Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention
Governments can significantly reduce earthquake mortality by implementing and enforcing quake-proof construction regulation. The authors examine why many governments do not. Contrary to intuition, controlling for the strength and location of actual...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/01/11670035/earthquake-propensity-politics-mortality-prevention http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19863 |
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okr-10986-198632021-04-23T14:03:52Z Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention Keefer, Philip Neumayer, Eric Plumper, Thomas BUILDING CODES CATASTROPHIC EVENTS CHILD MORTALITY CITIZEN CITIZENS COLLECTIVE ACTION CRISES DAMAGES DEATH TOLL DEMOCRACY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DISASTER DISASTER AID DISASTER PREPAREDNESS DISASTER PREVENTION DISASTER REDUCTION DISASTER RELIEF DISASTER RISK DISASTER RISK REDUCTION DISASTER TYPE DISASTER TYPES DISASTERS EARTHQUAKE EARTHQUAKES ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMICS EFFECTS OF EARTHQUAKE EXPLOSIVE FAMINE FAMINES FARMERS FATALITIES FATALITY FEWER PEOPLE FLOODING GENDER GAP GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT POLICIES GOVERNMENT RESPONSE HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE HIGH MORTALITY COUNTRIES INCOME INFECTIOUS DISEASE INFECTIOUS DISEASES INSURANCE JOURNAL OF EPIDEMIOLOGY LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE LIFE EXPECTANCY LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MARGINAL COSTS MARKET FAILURES MORTALITY MORTALITY REDUCTION NATURAL DISASTERS NUMBER OF PEOPLE OPPORTUNITY COSTS POLICY ANALYSIS POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER POLITICAL ECONOMICS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POPULATION DENSITY POPULATION SIZE POPULOUS COUNTRIES PREVENTION EFFORTS PROGRESS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC POLICY RECONSTRUCTION RICHER COUNTRIES SAFETY SANCTION SANITATION SCARCE RESOURCES SOCIAL WELFARE SOCIETAL LEVEL TECTONIC PLATES VICTIMS VULNERABILITY Governments can significantly reduce earthquake mortality by implementing and enforcing quake-proof construction regulation. The authors examine why many governments do not. Contrary to intuition, controlling for the strength and location of actual earthquakes, mortality is lower in countries with higher earthquake propensity, where the payoffs to mortality prevention are higher. Importantly, however, the government response to earthquake propensity depends on country income and the political incentives of governments to provide public goods to citizens. The opportunity costs of earthquake mortality prevention are higher in poorer countries; rich countries invest more in mortality prevention than poor countries in response to a higher earthquake propensity. Similarly, governments that have fewer incentives to provide public goods, such as younger democracies, autocracies with less institutionalized ruling parties and countries with corrupt regimes, respond less to an elevated quake propensity. They therefore have higher mortality at any level of quake propensity compared to older democracies, autocracies with highly institutionalized parties and non-corrupt regimes, respectively. The authors find robust evidence for these predictions in our analysis of earthquake mortality over the period 1960 to 2005. 2014-08-29T17:46:59Z 2014-08-29T17:46:59Z 2010-01 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/01/11670035/earthquake-propensity-politics-mortality-prevention http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19863 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 5182 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
BUILDING CODES CATASTROPHIC EVENTS CHILD MORTALITY CITIZEN CITIZENS COLLECTIVE ACTION CRISES DAMAGES DEATH TOLL DEMOCRACY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DISASTER DISASTER AID DISASTER PREPAREDNESS DISASTER PREVENTION DISASTER REDUCTION DISASTER RELIEF DISASTER RISK DISASTER RISK REDUCTION DISASTER TYPE DISASTER TYPES DISASTERS EARTHQUAKE EARTHQUAKES ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMICS EFFECTS OF EARTHQUAKE EXPLOSIVE FAMINE FAMINES FARMERS FATALITIES FATALITY FEWER PEOPLE FLOODING GENDER GAP GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT POLICIES GOVERNMENT RESPONSE HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE HIGH MORTALITY COUNTRIES INCOME INFECTIOUS DISEASE INFECTIOUS DISEASES INSURANCE JOURNAL OF EPIDEMIOLOGY LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE LIFE EXPECTANCY LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MARGINAL COSTS MARKET FAILURES MORTALITY MORTALITY REDUCTION NATURAL DISASTERS NUMBER OF PEOPLE OPPORTUNITY COSTS POLICY ANALYSIS POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER POLITICAL ECONOMICS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POPULATION DENSITY POPULATION SIZE POPULOUS COUNTRIES PREVENTION EFFORTS PROGRESS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC POLICY RECONSTRUCTION RICHER COUNTRIES SAFETY SANCTION SANITATION SCARCE RESOURCES SOCIAL WELFARE SOCIETAL LEVEL TECTONIC PLATES VICTIMS VULNERABILITY |
| spellingShingle |
BUILDING CODES CATASTROPHIC EVENTS CHILD MORTALITY CITIZEN CITIZENS COLLECTIVE ACTION CRISES DAMAGES DEATH TOLL DEMOCRACY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DISASTER DISASTER AID DISASTER PREPAREDNESS DISASTER PREVENTION DISASTER REDUCTION DISASTER RELIEF DISASTER RISK DISASTER RISK REDUCTION DISASTER TYPE DISASTER TYPES DISASTERS EARTHQUAKE EARTHQUAKES ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMICS EFFECTS OF EARTHQUAKE EXPLOSIVE FAMINE FAMINES FARMERS FATALITIES FATALITY FEWER PEOPLE FLOODING GENDER GAP GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT POLICIES GOVERNMENT RESPONSE HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE HIGH MORTALITY COUNTRIES INCOME INFECTIOUS DISEASE INFECTIOUS DISEASES INSURANCE JOURNAL OF EPIDEMIOLOGY LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE LIFE EXPECTANCY LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MARGINAL COSTS MARKET FAILURES MORTALITY MORTALITY REDUCTION NATURAL DISASTERS NUMBER OF PEOPLE OPPORTUNITY COSTS POLICY ANALYSIS POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER POLITICAL ECONOMICS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POPULATION DENSITY POPULATION SIZE POPULOUS COUNTRIES PREVENTION EFFORTS PROGRESS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC POLICY RECONSTRUCTION RICHER COUNTRIES SAFETY SANCTION SANITATION SCARCE RESOURCES SOCIAL WELFARE SOCIETAL LEVEL TECTONIC PLATES VICTIMS VULNERABILITY Keefer, Philip Neumayer, Eric Plumper, Thomas Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 5182 |
| description |
Governments can significantly reduce
earthquake mortality by implementing and enforcing
quake-proof construction regulation. The authors examine why
many governments do not. Contrary to intuition, controlling
for the strength and location of actual earthquakes,
mortality is lower in countries with higher earthquake
propensity, where the payoffs to mortality prevention are
higher. Importantly, however, the government response to
earthquake propensity depends on country income and the
political incentives of governments to provide public goods
to citizens. The opportunity costs of earthquake mortality
prevention are higher in poorer countries; rich countries
invest more in mortality prevention than poor countries in
response to a higher earthquake propensity. Similarly,
governments that have fewer incentives to provide public
goods, such as younger democracies, autocracies with less
institutionalized ruling parties and countries with corrupt
regimes, respond less to an elevated quake propensity. They
therefore have higher mortality at any level of quake
propensity compared to older democracies, autocracies with
highly institutionalized parties and non-corrupt regimes,
respectively. The authors find robust evidence for these
predictions in our analysis of earthquake mortality over the
period 1960 to 2005. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Keefer, Philip Neumayer, Eric Plumper, Thomas |
| author_facet |
Keefer, Philip Neumayer, Eric Plumper, Thomas |
| author_sort |
Keefer, Philip |
| title |
Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention |
| title_short |
Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention |
| title_full |
Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention |
| title_fullStr |
Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention |
| title_sort |
earthquake propensity and the politics of mortality prevention |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/01/11670035/earthquake-propensity-politics-mortality-prevention http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19863 |
| _version_ |
1764443960958255104 |