scheme is needed most. Labor-market responses to the scheme are likely to be weak. The scheme is attracting poor women into the workforce, although the local-level rationing processes favor men. 2014-08-29T18:50:09Z 2014-08-29T18:50:09Z 2012-03 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/03/15958094/indias-employment-guarantee-scheme-guarantee-employment http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19877 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6003 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research South Asia India |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
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World Bank |
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English en_US |
topic |
AGGREGATE DEMAND AGRICULTURAL LABORERS ANTI-POVERTY ANTI-POVERTY PROGRAM ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAM AVERAGE WAGE AVERAGE WAGES BARGAINING POWER CASH TRANSFERS CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES CONSUMPTION QUINTILES EGS EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE SCHEME EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE SCHEMES EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS FLEXIBILITY FORCED LABOR HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IMPACT ON POVERTY INCIDENCE OF POVERTY INCOME INEQUALITY INSURANCE JOBS LABOR ECONOMICS LABOR FORCE LABORERS LABOUR LANDHOLDINGS MANPOWER MANUAL LABOR MARKET WAGES MINIMUM WAGE MINIMUM WAGES NATIONAL POVERTY OCCUPATION PARTICIPATION RATES PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION POLITICAL ECONOMY POOR POOR AREAS POOR FAMILIES POOR HOUSEHOLDS POOR INDIVIDUALS POOR PEOPLE POOR WOMEN POORER FAMILIES POORER HOUSEHOLDS POVERTY ALLEVIATION POVERTY ALLEVIATION PROGRAMS POVERTY IMPACTS POVERTY LINE POVERTY LINES POVERTY PROGRAMS POVERTY RATE POVERTY RATES POVERTY STATUS PROGRAM COSTS PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC SPENDING PUBLIC WORKS PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMS PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS RIGHT TO WORK RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL DEVELOPMENT RURAL EMPLOYMENT RURAL HEADCOUNT RURAL HEADCOUNT INDEX RURAL HOUSEHOLD RURAL HOUSEHOLDS RURAL LABOR RURAL LABOR MARKET RURAL LABOR MARKETS RURAL POOR RURAL POPULATION RURAL POVERTY RURAL PUBLIC SCHOOLING SEASONAL LABOR SOCIAL PROTECTION SUBSTITUTION EFFECT TARGETING TRANSFER BENEFITS UNEMPLOYMENT UNSKILLED LABOR WAGE EFFECT WAGE INCREASE WAGE RATE WAGE RATES WORKER WORKERS |
spellingShingle |
AGGREGATE DEMAND AGRICULTURAL LABORERS ANTI-POVERTY ANTI-POVERTY PROGRAM ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAM AVERAGE WAGE AVERAGE WAGES BARGAINING POWER CASH TRANSFERS CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES CONSUMPTION QUINTILES EGS EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE SCHEME EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE SCHEMES EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS FLEXIBILITY FORCED LABOR HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IMPACT ON POVERTY INCIDENCE OF POVERTY INCOME INEQUALITY INSURANCE JOBS LABOR ECONOMICS LABOR FORCE LABORERS LABOUR LANDHOLDINGS MANPOWER MANUAL LABOR MARKET WAGES MINIMUM WAGE MINIMUM WAGES NATIONAL POVERTY OCCUPATION PARTICIPATION RATES PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION POLITICAL ECONOMY POOR POOR AREAS POOR FAMILIES POOR HOUSEHOLDS POOR INDIVIDUALS POOR PEOPLE POOR WOMEN POORER FAMILIES POORER HOUSEHOLDS POVERTY ALLEVIATION POVERTY ALLEVIATION PROGRAMS POVERTY IMPACTS POVERTY LINE POVERTY LINES POVERTY PROGRAMS POVERTY RATE POVERTY RATES POVERTY STATUS PROGRAM COSTS PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC SPENDING PUBLIC WORKS PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMS PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS RIGHT TO WORK RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL DEVELOPMENT RURAL EMPLOYMENT RURAL HEADCOUNT RURAL HEADCOUNT INDEX RURAL HOUSEHOLD RURAL HOUSEHOLDS RURAL LABOR RURAL LABOR MARKET RURAL LABOR MARKETS RURAL POOR RURAL POPULATION RURAL POVERTY RURAL PUBLIC SCHOOLING SEASONAL LABOR SOCIAL PROTECTION SUBSTITUTION EFFECT TARGETING TRANSFER BENEFITS UNEMPLOYMENT UNSKILLED LABOR WAGE EFFECT WAGE INCREASE WAGE RATE WAGE RATES WORKER WORKERS Dutta, Puja Murgai, Rinku Ravallion, Martin van de Walle, Dominique Does India's Employment Guarantee Scheme Quarantee Employment? |
geographic_facet |
South Asia India |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6003 |
description |
In 2005 India introduced an ambitious
national anti-poverty program, now called the Mahatma Gandhi
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. The program
offers up to 100 days of unskilled manual labor per year on
public works projects for any rural household member who
wants such work at the stipulated minimum wage rate. The aim
is to dramatically reduce poverty by providing extra
earnings for poor families, as well as empowerment and
insurance. If the program worked in practice the way it is
designed, then anyone who wanted work on the scheme would
get it. However, analysis of data from India's National
Sample Survey for 2009/10 reveals considerable un-met demand
for work in all states. The authors confirm expectations
that poorer families tend to have more demand for work on
the scheme, and that (despite the un-met demand) the
self-targeting mechanism allows it to reach relatively poor
families and backward castes. The extent of the un-met
demand is greater in the poorest states -- ironically where
the scheme is needed most. Labor-market responses to the
scheme are likely to be weak. The scheme is attracting poor
women into the workforce, although the local-level rationing
processes favor men. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Dutta, Puja Murgai, Rinku Ravallion, Martin van de Walle, Dominique |
author_facet |
Dutta, Puja Murgai, Rinku Ravallion, Martin van de Walle, Dominique |
author_sort |
Dutta, Puja |
title |
Does India's Employment Guarantee Scheme Quarantee Employment? |
title_short |
Does India's Employment Guarantee Scheme Quarantee Employment? |
title_full |
Does India's Employment Guarantee Scheme Quarantee Employment? |
title_fullStr |
Does India's Employment Guarantee Scheme Quarantee Employment? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Does India's Employment Guarantee Scheme Quarantee Employment? |
title_sort |
does india's employment guarantee scheme quarantee employment? |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2014 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/03/15958094/indias-employment-guarantee-scheme-guarantee-employment http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19877 |
_version_ |
1764444004520296448 |