Decentralization and Accountability : Are Voters More Vigilant in Local than in National Elections?

Defining vigilance as retrospective voting - where voters evaluate incumbents on their performance during their entire term in office - the author compares voter behavior in local and national elections to make inferences about whether voters are m...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Khemani, Stuti
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:	ACCOUNTABILITY ADVERSE SELECTION AGRICULTURE AUTHORITY BY ELECTION CANDIDATES CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS CITIZENS COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUTION DECENTRALIZATION DECENTRALIZATION IN GOVERNMENT DEMOCRACIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ECONOMIC INFORMATION ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ELECTION ELECTORATE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERALISM FISCAL FISCAL POLICY FOREIGN POLICY FREEDOM FUTURE RESEARCH GINI COEFFICIENT GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT BUDGETS GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES INFLATION INTEREST GROUP LAWS LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEGISLATURE LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL ELECTIONS LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS MARGINAL COST MONETARY POLICY MORAL HAZARD NATIONAL ELECTIONS NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL INCOME NATIONAL LEVEL PARTY AFFILIATION POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL ACTIONS POLITICAL AFFILIATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL FACTORS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICIANS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS PRESIDENTIAL RACE PRIME MINISTER PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE STATE ELECTIONS STATE FISCAL POLICY STATE GOVERNMENT STATE INCOME TAX CUTS UNEMPLOYMENT VOTER PARTICIPATION VOTER PREFERENCES VOTERS VOTING VOTING BEHAVIOR
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/02/1003165/decentralization-accountability-voters-more-vigilant-local-national-elections http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19702

id	okr-10986-19702
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-197022021-04-23T14:03:44Z Decentralization and Accountability : Are Voters More Vigilant in Local than in National Elections? Khemani, Stuti ACCOUNTABILITY ADVERSE SELECTION AGRICULTURE AUTHORITY BY ELECTION CANDIDATES CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS CITIZENS COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUTION DECENTRALIZATION DECENTRALIZATION IN GOVERNMENT DEMOCRACIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ECONOMIC INFORMATION ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ELECTION ELECTORATE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERALISM FISCAL FISCAL POLICY FOREIGN POLICY FREEDOM FUTURE RESEARCH GINI COEFFICIENT GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT BUDGETS GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES INFLATION INTEREST GROUP LAWS LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEGISLATURE LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL ELECTIONS LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS MARGINAL COST MONETARY POLICY MORAL HAZARD NATIONAL ELECTIONS NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL INCOME NATIONAL LEVEL PARTY AFFILIATION POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL ACTIONS POLITICAL AFFILIATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL FACTORS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICIANS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS PRESIDENTIAL RACE PRIME MINISTER PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE STATE ELECTIONS STATE FISCAL POLICY STATE GOVERNMENT STATE INCOME TAX CUTS UNEMPLOYMENT VOTER PARTICIPATION VOTER PREFERENCES VOTERS VOTING VOTING BEHAVIOR Defining vigilance as retrospective voting - where voters evaluate incumbents on their performance during their entire term in office - the author compares voter behavior in local and national elections to make inferences about whether voters are more vigilant in monitoring government at the local level. Using data from 14 major states in India over the period 1960-92, she contrasts voters' behavior in state legislative assembly elections with their behavior in national legislative elections. In state assembly elections voter reward incumbents for local income growth, and punish them for a rise in inequality, over their entire term in office. But in national elections voters behave myopically, rewarding growth in national income and a fall in inflation and inequality only in the year preceding the election. The evidence is consistent with greater voter vigilance and government accountability in local than in national elections. 2014-08-26T19:00:54Z 2014-08-26T19:00:54Z 2001-02 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/02/1003165/decentralization-accountability-voters-more-vigilant-local-national-elections http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19702 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2557 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research South Asia India
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	ACCOUNTABILITY ADVERSE SELECTION AGRICULTURE AUTHORITY BY ELECTION CANDIDATES CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS CITIZENS COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUTION DECENTRALIZATION DECENTRALIZATION IN GOVERNMENT DEMOCRACIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ECONOMIC INFORMATION ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ELECTION ELECTORATE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERALISM FISCAL FISCAL POLICY FOREIGN POLICY FREEDOM FUTURE RESEARCH GINI COEFFICIENT GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT BUDGETS GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES INFLATION INTEREST GROUP LAWS LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEGISLATURE LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL ELECTIONS LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS MARGINAL COST MONETARY POLICY MORAL HAZARD NATIONAL ELECTIONS NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL INCOME NATIONAL LEVEL PARTY AFFILIATION POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL ACTIONS POLITICAL AFFILIATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL FACTORS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICIANS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS PRESIDENTIAL RACE PRIME MINISTER PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE STATE ELECTIONS STATE FISCAL POLICY STATE GOVERNMENT STATE INCOME TAX CUTS UNEMPLOYMENT VOTER PARTICIPATION VOTER PREFERENCES VOTERS VOTING VOTING BEHAVIOR
spellingShingle	ACCOUNTABILITY ADVERSE SELECTION AGRICULTURE AUTHORITY BY ELECTION CANDIDATES CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS CITIZENS COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUTION DECENTRALIZATION DECENTRALIZATION IN GOVERNMENT DEMOCRACIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ECONOMIC INFORMATION ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ELECTION ELECTORATE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERALISM FISCAL FISCAL POLICY FOREIGN POLICY FREEDOM FUTURE RESEARCH GINI COEFFICIENT GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT BUDGETS GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES INFLATION INTEREST GROUP LAWS LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEGISLATURE LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL ELECTIONS LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS MARGINAL COST MONETARY POLICY MORAL HAZARD NATIONAL ELECTIONS NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL INCOME NATIONAL LEVEL PARTY AFFILIATION POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL ACTIONS POLITICAL AFFILIATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL FACTORS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICIANS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS PRESIDENTIAL RACE PRIME MINISTER PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE STATE ELECTIONS STATE FISCAL POLICY STATE GOVERNMENT STATE INCOME TAX CUTS UNEMPLOYMENT VOTER PARTICIPATION VOTER PREFERENCES VOTERS VOTING VOTING BEHAVIOR Khemani, Stuti Decentralization and Accountability : Are Voters More Vigilant in Local than in National Elections?
geographic_facet	South Asia India
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2557
description	Defining vigilance as retrospective voting - where voters evaluate incumbents on their performance during their entire term in office - the author compares voter behavior in local and national elections to make inferences about whether voters are more vigilant in monitoring government at the local level. Using data from 14 major states in India over the period 1960-92, she contrasts voters' behavior in state legislative assembly elections with their behavior in national legislative elections. In state assembly elections voter reward incumbents for local income growth, and punish them for a rise in inequality, over their entire term in office. But in national elections voters behave myopically, rewarding growth in national income and a fall in inflation and inequality only in the year preceding the election. The evidence is consistent with greater voter vigilance and government accountability in local than in national elections.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Khemani, Stuti
author_facet	Khemani, Stuti
author_sort	Khemani, Stuti
title	Decentralization and Accountability : Are Voters More Vigilant in Local than in National Elections?
title_short	Decentralization and Accountability : Are Voters More Vigilant in Local than in National Elections?
title_full	Decentralization and Accountability : Are Voters More Vigilant in Local than in National Elections?
title_fullStr	Decentralization and Accountability : Are Voters More Vigilant in Local than in National Elections?
title_full_unstemmed	Decentralization and Accountability : Are Voters More Vigilant in Local than in National Elections?
title_sort	decentralization and accountability : are voters more vigilant in local than in national elections?
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2014
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/02/1003165/decentralization-accountability-voters-more-vigilant-local-national-elections http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19702
_version_	1764440397291978752

Decentralization and Accountability : Are Voters More Vigilant in Local than in National Elections?

Similar Items