Does India's Employment Guarantee Scheme Quarantee Employment?
In 2005 India introduced an ambitious national anti-poverty program, now called the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. The program offers up to 100 days of unskilled manual labor per year on public works projects for any rur...
Main Authors: | , , , |
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Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/03/15958094/indias-employment-guarantee-scheme-guarantee-employment http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19877 |
Summary: | In 2005 India introduced an ambitious
national anti-poverty program, now called the Mahatma Gandhi
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. The program
offers up to 100 days of unskilled manual labor per year on
public works projects for any rural household member who
wants such work at the stipulated minimum wage rate. The aim
is to dramatically reduce poverty by providing extra
earnings for poor families, as well as empowerment and
insurance. If the program worked in practice the way it is
designed, then anyone who wanted work on the scheme would
get it. However, analysis of data from India's National
Sample Survey for 2009/10 reveals considerable un-met demand
for work in all states. The authors confirm expectations
that poorer families tend to have more demand for work on
the scheme, and that (despite the un-met demand) the
self-targeting mechanism allows it to reach relatively poor
families and backward castes. The extent of the un-met
demand is greater in the poorest states -- ironically where
the scheme is needed most. Labor-market responses to the
scheme are likely to be weak. The scheme is attracting poor
women into the workforce, although the local-level rationing
processes favor men. |
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