Estimating the Effects of Corruption : Implications for Bangladesh
Building on the pioneering work of Barro (1991) and Mauro (1995) to include the most recent years for which data are available (for Bangladesh in the 1990s), the authors investigate the relationships between corruption, and growth, and, between cor...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/11/717506/estimating-effects-corruption-implications-bangladesh http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19765 |
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okr-10986-197652021-04-23T14:03:44Z Estimating the Effects of Corruption : Implications for Bangladesh Rahman, Aminur Kisunko, Gregory Kapoor, Kapil ACCOUNTABILITY ADVERSE EFFECTS ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY AUTHORITY BRIBERY BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRAT CIVIL SOCIETY COMPETITIVE BIDDING COMPETITIVE BIDDING PROCESS CORRUPT COUNTRIES CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION INDICATOR CORRUPTION LEVELS CORRUPTION VARIABLE COUNTRY COVERAGE DEMOCRACY DIRECT INVESTMENT DISCRETIONARY POWERS ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC RISKS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EXTREME POVERTY FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOREIGN INVESTMENT FOREIGN INVESTORS FREE PRESS GCR GDP GDP PER CAPITA GNP GNP PER CAPITA GOVERNANCE PROBLEM GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION GROWTH MODELS GROWTH RATE GROWTH RATES GROWTH REGRESSION GROWTH THEORIES HUMAN CAPITAL IMPORTS IMPROVING GOVERNANCE INCOME INEFFICIENCY INEQUALITY INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE INVESTMENT RATES LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY LDCS LOBBYING MILITARY REGIME NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATIONS POLICY MAKERS POLITICAL RISK POPULATION GROWTH PRODUCTIVITY PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC FINANCES PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SECTOR REAL GDP SECONDARY SCHOOLS SMUGGLING SOCIAL PROGRAMS STATE REVENUE TACIT COLLUSION TAX RATE TAX REVENUE TAX SYSTEMS TIME SERIES TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY UNEQUAL ACCESS Building on the pioneering work of Barro (1991) and Mauro (1995) to include the most recent years for which data are available (for Bangladesh in the 1990s), the authors investigate the relationships between corruption, and growth, and, between corruption and investment, both domestic and foreign, to see whether they have changed from earlier decades. Then they move away from Mauro's implicit assumption that the corruption index value for a relatively short period of time, can be used as a proxy for the long run, and further augment Mauro's model by including significant regional dummy variables, in an attempt to take account of various region-specific effects. The authors also analyze the sensitivity of corruption in the presence, and absence of various policy, geographic, and demographic variables that are widely used in empirical growth, and investment literature. The findings suggest that countries serious about improving governance, and reducing corruption, should redefine the role of government, overhaul the system of incentives, and strengthen domestic institutions, to make sure the necessary checks, and balances are in place. Such an approach to reform would help attract more investment - both domestic and foreign - and would accelerate economic growth, and poverty reduction. 2014-08-27T18:19:16Z 2014-08-27T18:19:16Z 2000-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/11/717506/estimating-effects-corruption-implications-bangladesh http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19765 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2479 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research South Asia Bangladesh |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY ADVERSE EFFECTS ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY AUTHORITY BRIBERY BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRAT CIVIL SOCIETY COMPETITIVE BIDDING COMPETITIVE BIDDING PROCESS CORRUPT COUNTRIES CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION INDICATOR CORRUPTION LEVELS CORRUPTION VARIABLE COUNTRY COVERAGE DEMOCRACY DIRECT INVESTMENT DISCRETIONARY POWERS ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC RISKS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EXTREME POVERTY FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOREIGN INVESTMENT FOREIGN INVESTORS FREE PRESS GCR GDP GDP PER CAPITA GNP GNP PER CAPITA GOVERNANCE PROBLEM GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION GROWTH MODELS GROWTH RATE GROWTH RATES GROWTH REGRESSION GROWTH THEORIES HUMAN CAPITAL IMPORTS IMPROVING GOVERNANCE INCOME INEFFICIENCY INEQUALITY INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE INVESTMENT RATES LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY LDCS LOBBYING MILITARY REGIME NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATIONS POLICY MAKERS POLITICAL RISK POPULATION GROWTH PRODUCTIVITY PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC FINANCES PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SECTOR REAL GDP SECONDARY SCHOOLS SMUGGLING SOCIAL PROGRAMS STATE REVENUE TACIT COLLUSION TAX RATE TAX REVENUE TAX SYSTEMS TIME SERIES TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY UNEQUAL ACCESS |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY ADVERSE EFFECTS ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY AUTHORITY BRIBERY BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRAT CIVIL SOCIETY COMPETITIVE BIDDING COMPETITIVE BIDDING PROCESS CORRUPT COUNTRIES CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION INDICATOR CORRUPTION LEVELS CORRUPTION VARIABLE COUNTRY COVERAGE DEMOCRACY DIRECT INVESTMENT DISCRETIONARY POWERS ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC RISKS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EXTREME POVERTY FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOREIGN INVESTMENT FOREIGN INVESTORS FREE PRESS GCR GDP GDP PER CAPITA GNP GNP PER CAPITA GOVERNANCE PROBLEM GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION GROWTH MODELS GROWTH RATE GROWTH RATES GROWTH REGRESSION GROWTH THEORIES HUMAN CAPITAL IMPORTS IMPROVING GOVERNANCE INCOME INEFFICIENCY INEQUALITY INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE INVESTMENT RATES LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY LDCS LOBBYING MILITARY REGIME NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATIONS POLICY MAKERS POLITICAL RISK POPULATION GROWTH PRODUCTIVITY PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC FINANCES PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SECTOR REAL GDP SECONDARY SCHOOLS SMUGGLING SOCIAL PROGRAMS STATE REVENUE TACIT COLLUSION TAX RATE TAX REVENUE TAX SYSTEMS TIME SERIES TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY UNEQUAL ACCESS Rahman, Aminur Kisunko, Gregory Kapoor, Kapil Estimating the Effects of Corruption : Implications for Bangladesh |
| geographic_facet |
South Asia Bangladesh |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2479 |
| description |
Building on the pioneering work of Barro
(1991) and Mauro (1995) to include the most recent years for
which data are available (for Bangladesh in the 1990s), the
authors investigate the relationships between corruption,
and growth, and, between corruption and investment, both
domestic and foreign, to see whether they have changed from
earlier decades. Then they move away from Mauro's
implicit assumption that the corruption index value for a
relatively short period of time, can be used as a proxy for
the long run, and further augment Mauro's model by
including significant regional dummy variables, in an
attempt to take account of various region-specific effects.
The authors also analyze the sensitivity of corruption in
the presence, and absence of various policy, geographic, and
demographic variables that are widely used in empirical
growth, and investment literature. The findings suggest that
countries serious about improving governance, and reducing
corruption, should redefine the role of government, overhaul
the system of incentives, and strengthen domestic
institutions, to make sure the necessary checks, and
balances are in place. Such an approach to reform would help
attract more investment - both domestic and foreign - and
would accelerate economic growth, and poverty reduction. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Rahman, Aminur Kisunko, Gregory Kapoor, Kapil |
| author_facet |
Rahman, Aminur Kisunko, Gregory Kapoor, Kapil |
| author_sort |
Rahman, Aminur |
| title |
Estimating the Effects of Corruption : Implications for Bangladesh |
| title_short |
Estimating the Effects of Corruption : Implications for Bangladesh |
| title_full |
Estimating the Effects of Corruption : Implications for Bangladesh |
| title_fullStr |
Estimating the Effects of Corruption : Implications for Bangladesh |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Estimating the Effects of Corruption : Implications for Bangladesh |
| title_sort |
estimating the effects of corruption : implications for bangladesh |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/11/717506/estimating-effects-corruption-implications-bangladesh http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19765 |
| _version_ |
1764440583887126528 |