On Financing Global and International Public Goods
Three dimensions of public goods--nonrivalry of benefits, the possibility of being excluded from benefits, and the technology for aggregating public supply--determine what kinds of institutions and transnational actions are required for their provi...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/07/1552020/financing-global-international-public-goods http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19577 |
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okr-10986-195772021-04-23T14:03:43Z On Financing Global and International Public Goods Sandler, Todd AGGREGATE LEVEL AGRICULTURE AIR POLLUTION AIR QUALITY CARBON CARBON SEQUESTRATION CFCS CHLOROFLUOROCARBONS COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE CONSUMERS DEMAND CURVE DIMINISHING MARGINAL UTILITY DISTRIBUTIONAL EQUITY ECONOMIES OF SCALE EMISSION EMISSIONS EROSION CONTROL EXTERNALITY FISHERIES FISHING GREENHOUSE GAS GREENHOUSE GASES HORIZONTAL EQUITY INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCREASING RETURNS INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE INEFFICIENCY INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS MARGINAL COST METHANE OZONE LAYER POWER PLANTS PRIVATE GOODS PRIVATE SECTOR PROPERTY RIGHTS PROPERTY TAXES PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC SECTOR REDUCING METHANE EMISSIONS RETURNS TO SCALE SALES TAXES SOCIAL COSTS SOCIAL WELFARE SUPPLY CURVE TAX TAXATION TOTAL EMISSIONS TRANSACTION COSTS VALUATION VERTICAL EQUITY WEALTH WILLINGNESS TO PAY WIND Three dimensions of public goods--nonrivalry of benefits, the possibility of being excluded from benefits, and the technology for aggregating public supply--determine what kinds of institutions and transnational actions are required for their provision and financing. For some public goods--especially for those for which the exclusion of nonpayers is not feasible--these properties are such that a public sector push is needed or the good will not be financed. This push can come from a supranational structure (such as the World Bank, the United Nations, or the European Union) that directly or indirectly collects the requisite fees from its members to underwrite international public goods (IPGs). To understand the role of international institutions in promoting IPGs, one must ascertain the nature of the good and whether it requires a push, a coax, or no assistance from a supranational structure or influential nation(s) and agents (such as charitable foundations). The transnational community should explicitly direct scarce resources only to those global and international public goods that need either a significant push or only a smaller coax by the transnational community. When clubs or markets can finance international public goods, the community should sit back and let incentives guide the actions of sovereign nations. 2014-08-21T18:45:56Z 2014-08-21T18:45:56Z 2001-07 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/07/1552020/financing-global-international-public-goods http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19577 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2638 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
AGGREGATE LEVEL AGRICULTURE AIR POLLUTION AIR QUALITY CARBON CARBON SEQUESTRATION CFCS CHLOROFLUOROCARBONS COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE CONSUMERS DEMAND CURVE DIMINISHING MARGINAL UTILITY DISTRIBUTIONAL EQUITY ECONOMIES OF SCALE EMISSION EMISSIONS EROSION CONTROL EXTERNALITY FISHERIES FISHING GREENHOUSE GAS GREENHOUSE GASES HORIZONTAL EQUITY INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCREASING RETURNS INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE INEFFICIENCY INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS MARGINAL COST METHANE OZONE LAYER POWER PLANTS PRIVATE GOODS PRIVATE SECTOR PROPERTY RIGHTS PROPERTY TAXES PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC SECTOR REDUCING METHANE EMISSIONS RETURNS TO SCALE SALES TAXES SOCIAL COSTS SOCIAL WELFARE SUPPLY CURVE TAX TAXATION TOTAL EMISSIONS TRANSACTION COSTS VALUATION VERTICAL EQUITY WEALTH WILLINGNESS TO PAY WIND |
| spellingShingle |
AGGREGATE LEVEL AGRICULTURE AIR POLLUTION AIR QUALITY CARBON CARBON SEQUESTRATION CFCS CHLOROFLUOROCARBONS COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE CONSUMERS DEMAND CURVE DIMINISHING MARGINAL UTILITY DISTRIBUTIONAL EQUITY ECONOMIES OF SCALE EMISSION EMISSIONS EROSION CONTROL EXTERNALITY FISHERIES FISHING GREENHOUSE GAS GREENHOUSE GASES HORIZONTAL EQUITY INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCREASING RETURNS INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE INEFFICIENCY INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS MARGINAL COST METHANE OZONE LAYER POWER PLANTS PRIVATE GOODS PRIVATE SECTOR PROPERTY RIGHTS PROPERTY TAXES PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC SECTOR REDUCING METHANE EMISSIONS RETURNS TO SCALE SALES TAXES SOCIAL COSTS SOCIAL WELFARE SUPPLY CURVE TAX TAXATION TOTAL EMISSIONS TRANSACTION COSTS VALUATION VERTICAL EQUITY WEALTH WILLINGNESS TO PAY WIND Sandler, Todd On Financing Global and International Public Goods |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2638 |
| description |
Three dimensions of public
goods--nonrivalry of benefits, the possibility of being
excluded from benefits, and the technology for aggregating
public supply--determine what kinds of institutions and
transnational actions are required for their provision and
financing. For some public goods--especially for those for
which the exclusion of nonpayers is not feasible--these
properties are such that a public sector push is needed or
the good will not be financed. This push can come from a
supranational structure (such as the World Bank, the United
Nations, or the European Union) that directly or indirectly
collects the requisite fees from its members to underwrite
international public goods (IPGs). To understand the role of
international institutions in promoting IPGs, one must
ascertain the nature of the good and whether it requires a
push, a coax, or no assistance from a supranational
structure or influential nation(s) and agents (such as
charitable foundations). The transnational community should
explicitly direct scarce resources only to those global and
international public goods that need either a significant
push or only a smaller coax by the transnational community.
When clubs or markets can finance international public
goods, the community should sit back and let incentives
guide the actions of sovereign nations. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Sandler, Todd |
| author_facet |
Sandler, Todd |
| author_sort |
Sandler, Todd |
| title |
On Financing Global and International Public Goods |
| title_short |
On Financing Global and International Public Goods |
| title_full |
On Financing Global and International Public Goods |
| title_fullStr |
On Financing Global and International Public Goods |
| title_full_unstemmed |
On Financing Global and International Public Goods |
| title_sort |
on financing global and international public goods |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/07/1552020/financing-global-international-public-goods http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19577 |
| _version_ |
1764440060478881792 |