Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict?
High-quality institutions -- reflected in such factors as rule of law, bureaucratic quality, freedom from government expropriation, and freedom from government repudiation of contracts -- mitigate the adverse economic effects of ethnic fractionaliz...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/11/717462/can-institutions-resolve-ethnic-conflict http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19747 |
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okr-10986-19747 |
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oai_dc |
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Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
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Digital Repositories |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
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World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW BANKING SYSTEM BLACK MARKET BLACK MARKET PREMIUM BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CAPITAL ACCUMULATION CASE STUDIES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CIVIL WAR COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE CORRUPTION COUNTRY DATA COUNTRY RISK GUIDE CROSS-COUNTRY DATA DATA SOURCES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH DISTRIBUTIVE GOODS ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC EFFECTS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC POLICY ECONOMIC POLICY REFORMS ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC STUDIES ECONOMICS LITERATURE EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ENDOGENOUS SEGREGATION ERROR TERMS ESTIMATION METHOD ETHNIC DIVERSITY ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION ETHNIC GROUP ETHNIC GROUPS ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY ETHNIC HOMOGENEITY ETHNIC MINORITIES EXCHANGE OF IDEAS EXCHANGE RATE EXTERNAL SHOCKS FINANCIAL DEPTH FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FOREIGN AID FOREIGN EXCHANGE FORMAL INSTITUTIONS GLOBAL VIEW GOOD INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP GROWTH GROWTH EQUATION GROWTH ESTIMATION GROWTH PERFORMANCE GROWTH REGRESSION GROWTH REGRESSIONS HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES HETEROSKEDASTICITY HISTORICAL DATA HUMAN CAPITAL INCOME INCOME INCOME DIFFERENTIALS INCOME DISTRIBUTION INDEPENDENT VARIABLES INEQUALITY INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL INDEX INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INTEREST GROUP INTEREST RATE INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY INTERNATIONAL TRADE LOCAL COMMUNITY LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE LONG-RUN GROWTH MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS MACROECONOMIC POLICY MACROECONOMICS MARGINAL EFFECT MARKET EXCHANGE MIDDLE CLASS MIDDLE CLASS CONSENSUS NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS NATIONAL TERRITORY NATURAL RESOURCE ABUNDANCE NEGATIVE EFFECT NEIGHBORHOOD EXTERNALITIES OIL WINDFALL OVERVALUED EXCHANGE OVERVALUED EXCHANGE RATE PERSISTENT INCOME INEQUALITY POLICY CHOICES POLICY INDICATORS POLICY REFORM POLICY REFORMS POLICY RESEARCH POLICY VARIABLES POLITICAL BLOCS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL FREEDOMS POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION POLITICAL MODELS POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SCIENCE LITERATURE POLITICAL STABILITY POOR GROWTH POOR PERFORMANCE POPULATION SIZE POSITIVE EFFECT POVERTY RATE POVERTY REDUCTION PRIMARY SCHOOL PRIME MINISTER PRODUCTIVE POTENTIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC SPENDING PUBLIC SUPPORT QUALITY INSTITUTIONS QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS QUALITY OF PUBLIC QUANTITATIVE APPROACH REVERSE CAUSATION RULE OF LAW SECONDARY SCHOOL EXPANSION SOCIAL CAPITAL SOCIAL CLUBS SOCIAL CONFLICT SOCIAL EXPENDITURES SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS SOCIAL OUTCOMES TELEPHONES TRADE SHOCKS |
| spellingShingle |
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW BANKING SYSTEM BLACK MARKET BLACK MARKET PREMIUM BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CAPITAL ACCUMULATION CASE STUDIES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CIVIL WAR COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE CORRUPTION COUNTRY DATA COUNTRY RISK GUIDE CROSS-COUNTRY DATA DATA SOURCES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH DISTRIBUTIVE GOODS ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC EFFECTS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC POLICY ECONOMIC POLICY REFORMS ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC STUDIES ECONOMICS LITERATURE EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ENDOGENOUS SEGREGATION ERROR TERMS ESTIMATION METHOD ETHNIC DIVERSITY ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION ETHNIC GROUP ETHNIC GROUPS ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY ETHNIC HOMOGENEITY ETHNIC MINORITIES EXCHANGE OF IDEAS EXCHANGE RATE EXTERNAL SHOCKS FINANCIAL DEPTH FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FOREIGN AID FOREIGN EXCHANGE FORMAL INSTITUTIONS GLOBAL VIEW GOOD INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP GROWTH GROWTH EQUATION GROWTH ESTIMATION GROWTH PERFORMANCE GROWTH REGRESSION GROWTH REGRESSIONS HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES HETEROSKEDASTICITY HISTORICAL DATA HUMAN CAPITAL INCOME INCOME INCOME DIFFERENTIALS INCOME DISTRIBUTION INDEPENDENT VARIABLES INEQUALITY INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL INDEX INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INTEREST GROUP INTEREST RATE INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY INTERNATIONAL TRADE LOCAL COMMUNITY LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE LONG-RUN GROWTH MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS MACROECONOMIC POLICY MACROECONOMICS MARGINAL EFFECT MARKET EXCHANGE MIDDLE CLASS MIDDLE CLASS CONSENSUS NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS NATIONAL TERRITORY NATURAL RESOURCE ABUNDANCE NEGATIVE EFFECT NEIGHBORHOOD EXTERNALITIES OIL WINDFALL OVERVALUED EXCHANGE OVERVALUED EXCHANGE RATE PERSISTENT INCOME INEQUALITY POLICY CHOICES POLICY INDICATORS POLICY REFORM POLICY REFORMS POLICY RESEARCH POLICY VARIABLES POLITICAL BLOCS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL FREEDOMS POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION POLITICAL MODELS POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SCIENCE LITERATURE POLITICAL STABILITY POOR GROWTH POOR PERFORMANCE POPULATION SIZE POSITIVE EFFECT POVERTY RATE POVERTY REDUCTION PRIMARY SCHOOL PRIME MINISTER PRODUCTIVE POTENTIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC SPENDING PUBLIC SUPPORT QUALITY INSTITUTIONS QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS QUALITY OF PUBLIC QUANTITATIVE APPROACH REVERSE CAUSATION RULE OF LAW SECONDARY SCHOOL EXPANSION SOCIAL CAPITAL SOCIAL CLUBS SOCIAL CONFLICT SOCIAL EXPENDITURES SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS SOCIAL OUTCOMES TELEPHONES TRADE SHOCKS Easterly, William Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict? |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2482 |
| description |
High-quality institutions -- reflected
in such factors as rule of law, bureaucratic quality,
freedom from government expropriation, and freedom from
government repudiation of contracts -- mitigate the adverse
economic effects of ethnic fractionalization identified by
Easterly and Levine (1997) and others. Ethnic diversity has
a more adverse effect on economic policy and growth when a
government's institutions are poor. But poor
institutions have an even more adverse effect on growth and
policy when ethnic diversity is high. In countries where the
institutions are good enough, however, ethnic diversity does
not lessen growth or worsen economic policies. Good
institutions also reduce the risk of wars and genocides that
might otherwise result from ethnic fractionalization.
However, these forms of violence are not the channel through
which ethnic fragmentation and its interaction with
institutions affect economic growth. Ethnically diverse
nations that want to endure in peace and prosperity must
build good institutions. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Easterly, William |
| author_facet |
Easterly, William |
| author_sort |
Easterly, William |
| title |
Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict? |
| title_short |
Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict? |
| title_full |
Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict? |
| title_fullStr |
Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict? |
| title_sort |
can institutions resolve ethnic conflict? |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/11/717462/can-institutions-resolve-ethnic-conflict http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19747 |
| _version_ |
1764440529519509504 |
| spelling |
okr-10986-197472021-04-23T14:03:44Z Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict? Easterly, William AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW BANKING SYSTEM BLACK MARKET BLACK MARKET PREMIUM BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CAPITAL ACCUMULATION CASE STUDIES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CIVIL WAR COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE CORRUPTION COUNTRY DATA COUNTRY RISK GUIDE CROSS-COUNTRY DATA DATA SOURCES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH DISTRIBUTIVE GOODS ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC EFFECTS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC POLICY ECONOMIC POLICY REFORMS ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC STUDIES ECONOMICS LITERATURE EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ENDOGENOUS SEGREGATION ERROR TERMS ESTIMATION METHOD ETHNIC DIVERSITY ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION ETHNIC GROUP ETHNIC GROUPS ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY ETHNIC HOMOGENEITY ETHNIC MINORITIES EXCHANGE OF IDEAS EXCHANGE RATE EXTERNAL SHOCKS FINANCIAL DEPTH FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FOREIGN AID FOREIGN EXCHANGE FORMAL INSTITUTIONS GLOBAL VIEW GOOD INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP GROWTH GROWTH EQUATION GROWTH ESTIMATION GROWTH PERFORMANCE GROWTH REGRESSION GROWTH REGRESSIONS HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES HETEROSKEDASTICITY HISTORICAL DATA HUMAN CAPITAL INCOME INCOME INCOME DIFFERENTIALS INCOME DISTRIBUTION INDEPENDENT VARIABLES INEQUALITY INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL INDEX INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INTEREST GROUP INTEREST RATE INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY INTERNATIONAL TRADE LOCAL COMMUNITY LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE LONG-RUN GROWTH MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS MACROECONOMIC POLICY MACROECONOMICS MARGINAL EFFECT MARKET EXCHANGE MIDDLE CLASS MIDDLE CLASS CONSENSUS NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS NATIONAL TERRITORY NATURAL RESOURCE ABUNDANCE NEGATIVE EFFECT NEIGHBORHOOD EXTERNALITIES OIL WINDFALL OVERVALUED EXCHANGE OVERVALUED EXCHANGE RATE PERSISTENT INCOME INEQUALITY POLICY CHOICES POLICY INDICATORS POLICY REFORM POLICY REFORMS POLICY RESEARCH POLICY VARIABLES POLITICAL BLOCS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL FREEDOMS POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION POLITICAL MODELS POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SCIENCE LITERATURE POLITICAL STABILITY POOR GROWTH POOR PERFORMANCE POPULATION SIZE POSITIVE EFFECT POVERTY RATE POVERTY REDUCTION PRIMARY SCHOOL PRIME MINISTER PRODUCTIVE POTENTIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC SPENDING PUBLIC SUPPORT QUALITY INSTITUTIONS QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS QUALITY OF PUBLIC QUANTITATIVE APPROACH REVERSE CAUSATION RULE OF LAW SECONDARY SCHOOL EXPANSION SOCIAL CAPITAL SOCIAL CLUBS SOCIAL CONFLICT SOCIAL EXPENDITURES SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS SOCIAL OUTCOMES TELEPHONES TRADE SHOCKS High-quality institutions -- reflected in such factors as rule of law, bureaucratic quality, freedom from government expropriation, and freedom from government repudiation of contracts -- mitigate the adverse economic effects of ethnic fractionalization identified by Easterly and Levine (1997) and others. Ethnic diversity has a more adverse effect on economic policy and growth when a government's institutions are poor. But poor institutions have an even more adverse effect on growth and policy when ethnic diversity is high. In countries where the institutions are good enough, however, ethnic diversity does not lessen growth or worsen economic policies. Good institutions also reduce the risk of wars and genocides that might otherwise result from ethnic fractionalization. However, these forms of violence are not the channel through which ethnic fragmentation and its interaction with institutions affect economic growth. Ethnically diverse nations that want to endure in peace and prosperity must build good institutions. 2014-08-27T14:01:11Z 2014-08-27T14:01:11Z 2000-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/11/717462/can-institutions-resolve-ethnic-conflict http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19747 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2482 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |