Are Incentives Everything? Payment Mechanisms for Health Care Providers in Developing Countries

This paper assesses the extent to which provider payment mechanisms can help developing countries address their leading health care problems. It first identifies four key problems in the health care systems in developing countries: 1) public facili...

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Main Author:	Gauri, Varun
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:	ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BREAST CANCER CAPITATION CITIES CLINICS COMMUNITIES COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONDOMS COUNSELING DECISION MAKING DISTORTIONARY EFFECTS DOCTORS ECONOMIC REVIEW EDUCATION ELASTICITIES ELASTICITY OF DEMAND EMERGENCY ROOMS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EMPIRICAL STUDIES EMPLOYMENT EPIDEMIOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE EXPENDITURES EXTERNALITIES FAMILIES FUELS HEALTH HEALTH CARE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS HEALTH CARE PROVISION HEALTH CARE SERVICES HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS HEALTH CARE UTILIZATION HEALTH CLINICS HEALTH ECONOMICS HEALTH EXPENDITURES HEALTH OUTCOMES HEALTH POLICY HEALTH POSTS HEALTH PROVIDERS HEALTH SECTOR HEALTH SERVICES HEALTH SYSTEM HEALTH SYSTEMS HMO HMOS HOSPITAL CARE HOSPITAL SERVICES HOSPITALIZATION HOSPITALS HOUSEHOLDS IMMUNIZATION INCENTIVE SCHEMES INCOME INFORMAL SECTOR INSURANCE INSURANCE MARKETS ISOLATION LEISURE MANAGED CARE MANAGERS MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COSTS MARKET FAILURES MARKET POWER MEDICAL CARE MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS MEDICARE MORAL HAZARD MORTALITY MOTIVATION NONPROFIT HOSPITALS NURSES NURSING PARTNERSHIP PATIENT CHOICE PATIENT DUMPING PATIENT EDUCATION PATIENTS PHARMACISTS PHYSICIANS POLICY DECISIONS POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLICY MAKERS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES PRICE ELASTICITIES PRIMARY CARE PRIMARY HEALTH CARE PRIVATE INSURANCE PROBABILITY PRODUCTIVITY PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES PUBLIC HOSPITALS PUBLIC SECTOR QUALITY CONTROL QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE RELATIVE VALUE RISK SHARING RURAL AREAS SAVINGS SCHOOLS SCREENING SOCIAL WELFARE SOCIAL WORKERS SPILLOVERS STERILIZATION SURGERY THEORETICAL MODELS TRADEOFFS TRANSACTION COSTS URBAN AREAS WELFARE ECONOMICS
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/06/2874342/incentives-everything-payment-mechanisms-health-care-providers-developing-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19652

id	okr-10986-19652
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-196522021-04-23T14:03:43Z Are Incentives Everything? Payment Mechanisms for Health Care Providers in Developing Countries Gauri, Varun ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BREAST CANCER CAPITATION CITIES CLINICS COMMUNITIES COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONDOMS COUNSELING DECISION MAKING DISTORTIONARY EFFECTS DOCTORS ECONOMIC REVIEW EDUCATION ELASTICITIES ELASTICITY OF DEMAND EMERGENCY ROOMS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EMPIRICAL STUDIES EMPLOYMENT EPIDEMIOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE EXPENDITURES EXTERNALITIES FAMILIES FUELS HEALTH HEALTH CARE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS HEALTH CARE PROVISION HEALTH CARE SERVICES HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS HEALTH CARE UTILIZATION HEALTH CLINICS HEALTH ECONOMICS HEALTH EXPENDITURES HEALTH OUTCOMES HEALTH POLICY HEALTH POSTS HEALTH PROVIDERS HEALTH SECTOR HEALTH SERVICES HEALTH SYSTEM HEALTH SYSTEMS HMO HMOS HOSPITAL CARE HOSPITAL SERVICES HOSPITALIZATION HOSPITALS HOUSEHOLDS IMMUNIZATION INCENTIVE SCHEMES INCOME INFORMAL SECTOR INSURANCE INSURANCE MARKETS ISOLATION LEISURE MANAGED CARE MANAGERS MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COSTS MARKET FAILURES MARKET POWER MEDICAL CARE MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS MEDICARE MORAL HAZARD MORTALITY MOTIVATION NONPROFIT HOSPITALS NURSES NURSING PARTNERSHIP PATIENT CHOICE PATIENT DUMPING PATIENT EDUCATION PATIENTS PHARMACISTS PHYSICIANS POLICY DECISIONS POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLICY MAKERS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES PRICE ELASTICITIES PRIMARY CARE PRIMARY HEALTH CARE PRIVATE INSURANCE PROBABILITY PRODUCTIVITY PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES PUBLIC HOSPITALS PUBLIC SECTOR QUALITY CONTROL QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE RELATIVE VALUE RISK SHARING RURAL AREAS SAVINGS SCHOOLS SCREENING SOCIAL WELFARE SOCIAL WORKERS SPILLOVERS STERILIZATION SURGERY THEORETICAL MODELS TRADEOFFS TRANSACTION COSTS URBAN AREAS WELFARE ECONOMICS This paper assesses the extent to which provider payment mechanisms can help developing countries address their leading health care problems. It first identifies four key problems in the health care systems in developing countries: 1) public facilities, which provide the bulk of secondary and tertiary health care services in most countries, offer services of poor quality; 2) providers cannot be enticed to rural and urban marginal areas, leaving large segments of the population without adequate access to health care; 3) the composition of health services offered and consumed is sub-optimal; and 4) coordination in the delivery of care, including referrals, second opinions, and teamwork, is inadequate. The paper examines each problem in turn and assesses the extent to which changes in provider payments might address it. 2014-08-25T22:48:43Z 2014-08-25T22:48:43Z 2001-06 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/06/2874342/incentives-everything-payment-mechanisms-health-care-providers-developing-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19652 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2624 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BREAST CANCER CAPITATION CITIES CLINICS COMMUNITIES COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONDOMS COUNSELING DECISION MAKING DISTORTIONARY EFFECTS DOCTORS ECONOMIC REVIEW EDUCATION ELASTICITIES ELASTICITY OF DEMAND EMERGENCY ROOMS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EMPIRICAL STUDIES EMPLOYMENT EPIDEMIOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE EXPENDITURES EXTERNALITIES FAMILIES FUELS HEALTH HEALTH CARE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS HEALTH CARE PROVISION HEALTH CARE SERVICES HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS HEALTH CARE UTILIZATION HEALTH CLINICS HEALTH ECONOMICS HEALTH EXPENDITURES HEALTH OUTCOMES HEALTH POLICY HEALTH POSTS HEALTH PROVIDERS HEALTH SECTOR HEALTH SERVICES HEALTH SYSTEM HEALTH SYSTEMS HMO HMOS HOSPITAL CARE HOSPITAL SERVICES HOSPITALIZATION HOSPITALS HOUSEHOLDS IMMUNIZATION INCENTIVE SCHEMES INCOME INFORMAL SECTOR INSURANCE INSURANCE MARKETS ISOLATION LEISURE MANAGED CARE MANAGERS MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COSTS MARKET FAILURES MARKET POWER MEDICAL CARE MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS MEDICARE MORAL HAZARD MORTALITY MOTIVATION NONPROFIT HOSPITALS NURSES NURSING PARTNERSHIP PATIENT CHOICE PATIENT DUMPING PATIENT EDUCATION PATIENTS PHARMACISTS PHYSICIANS POLICY DECISIONS POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLICY MAKERS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES PRICE ELASTICITIES PRIMARY CARE PRIMARY HEALTH CARE PRIVATE INSURANCE PROBABILITY PRODUCTIVITY PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES PUBLIC HOSPITALS PUBLIC SECTOR QUALITY CONTROL QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE RELATIVE VALUE RISK SHARING RURAL AREAS SAVINGS SCHOOLS SCREENING SOCIAL WELFARE SOCIAL WORKERS SPILLOVERS STERILIZATION SURGERY THEORETICAL MODELS TRADEOFFS TRANSACTION COSTS URBAN AREAS WELFARE ECONOMICS
spellingShingle	ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BREAST CANCER CAPITATION CITIES CLINICS COMMUNITIES COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONDOMS COUNSELING DECISION MAKING DISTORTIONARY EFFECTS DOCTORS ECONOMIC REVIEW EDUCATION ELASTICITIES ELASTICITY OF DEMAND EMERGENCY ROOMS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EMPIRICAL STUDIES EMPLOYMENT EPIDEMIOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE EXPENDITURES EXTERNALITIES FAMILIES FUELS HEALTH HEALTH CARE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS HEALTH CARE PROVISION HEALTH CARE SERVICES HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS HEALTH CARE UTILIZATION HEALTH CLINICS HEALTH ECONOMICS HEALTH EXPENDITURES HEALTH OUTCOMES HEALTH POLICY HEALTH POSTS HEALTH PROVIDERS HEALTH SECTOR HEALTH SERVICES HEALTH SYSTEM HEALTH SYSTEMS HMO HMOS HOSPITAL CARE HOSPITAL SERVICES HOSPITALIZATION HOSPITALS HOUSEHOLDS IMMUNIZATION INCENTIVE SCHEMES INCOME INFORMAL SECTOR INSURANCE INSURANCE MARKETS ISOLATION LEISURE MANAGED CARE MANAGERS MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COSTS MARKET FAILURES MARKET POWER MEDICAL CARE MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS MEDICARE MORAL HAZARD MORTALITY MOTIVATION NONPROFIT HOSPITALS NURSES NURSING PARTNERSHIP PATIENT CHOICE PATIENT DUMPING PATIENT EDUCATION PATIENTS PHARMACISTS PHYSICIANS POLICY DECISIONS POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLICY MAKERS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES PRICE ELASTICITIES PRIMARY CARE PRIMARY HEALTH CARE PRIVATE INSURANCE PROBABILITY PRODUCTIVITY PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES PUBLIC HOSPITALS PUBLIC SECTOR QUALITY CONTROL QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE RELATIVE VALUE RISK SHARING RURAL AREAS SAVINGS SCHOOLS SCREENING SOCIAL WELFARE SOCIAL WORKERS SPILLOVERS STERILIZATION SURGERY THEORETICAL MODELS TRADEOFFS TRANSACTION COSTS URBAN AREAS WELFARE ECONOMICS Gauri, Varun Are Incentives Everything? Payment Mechanisms for Health Care Providers in Developing Countries
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2624
description	This paper assesses the extent to which provider payment mechanisms can help developing countries address their leading health care problems. It first identifies four key problems in the health care systems in developing countries: 1) public facilities, which provide the bulk of secondary and tertiary health care services in most countries, offer services of poor quality; 2) providers cannot be enticed to rural and urban marginal areas, leaving large segments of the population without adequate access to health care; 3) the composition of health services offered and consumed is sub-optimal; and 4) coordination in the delivery of care, including referrals, second opinions, and teamwork, is inadequate. The paper examines each problem in turn and assesses the extent to which changes in provider payments might address it.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Gauri, Varun
author_facet	Gauri, Varun
author_sort	Gauri, Varun
title	Are Incentives Everything? Payment Mechanisms for Health Care Providers in Developing Countries
title_short	Are Incentives Everything? Payment Mechanisms for Health Care Providers in Developing Countries
title_full	Are Incentives Everything? Payment Mechanisms for Health Care Providers in Developing Countries
title_fullStr	Are Incentives Everything? Payment Mechanisms for Health Care Providers in Developing Countries
title_full_unstemmed	Are Incentives Everything? Payment Mechanisms for Health Care Providers in Developing Countries
title_sort	are incentives everything? payment mechanisms for health care providers in developing countries
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2014
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/06/2874342/incentives-everything-payment-mechanisms-health-care-providers-developing-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19652
_version_	1764440176714579968

Are Incentives Everything? Payment Mechanisms for Health Care Providers in Developing Countries

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