Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs : A Framework for Evaluation

The anti-corruption strategy the World Bank announced in September 1997 defined corruption as the "use of public office for private gain" and called for the Bank to address corruption along four dimensions: 1) Preventing fraud and corrupt...

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Main Authors: Huther, Jeff, Shah, Anwar
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/12/748708/anti-corruption-policies-programs-framework-evaluation
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19753
id okr-10986-19753
recordtype oai_dc
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic ACCOUNTABILITY
ANTI- CORRUPTION
ANTI-CORRUPTION
ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTIONS
ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY
ANTICORRUPTION
BASIC NEEDS
BENEFITS OF CORRUPTION
BRIBERY
BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS
BRIBES
BUREAUCRACY
BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES
CAPACITY BUILDING
CITIZEN
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
CITIZENS
CIVIL SERVICE
COLLUSION
COMBATING BRIBERY
CONSENSUS
CONTROLLING CORRUPTION
CORRUPT ACTS
CORRUPT INTERESTS
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
CORRUPT PRACTICES
CORRUPTION ACTS
CORRUPTION PENALTIES
CREDIBILITY
DECENTRALIZATION
DECISION MAKING
DECISION-MAKING
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
DISCRETION
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
ELECTORAL PROCESS
ETHICS
EXTORTION
FIGHTING CORRUPTION
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
FISCAL
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
FRAUD
FREE PRESS
GOOD GOVERNANCE
GOVERNANCE FAILURES
GOVERNANCE QUALITY
GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION
GOVERNMENT SERVICES
GOVERNMENT SIZE
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES
GRAFT
GRAND CORRUPTION
INCOME
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
INTEGRITY
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
JUDICIAL REFORM
JUDICIARY
LAWS
LEGAL SYSTEM
LEGISLATION
LISTENING
MEASUREMENT ERRORS
MEDIA
MEDIA FREEDOM
MEDIA INDEPENDENCE
MOTIVATIONS
NO BRIBERY PLEDGE
PARLIAMENT
PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT
PENALTIES
PETTY CORRUPTION
POLITICAL CORRUPTION
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICIANS
POOR GOVERNANCE
POVERTY ALLEVIATION
POVERTY REDUCTION
PRESIDENTS
PRIME MINISTER
PRIORITIES
PROCUREMENT
PROSECUTION
PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
PUBLIC FUNDS
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC OPINION
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
PUBLIC SECTOR
PUBLIC SERVICE
PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY
REGULATORY CAPTURE
REMEDIES
RULE OF LAW
SANCTIONS
SELF-INTEREST
SERVICE DELIVERY
SIZE OF GOVERNMENT
STAKEHOLDERS
TAX EVASION
TAXATION
TRANSPARENCY
spellingShingle ACCOUNTABILITY
ANTI- CORRUPTION
ANTI-CORRUPTION
ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTIONS
ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY
ANTICORRUPTION
BASIC NEEDS
BENEFITS OF CORRUPTION
BRIBERY
BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS
BRIBES
BUREAUCRACY
BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES
CAPACITY BUILDING
CITIZEN
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
CITIZENS
CIVIL SERVICE
COLLUSION
COMBATING BRIBERY
CONSENSUS
CONTROLLING CORRUPTION
CORRUPT ACTS
CORRUPT INTERESTS
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
CORRUPT PRACTICES
CORRUPTION ACTS
CORRUPTION PENALTIES
CREDIBILITY
DECENTRALIZATION
DECISION MAKING
DECISION-MAKING
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
DISCRETION
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
ELECTORAL PROCESS
ETHICS
EXTORTION
FIGHTING CORRUPTION
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
FISCAL
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
FRAUD
FREE PRESS
GOOD GOVERNANCE
GOVERNANCE FAILURES
GOVERNANCE QUALITY
GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION
GOVERNMENT SERVICES
GOVERNMENT SIZE
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES
GRAFT
GRAND CORRUPTION
INCOME
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
INTEGRITY
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
JUDICIAL REFORM
JUDICIARY
LAWS
LEGAL SYSTEM
LEGISLATION
LISTENING
MEASUREMENT ERRORS
MEDIA
MEDIA FREEDOM
MEDIA INDEPENDENCE
MOTIVATIONS
NO BRIBERY PLEDGE
PARLIAMENT
PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT
PENALTIES
PETTY CORRUPTION
POLITICAL CORRUPTION
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICIANS
POOR GOVERNANCE
POVERTY ALLEVIATION
POVERTY REDUCTION
PRESIDENTS
PRIME MINISTER
PRIORITIES
PROCUREMENT
PROSECUTION
PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
PUBLIC FUNDS
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC OPINION
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
PUBLIC SECTOR
PUBLIC SERVICE
PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY
REGULATORY CAPTURE
REMEDIES
RULE OF LAW
SANCTIONS
SELF-INTEREST
SERVICE DELIVERY
SIZE OF GOVERNMENT
STAKEHOLDERS
TAX EVASION
TAXATION
TRANSPARENCY
Huther, Jeff
Shah, Anwar
Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs : A Framework for Evaluation
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2501
description The anti-corruption strategy the World Bank announced in September 1997 defined corruption as the "use of public office for private gain" and called for the Bank to address corruption along four dimensions: 1) Preventing fraud and corruption in Bank projects; 2) Helping countries that request Bank assistance for fighting corruption; 3) Mainstreaming a concern about corruption in Bank work; and 4) Lending active support to international efforts to address corruption. The menu of possible actions to contain corruption (in both countries and Bank projects) is very large, so the authors develop a framework to help assign priorities, depending on views of what does and does not work in specific countries. Their framework, based on public officials' incentives for opportunistic behavior, distinguishes between highly corrupt and largely corruption-free societies. Certain conditions encourage public officials to seek or accept corruption: a) The expected gains from undertaking a corrupt act exceed the expected costs. b) Little weight is placed on the cost that corruption imposes on others. In a country with heavy corruption and poor governance, the priorities in anti-corruption efforts would then be to establish rule of law, strengthen institutions of participation and accountability, and limit government interventions to focus on core mandates. In a country with moderate corruption and fair governance, the priorities would be decentralization and economic reform, results-oriented management and evaluation, and the introduction of incentives for competitive delivery of public services. In a country with little corruption and strong governance, the priorities might be explicit anti-corruption agencies and programs, stronger financial management, increased public and government awareness, no-bribery pledges, efforts to fry the "big fish," and so on.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Huther, Jeff
Shah, Anwar
author_facet Huther, Jeff
Shah, Anwar
author_sort Huther, Jeff
title Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs : A Framework for Evaluation
title_short Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs : A Framework for Evaluation
title_full Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs : A Framework for Evaluation
title_fullStr Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs : A Framework for Evaluation
title_full_unstemmed Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs : A Framework for Evaluation
title_sort anti-corruption policies and programs : a framework for evaluation
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2014
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/12/748708/anti-corruption-policies-programs-framework-evaluation
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19753
_version_ 1764440547945086976
spelling okr-10986-197532021-04-23T14:03:44Z Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs : A Framework for Evaluation Huther, Jeff Shah, Anwar ACCOUNTABILITY ANTI- CORRUPTION ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTIONS ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY ANTICORRUPTION BASIC NEEDS BENEFITS OF CORRUPTION BRIBERY BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS BRIBES BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES CAPACITY BUILDING CITIZEN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION CITIZENS CIVIL SERVICE COLLUSION COMBATING BRIBERY CONSENSUS CONTROLLING CORRUPTION CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPT INTERESTS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION ACTS CORRUPTION PENALTIES CREDIBILITY DECENTRALIZATION DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS DISCRETION ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ELECTORAL PROCESS ETHICS EXTORTION FIGHTING CORRUPTION FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FISCAL FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FRAUD FREE PRESS GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE FAILURES GOVERNANCE QUALITY GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION GOVERNMENT SERVICES GOVERNMENT SIZE GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES GRAFT GRAND CORRUPTION INCOME INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDICIAL REFORM JUDICIARY LAWS LEGAL SYSTEM LEGISLATION LISTENING MEASUREMENT ERRORS MEDIA MEDIA FREEDOM MEDIA INDEPENDENCE MOTIVATIONS NO BRIBERY PLEDGE PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT PENALTIES PETTY CORRUPTION POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICIANS POOR GOVERNANCE POVERTY ALLEVIATION POVERTY REDUCTION PRESIDENTS PRIME MINISTER PRIORITIES PROCUREMENT PROSECUTION PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY REGULATORY CAPTURE REMEDIES RULE OF LAW SANCTIONS SELF-INTEREST SERVICE DELIVERY SIZE OF GOVERNMENT STAKEHOLDERS TAX EVASION TAXATION TRANSPARENCY The anti-corruption strategy the World Bank announced in September 1997 defined corruption as the "use of public office for private gain" and called for the Bank to address corruption along four dimensions: 1) Preventing fraud and corruption in Bank projects; 2) Helping countries that request Bank assistance for fighting corruption; 3) Mainstreaming a concern about corruption in Bank work; and 4) Lending active support to international efforts to address corruption. The menu of possible actions to contain corruption (in both countries and Bank projects) is very large, so the authors develop a framework to help assign priorities, depending on views of what does and does not work in specific countries. Their framework, based on public officials' incentives for opportunistic behavior, distinguishes between highly corrupt and largely corruption-free societies. Certain conditions encourage public officials to seek or accept corruption: a) The expected gains from undertaking a corrupt act exceed the expected costs. b) Little weight is placed on the cost that corruption imposes on others. In a country with heavy corruption and poor governance, the priorities in anti-corruption efforts would then be to establish rule of law, strengthen institutions of participation and accountability, and limit government interventions to focus on core mandates. In a country with moderate corruption and fair governance, the priorities would be decentralization and economic reform, results-oriented management and evaluation, and the introduction of incentives for competitive delivery of public services. In a country with little corruption and strong governance, the priorities might be explicit anti-corruption agencies and programs, stronger financial management, increased public and government awareness, no-bribery pledges, efforts to fry the "big fish," and so on. 2014-08-27T16:56:36Z 2014-08-27T16:56:36Z 2000-12 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/12/748708/anti-corruption-policies-programs-framework-evaluation http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19753 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2501 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research