Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs : A Framework for Evaluation
The anti-corruption strategy the World Bank announced in September 1997 defined corruption as the "use of public office for private gain" and called for the Bank to address corruption along four dimensions: 1) Preventing fraud and corrupt...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/12/748708/anti-corruption-policies-programs-framework-evaluation http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19753 |
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okr-10986-19753 |
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oai_dc |
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Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY ANTI- CORRUPTION ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTIONS ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY ANTICORRUPTION BASIC NEEDS BENEFITS OF CORRUPTION BRIBERY BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS BRIBES BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES CAPACITY BUILDING CITIZEN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION CITIZENS CIVIL SERVICE COLLUSION COMBATING BRIBERY CONSENSUS CONTROLLING CORRUPTION CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPT INTERESTS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION ACTS CORRUPTION PENALTIES CREDIBILITY DECENTRALIZATION DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS DISCRETION ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ELECTORAL PROCESS ETHICS EXTORTION FIGHTING CORRUPTION FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FISCAL FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FRAUD FREE PRESS GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE FAILURES GOVERNANCE QUALITY GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION GOVERNMENT SERVICES GOVERNMENT SIZE GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES GRAFT GRAND CORRUPTION INCOME INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDICIAL REFORM JUDICIARY LAWS LEGAL SYSTEM LEGISLATION LISTENING MEASUREMENT ERRORS MEDIA MEDIA FREEDOM MEDIA INDEPENDENCE MOTIVATIONS NO BRIBERY PLEDGE PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT PENALTIES PETTY CORRUPTION POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICIANS POOR GOVERNANCE POVERTY ALLEVIATION POVERTY REDUCTION PRESIDENTS PRIME MINISTER PRIORITIES PROCUREMENT PROSECUTION PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY REGULATORY CAPTURE REMEDIES RULE OF LAW SANCTIONS SELF-INTEREST SERVICE DELIVERY SIZE OF GOVERNMENT STAKEHOLDERS TAX EVASION TAXATION TRANSPARENCY |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY ANTI- CORRUPTION ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTIONS ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY ANTICORRUPTION BASIC NEEDS BENEFITS OF CORRUPTION BRIBERY BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS BRIBES BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES CAPACITY BUILDING CITIZEN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION CITIZENS CIVIL SERVICE COLLUSION COMBATING BRIBERY CONSENSUS CONTROLLING CORRUPTION CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPT INTERESTS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION ACTS CORRUPTION PENALTIES CREDIBILITY DECENTRALIZATION DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS DISCRETION ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ELECTORAL PROCESS ETHICS EXTORTION FIGHTING CORRUPTION FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FISCAL FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FRAUD FREE PRESS GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE FAILURES GOVERNANCE QUALITY GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION GOVERNMENT SERVICES GOVERNMENT SIZE GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES GRAFT GRAND CORRUPTION INCOME INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDICIAL REFORM JUDICIARY LAWS LEGAL SYSTEM LEGISLATION LISTENING MEASUREMENT ERRORS MEDIA MEDIA FREEDOM MEDIA INDEPENDENCE MOTIVATIONS NO BRIBERY PLEDGE PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT PENALTIES PETTY CORRUPTION POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICIANS POOR GOVERNANCE POVERTY ALLEVIATION POVERTY REDUCTION PRESIDENTS PRIME MINISTER PRIORITIES PROCUREMENT PROSECUTION PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY REGULATORY CAPTURE REMEDIES RULE OF LAW SANCTIONS SELF-INTEREST SERVICE DELIVERY SIZE OF GOVERNMENT STAKEHOLDERS TAX EVASION TAXATION TRANSPARENCY Huther, Jeff Shah, Anwar Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs : A Framework for Evaluation |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2501 |
| description |
The anti-corruption strategy the World
Bank announced in September 1997 defined corruption as the
"use of public office for private gain" and called
for the Bank to address corruption along four dimensions: 1)
Preventing fraud and corruption in Bank projects; 2) Helping
countries that request Bank assistance for fighting
corruption; 3) Mainstreaming a concern about corruption in
Bank work; and 4) Lending active support to international
efforts to address corruption. The menu of possible actions
to contain corruption (in both countries and Bank projects)
is very large, so the authors develop a framework to help
assign priorities, depending on views of what does and does
not work in specific countries. Their framework, based on
public officials' incentives for opportunistic
behavior, distinguishes between highly corrupt and largely
corruption-free societies. Certain conditions encourage
public officials to seek or accept corruption: a) The
expected gains from undertaking a corrupt act exceed the
expected costs. b) Little weight is placed on the cost that
corruption imposes on others. In a country with heavy
corruption and poor governance, the priorities in
anti-corruption efforts would then be to establish rule of
law, strengthen institutions of participation and
accountability, and limit government interventions to focus
on core mandates. In a country with moderate corruption and
fair governance, the priorities would be decentralization
and economic reform, results-oriented management and
evaluation, and the introduction of incentives for
competitive delivery of public services. In a country with
little corruption and strong governance, the priorities
might be explicit anti-corruption agencies and programs,
stronger financial management, increased public and
government awareness, no-bribery pledges, efforts to fry the
"big fish," and so on. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Huther, Jeff Shah, Anwar |
| author_facet |
Huther, Jeff Shah, Anwar |
| author_sort |
Huther, Jeff |
| title |
Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs : A Framework for Evaluation |
| title_short |
Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs : A Framework for Evaluation |
| title_full |
Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs : A Framework for Evaluation |
| title_fullStr |
Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs : A Framework for Evaluation |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs : A Framework for Evaluation |
| title_sort |
anti-corruption policies and programs : a framework for evaluation |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/12/748708/anti-corruption-policies-programs-framework-evaluation http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19753 |
| _version_ |
1764440547945086976 |
| spelling |
okr-10986-197532021-04-23T14:03:44Z Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs : A Framework for Evaluation Huther, Jeff Shah, Anwar ACCOUNTABILITY ANTI- CORRUPTION ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTIONS ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY ANTICORRUPTION BASIC NEEDS BENEFITS OF CORRUPTION BRIBERY BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS BRIBES BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES CAPACITY BUILDING CITIZEN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION CITIZENS CIVIL SERVICE COLLUSION COMBATING BRIBERY CONSENSUS CONTROLLING CORRUPTION CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPT INTERESTS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION ACTS CORRUPTION PENALTIES CREDIBILITY DECENTRALIZATION DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS DISCRETION ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ELECTORAL PROCESS ETHICS EXTORTION FIGHTING CORRUPTION FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FISCAL FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FRAUD FREE PRESS GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE FAILURES GOVERNANCE QUALITY GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION GOVERNMENT SERVICES GOVERNMENT SIZE GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES GRAFT GRAND CORRUPTION INCOME INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDICIAL REFORM JUDICIARY LAWS LEGAL SYSTEM LEGISLATION LISTENING MEASUREMENT ERRORS MEDIA MEDIA FREEDOM MEDIA INDEPENDENCE MOTIVATIONS NO BRIBERY PLEDGE PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT PENALTIES PETTY CORRUPTION POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICIANS POOR GOVERNANCE POVERTY ALLEVIATION POVERTY REDUCTION PRESIDENTS PRIME MINISTER PRIORITIES PROCUREMENT PROSECUTION PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY REGULATORY CAPTURE REMEDIES RULE OF LAW SANCTIONS SELF-INTEREST SERVICE DELIVERY SIZE OF GOVERNMENT STAKEHOLDERS TAX EVASION TAXATION TRANSPARENCY The anti-corruption strategy the World Bank announced in September 1997 defined corruption as the "use of public office for private gain" and called for the Bank to address corruption along four dimensions: 1) Preventing fraud and corruption in Bank projects; 2) Helping countries that request Bank assistance for fighting corruption; 3) Mainstreaming a concern about corruption in Bank work; and 4) Lending active support to international efforts to address corruption. The menu of possible actions to contain corruption (in both countries and Bank projects) is very large, so the authors develop a framework to help assign priorities, depending on views of what does and does not work in specific countries. Their framework, based on public officials' incentives for opportunistic behavior, distinguishes between highly corrupt and largely corruption-free societies. Certain conditions encourage public officials to seek or accept corruption: a) The expected gains from undertaking a corrupt act exceed the expected costs. b) Little weight is placed on the cost that corruption imposes on others. In a country with heavy corruption and poor governance, the priorities in anti-corruption efforts would then be to establish rule of law, strengthen institutions of participation and accountability, and limit government interventions to focus on core mandates. In a country with moderate corruption and fair governance, the priorities would be decentralization and economic reform, results-oriented management and evaluation, and the introduction of incentives for competitive delivery of public services. In a country with little corruption and strong governance, the priorities might be explicit anti-corruption agencies and programs, stronger financial management, increased public and government awareness, no-bribery pledges, efforts to fry the "big fish," and so on. 2014-08-27T16:56:36Z 2014-08-27T16:56:36Z 2000-12 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/12/748708/anti-corruption-policies-programs-framework-evaluation http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19753 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2501 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |