Democracy and Income Inequality : An Empirical Analysis

Standard political economy theories suggest that democratization has a moderating effect on income inequality. But the empirical literature has failed to uncover any such robust relationship. The authors take another look at the issue. The authors...

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Main Authors: Gradstein, Mark, Milanovic, Branko, Ying, Yvonne
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/03/1047466/democracy-income-inequality-empirical-analysis
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19685
id okr-10986-19685
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-196852021-04-23T14:03:44Z Democracy and Income Inequality : An Empirical Analysis Gradstein, Mark Milanovic, Branko Ying, Yvonne COALITION GOVERNMENTS COMMUNISM COMMUNIST COMMUNIST PARTY COUNTRY DUMMIES COUNTRY EFFECTS CROSS- COUNTRY DIFFERENCES CROSS-COUNTRY REGRESSION DATA SET DECREASING FUNCTION DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIZATION DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DICTATORSHIP DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EGALITARIAN DISTRIBUTION EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION EMPIRICAL LITERATURE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EMPIRICAL TEST GDP GINI COEFFICIENT GROWTH RATE HUMAN RESOURCES HUMAN RESOURCES IDEOLOGIES INCOME INCOME DIFFERENCES INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS INCOME GROUPS INCOME INEQUALITY INCOME LEVEL INCOME LEVELS INCOME REDISTRIBUTION INCREASED INEQUALITY INCREASING FUNCTION INEQUALITY INEQUALITY DATA INEQUALITY MEASURE INEQUALITY MEASURES LABOR SUPPLY LACK OF TRANSPARENCY LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEGISLATURE MEDIAN INCOME MEDIAN VOTER MINISTERS NATIONS NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP OLIGARCHY PARLIAMENT PER CAPITA GROWTH PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE PER CAPITA INCOME PER CAPITA INCOME LEVELS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICAL SCIENTISTS POLITICAL SYSTEM PRESIDENTS PRIME MINISTER PRIME MINISTERS PURCHASING POWER PURCHASING POWER PARITY REFERENDUM REGRESSION ANALYSIS REPUBLICS RESOURCE ALLOCATION REVERSE CAUSALITY REVERSE CAUSATION SAM TAX RATE TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY VETO VETO POWER VOTING WAGES Standard political economy theories suggest that democratization has a moderating effect on income inequality. But the empirical literature has failed to uncover any such robust relationship. The authors take another look at the issue. The authors argue that prevailing ideology may be an important determinant of inequality and that the democratization effect "works through" ideology. In societies that value equality highly there is less distributional conflict among income groups, so democratization may have only a negligible effect on inequality. But in societies that value equality less, democratization reduces inequality through redistribution as the poor outvote the rich. The authors' cross-country empirical analysis, covering 126 countries in 1960-98, confirms the hypothesis: ideology, as proxied by a country's dominant religion, seems to be related to inequality. In addition, while in Judeo-Christian societies increased democratization appears to lead to lower inequality, in Muslim and Confucian societies it has an insignificant effect. The authors hypothesize that Muslim and Confucian societies rely on informal transfers to reach the desired level of inequality, while Judeo-Christian societies, where family ties are weaker, use political action. 2014-08-26T15:57:06Z 2014-08-26T15:57:06Z 2001-03 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/03/1047466/democracy-income-inequality-empirical-analysis http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19685 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2561 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic COALITION GOVERNMENTS
COMMUNISM
COMMUNIST
COMMUNIST PARTY
COUNTRY DUMMIES
COUNTRY EFFECTS
CROSS- COUNTRY DIFFERENCES
CROSS-COUNTRY REGRESSION
DATA SET
DECREASING FUNCTION
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIZATION
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
DEVELOPMENT
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DICTATORSHIP
DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
EGALITARIAN DISTRIBUTION
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
EMPIRICAL TEST
GDP
GINI COEFFICIENT
GROWTH RATE
HUMAN RESOURCES
HUMAN RESOURCES
IDEOLOGIES
INCOME
INCOME DIFFERENCES
INCOME DISTRIBUTION
INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS
INCOME GROUPS
INCOME INEQUALITY
INCOME LEVEL
INCOME LEVELS
INCOME REDISTRIBUTION
INCREASED INEQUALITY
INCREASING FUNCTION
INEQUALITY
INEQUALITY DATA
INEQUALITY MEASURE
INEQUALITY MEASURES
LABOR SUPPLY
LACK OF TRANSPARENCY
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
LEGISLATURE
MEDIAN INCOME
MEDIAN VOTER
MINISTERS
NATIONS
NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP
OLIGARCHY
PARLIAMENT
PER CAPITA GROWTH
PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE
PER CAPITA INCOME
PER CAPITA INCOME LEVELS
POLICY RESEARCH
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
POLITICAL PARTIES
POLITICAL POWER
POLITICAL RIGHTS
POLITICAL SCIENTISTS
POLITICAL SYSTEM
PRESIDENTS
PRIME MINISTER
PRIME MINISTERS
PURCHASING POWER
PURCHASING POWER PARITY
REFERENDUM
REGRESSION ANALYSIS
REPUBLICS
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
REVERSE CAUSALITY
REVERSE CAUSATION
SAM
TAX RATE
TAXATION
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
TRANSPARENCY
VETO
VETO POWER
VOTING
WAGES
spellingShingle COALITION GOVERNMENTS
COMMUNISM
COMMUNIST
COMMUNIST PARTY
COUNTRY DUMMIES
COUNTRY EFFECTS
CROSS- COUNTRY DIFFERENCES
CROSS-COUNTRY REGRESSION
DATA SET
DECREASING FUNCTION
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIZATION
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
DEVELOPMENT
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DICTATORSHIP
DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
EGALITARIAN DISTRIBUTION
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
EMPIRICAL TEST
GDP
GINI COEFFICIENT
GROWTH RATE
HUMAN RESOURCES
HUMAN RESOURCES
IDEOLOGIES
INCOME
INCOME DIFFERENCES
INCOME DISTRIBUTION
INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS
INCOME GROUPS
INCOME INEQUALITY
INCOME LEVEL
INCOME LEVELS
INCOME REDISTRIBUTION
INCREASED INEQUALITY
INCREASING FUNCTION
INEQUALITY
INEQUALITY DATA
INEQUALITY MEASURE
INEQUALITY MEASURES
LABOR SUPPLY
LACK OF TRANSPARENCY
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
LEGISLATURE
MEDIAN INCOME
MEDIAN VOTER
MINISTERS
NATIONS
NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP
OLIGARCHY
PARLIAMENT
PER CAPITA GROWTH
PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE
PER CAPITA INCOME
PER CAPITA INCOME LEVELS
POLICY RESEARCH
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
POLITICAL PARTIES
POLITICAL POWER
POLITICAL RIGHTS
POLITICAL SCIENTISTS
POLITICAL SYSTEM
PRESIDENTS
PRIME MINISTER
PRIME MINISTERS
PURCHASING POWER
PURCHASING POWER PARITY
REFERENDUM
REGRESSION ANALYSIS
REPUBLICS
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
REVERSE CAUSALITY
REVERSE CAUSATION
SAM
TAX RATE
TAXATION
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
TRANSPARENCY
VETO
VETO POWER
VOTING
WAGES
Gradstein, Mark
Milanovic, Branko
Ying, Yvonne
Democracy and Income Inequality : An Empirical Analysis
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2561
description Standard political economy theories suggest that democratization has a moderating effect on income inequality. But the empirical literature has failed to uncover any such robust relationship. The authors take another look at the issue. The authors argue that prevailing ideology may be an important determinant of inequality and that the democratization effect "works through" ideology. In societies that value equality highly there is less distributional conflict among income groups, so democratization may have only a negligible effect on inequality. But in societies that value equality less, democratization reduces inequality through redistribution as the poor outvote the rich. The authors' cross-country empirical analysis, covering 126 countries in 1960-98, confirms the hypothesis: ideology, as proxied by a country's dominant religion, seems to be related to inequality. In addition, while in Judeo-Christian societies increased democratization appears to lead to lower inequality, in Muslim and Confucian societies it has an insignificant effect. The authors hypothesize that Muslim and Confucian societies rely on informal transfers to reach the desired level of inequality, while Judeo-Christian societies, where family ties are weaker, use political action.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Gradstein, Mark
Milanovic, Branko
Ying, Yvonne
author_facet Gradstein, Mark
Milanovic, Branko
Ying, Yvonne
author_sort Gradstein, Mark
title Democracy and Income Inequality : An Empirical Analysis
title_short Democracy and Income Inequality : An Empirical Analysis
title_full Democracy and Income Inequality : An Empirical Analysis
title_fullStr Democracy and Income Inequality : An Empirical Analysis
title_full_unstemmed Democracy and Income Inequality : An Empirical Analysis
title_sort democracy and income inequality : an empirical analysis
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2014
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/03/1047466/democracy-income-inequality-empirical-analysis
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19685
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