Environmental Protection and Optimal Taxation
Struck by the fact that economists did not have a plausible model for why emissions standards, and mandated technologies, play a dominant role in pollution control, the author sought answers to two questions: 1) Should one stimulate emissions reduc...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/12/828331/environmental-protection-optimal-taxation http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19755 |
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okr-10986-197552021-04-23T14:03:44Z Environmental Protection and Optimal Taxation Eskeland, Gunnar S. AGGREGATE DEMAND AGGREGATE PRODUCTION AIR POLLUTANT AIR POLLUTION AIR POLLUTION CONTROL AIR POLLUTION EMISSIONS AIR QUALITY CARBON CARBON MONOXIDE CLEAN AIR CLEAN WATER COMMODITY TAXES CONDITIONALITY CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONSUMERS COST EFFECTIVENESS COST EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS COSTS OF EMISSION REDUCTIONS CUMULATIVE EMISSIONS DEMAND CURVE DIVIDENDS DOUBLE DIVIDEND ECONOMICS LITERATURE ECONOMISTS ELASTICITIES ELASTICITY OF DEMAND EMISSION EMISSION COEFFICIENTS EMISSION CONTROL EMISSION FACTOR EMISSION FACTORS EMISSION QUOTA EMISSION QUOTAS EMISSION REDUCTIONS EMISSION STANDARD EMISSION STANDARDS EMISSION TAX EMISSION TAXES EMISSIONS EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS EMISSIONS STANDARDS EMISSIONS TAXES ENERGY DEMAND ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL TAX EQUILIBRIUM EXTERNALITIES EXTERNALITY FUEL FUEL CONSUMPTION FUELS GAS GASOLINE CONSUMPTION GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GREENHOUSE GREENHOUSE GAS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS INCOME INCOME TAXES INDIRECT UTILITY INDIRECT UTILITY FUNCTION MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COSTS MARGINAL EMISSIONS MARGINAL UTILITY NATURAL GAS PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS PARTICLES POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLLUTANTS POLLUTERS POLLUTION POLLUTION ABATEMENT POLLUTION LEVEL POLLUTION PROBLEMS PRICE ELASTICITIES PRICE ELASTICITY PRICE INCREASES PRIVATE GOODS PRODUCERS PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS QUOTAS REDUCTION IN EMISSIONS SHADOW PRICE SULFUR SULFUR OXIDES TAX RATES TAXATION TOTAL EMISSIONS VEHICULAR EMISSIONS WASTE WELFARE FUNCTION WILLINGNESS TO PAY Struck by the fact that economists did not have a plausible model for why emissions standards, and mandated technologies, play a dominant role in pollution control, the author sought answers to two questions: 1) Should one stimulate emissions reductions by firms, and households, rich and poor, in the same way? 2) How should one combine instruments that make activities cleaner, with instruments that shift the economy toward less-polluting activities? Using clean air as an example of a pure public good, he shows the role of emissions taxes, or such surrogate instruments, as emissions standards, and presumptive Pigouvian taxes. To illustrate the combination of demand management, and technical controls, he computes a marginal cost curve for emissions reductions in the form of cleaner cars, and fuels. And he estimates a demand model for cars, and driving. The result: under the assumption that revenue, and re-distributive transfers bear no premia, the cost of reducing pollution in Mexico City increases forty four percent if an emissions standards program is used, and the presumptive Pigouvian tax on gasoline is not. The important finding, as costly redistribution, and revenue generation are introduced, is that this influences the general scheme of taxation (in well-known ways), and it influences the conditions for optimal environmental quality in accordance with Pigou's conjecture. However, it does not change, or invalidate the rankings of technologies, and interventions on the control cost curve, nor does it change the role of demand management in environmental protection. 2014-08-27T17:01:32Z 2014-08-27T17:01:32Z 2000-12 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/12/828331/environmental-protection-optimal-taxation http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19755 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2510 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Latin America & Caribbean Mexico |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
AGGREGATE DEMAND AGGREGATE PRODUCTION AIR POLLUTANT AIR POLLUTION AIR POLLUTION CONTROL AIR POLLUTION EMISSIONS AIR QUALITY CARBON CARBON MONOXIDE CLEAN AIR CLEAN WATER COMMODITY TAXES CONDITIONALITY CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONSUMERS COST EFFECTIVENESS COST EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS COSTS OF EMISSION REDUCTIONS CUMULATIVE EMISSIONS DEMAND CURVE DIVIDENDS DOUBLE DIVIDEND ECONOMICS LITERATURE ECONOMISTS ELASTICITIES ELASTICITY OF DEMAND EMISSION EMISSION COEFFICIENTS EMISSION CONTROL EMISSION FACTOR EMISSION FACTORS EMISSION QUOTA EMISSION QUOTAS EMISSION REDUCTIONS EMISSION STANDARD EMISSION STANDARDS EMISSION TAX EMISSION TAXES EMISSIONS EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS EMISSIONS STANDARDS EMISSIONS TAXES ENERGY DEMAND ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL TAX EQUILIBRIUM EXTERNALITIES EXTERNALITY FUEL FUEL CONSUMPTION FUELS GAS GASOLINE CONSUMPTION GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GREENHOUSE GREENHOUSE GAS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS INCOME INCOME TAXES INDIRECT UTILITY INDIRECT UTILITY FUNCTION MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COSTS MARGINAL EMISSIONS MARGINAL UTILITY NATURAL GAS PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS PARTICLES POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLLUTANTS POLLUTERS POLLUTION POLLUTION ABATEMENT POLLUTION LEVEL POLLUTION PROBLEMS PRICE ELASTICITIES PRICE ELASTICITY PRICE INCREASES PRIVATE GOODS PRODUCERS PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS QUOTAS REDUCTION IN EMISSIONS SHADOW PRICE SULFUR SULFUR OXIDES TAX RATES TAXATION TOTAL EMISSIONS VEHICULAR EMISSIONS WASTE WELFARE FUNCTION WILLINGNESS TO PAY |
| spellingShingle |
AGGREGATE DEMAND AGGREGATE PRODUCTION AIR POLLUTANT AIR POLLUTION AIR POLLUTION CONTROL AIR POLLUTION EMISSIONS AIR QUALITY CARBON CARBON MONOXIDE CLEAN AIR CLEAN WATER COMMODITY TAXES CONDITIONALITY CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONSUMERS COST EFFECTIVENESS COST EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS COSTS OF EMISSION REDUCTIONS CUMULATIVE EMISSIONS DEMAND CURVE DIVIDENDS DOUBLE DIVIDEND ECONOMICS LITERATURE ECONOMISTS ELASTICITIES ELASTICITY OF DEMAND EMISSION EMISSION COEFFICIENTS EMISSION CONTROL EMISSION FACTOR EMISSION FACTORS EMISSION QUOTA EMISSION QUOTAS EMISSION REDUCTIONS EMISSION STANDARD EMISSION STANDARDS EMISSION TAX EMISSION TAXES EMISSIONS EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS EMISSIONS STANDARDS EMISSIONS TAXES ENERGY DEMAND ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL TAX EQUILIBRIUM EXTERNALITIES EXTERNALITY FUEL FUEL CONSUMPTION FUELS GAS GASOLINE CONSUMPTION GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GREENHOUSE GREENHOUSE GAS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS INCOME INCOME TAXES INDIRECT UTILITY INDIRECT UTILITY FUNCTION MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COSTS MARGINAL EMISSIONS MARGINAL UTILITY NATURAL GAS PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS PARTICLES POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLLUTANTS POLLUTERS POLLUTION POLLUTION ABATEMENT POLLUTION LEVEL POLLUTION PROBLEMS PRICE ELASTICITIES PRICE ELASTICITY PRICE INCREASES PRIVATE GOODS PRODUCERS PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS QUOTAS REDUCTION IN EMISSIONS SHADOW PRICE SULFUR SULFUR OXIDES TAX RATES TAXATION TOTAL EMISSIONS VEHICULAR EMISSIONS WASTE WELFARE FUNCTION WILLINGNESS TO PAY Eskeland, Gunnar S. Environmental Protection and Optimal Taxation |
| geographic_facet |
Latin America & Caribbean Mexico |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2510 |
| description |
Struck by the fact that economists did
not have a plausible model for why emissions standards, and
mandated technologies, play a dominant role in pollution
control, the author sought answers to two questions: 1)
Should one stimulate emissions reductions by firms, and
households, rich and poor, in the same way? 2) How should
one combine instruments that make activities cleaner, with
instruments that shift the economy toward less-polluting
activities? Using clean air as an example of a pure public
good, he shows the role of emissions taxes, or such
surrogate instruments, as emissions standards, and
presumptive Pigouvian taxes. To illustrate the combination
of demand management, and technical controls, he computes a
marginal cost curve for emissions reductions in the form of
cleaner cars, and fuels. And he estimates a demand model for
cars, and driving. The result: under the assumption that
revenue, and re-distributive transfers bear no premia, the
cost of reducing pollution in Mexico City increases forty
four percent if an emissions standards program is used, and
the presumptive Pigouvian tax on gasoline is not. The
important finding, as costly redistribution, and revenue
generation are introduced, is that this influences the
general scheme of taxation (in well-known ways), and it
influences the conditions for optimal environmental quality
in accordance with Pigou's conjecture. However, it does
not change, or invalidate the rankings of technologies, and
interventions on the control cost curve, nor does it change
the role of demand management in environmental protection. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Eskeland, Gunnar S. |
| author_facet |
Eskeland, Gunnar S. |
| author_sort |
Eskeland, Gunnar S. |
| title |
Environmental Protection and Optimal Taxation |
| title_short |
Environmental Protection and Optimal Taxation |
| title_full |
Environmental Protection and Optimal Taxation |
| title_fullStr |
Environmental Protection and Optimal Taxation |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Environmental Protection and Optimal Taxation |
| title_sort |
environmental protection and optimal taxation |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/12/828331/environmental-protection-optimal-taxation http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19755 |
| _version_ |
1764440553716449280 |