Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict?
High-quality institutions -- reflected in such factors as rule of law, bureaucratic quality, freedom from government expropriation, and freedom from government repudiation of contracts -- mitigate the adverse economic effects of ethnic fractionaliz...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/11/717462/can-institutions-resolve-ethnic-conflict http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19747 |
| Summary: | High-quality institutions -- reflected
in such factors as rule of law, bureaucratic quality,
freedom from government expropriation, and freedom from
government repudiation of contracts -- mitigate the adverse
economic effects of ethnic fractionalization identified by
Easterly and Levine (1997) and others. Ethnic diversity has
a more adverse effect on economic policy and growth when a
government's institutions are poor. But poor
institutions have an even more adverse effect on growth and
policy when ethnic diversity is high. In countries where the
institutions are good enough, however, ethnic diversity does
not lessen growth or worsen economic policies. Good
institutions also reduce the risk of wars and genocides that
might otherwise result from ethnic fractionalization.
However, these forms of violence are not the channel through
which ethnic fragmentation and its interaction with
institutions affect economic growth. Ethnically diverse
nations that want to endure in peace and prosperity must
build good institutions. |
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