Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations?
As each new round of multilateral trade negotiations approaches, there is a demand for a negotiating rule that would give credit for autonomous (unilateral) liberalization. The authors show that the feasibility, and desirability of such a rule depe...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/06/437087/credit-given-autonomous-liberalization-multilateral-trade-negotiations http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19829 |
| Summary: | As each new round of multilateral trade
negotiations approaches, there is a demand for a negotiating
rule that would give credit for autonomous (unilateral)
liberalization. The authors show that the feasibility, and
desirability of such a rule depend on when it is instituted.
A credit rule established at the beginning of a round of
negotiations has a primarily distributional effect, favoring
those who have already undertaken liberalization.
Implementing such a rule would depend on the generosity of
those who have not liberalized. The authors propose instead
establishing a credit rule at the end of a round of
negotiations, which creates an ex-ante assurance that any
unilateral liberalization will receive credit in the next
round. Such a rule would help induce, or enhance
liberalization in some countries between negotiating rounds,
by reducing the gains from retaining protection as
negotiating currency. More strikingly, it could also lead to
deeper levels of multilateral liberalization, and induce
other countries to go further than they would in the absence
of a rule. Most important, such an ex-ante rule would not
rely on altruism to be generally acceptable. |
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