The Regulation of Entry
The authors present new data on the regulation of the entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data cover the number if procedures, official time, and official costs that a start-up firm must bear before it can operate legally. The official cos...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/08/1561501/regulation-entry http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19564 |
| id |
okr-10986-19564 |
|---|---|
| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| spelling |
okr-10986-195642021-04-23T14:03:43Z The Regulation of Entry Djankov, Simeon La Porta, Rafael Lopez de Silanes, Florencio Shleifer, Andrei AIR AIR POLLUTION AUTHORITY BARRIERS TO ENTRY BUREAUCRATIC DELAYS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CITIZEN COMPETITIVENESS CONSUMERS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION LEVELS COUNTRY DATA DEMOCRACY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES DICTATORS ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC THEORIES EFFICIENT REGULATION ELASTICITY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPLOYMENT ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EXCISE TAXES EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS EXTERNALITIES FINANCIAL SECTOR FISCAL FOREIGN OWNERSHIP FOREIGN TRADE FREE PRESS GDP GDP PER CAPITA GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HEALTH OUTCOMES INCOME INCOME GROUPS INCOME LEVEL INCOME LEVELS JUDICIARY LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKET REGULATIONS LABOR MARKETS LAWS LAWYER LEGAL ORIGIN LEGAL REQUIREMENTS LEGISLATURE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL TAX MARKET COMPETITION MARKET POWER NATIONALS OPPORTUNITY COST PER CAPITA INCOME POLICY OUTCOMES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICIANS POLLUTION POLLUTION LEVELS PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOODS QUALITY STANDARDS REGULATORY CAPTURE REGULATORY SYSTEMS REPUBLICS SAFETY SCREENING SOCIAL OUTCOMES SOCIAL SECURITY SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS TAX TAX AUTHORITIES TAX COLLECTION TAX REVENUES TOTAL COSTS UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY WATER POLLUTION The authors present new data on the regulation of the entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data cover the number if procedures, official time, and official costs that a start-up firm must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries that regulate entry more heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial economics, but not better quality goods (public or private). Countries with more democratic and limited governments regulate entry more lightly. The evidence is inconsistent with public interest theories of regulations, but supports the public choice view that regulating entry benefits politicians and bureaucrats. 2014-08-21T17:30:17Z 2014-08-21T17:30:17Z 2001-08 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/08/1561501/regulation-entry http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19564 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2661 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
AIR AIR POLLUTION AUTHORITY BARRIERS TO ENTRY BUREAUCRATIC DELAYS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CITIZEN COMPETITIVENESS CONSUMERS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION LEVELS COUNTRY DATA DEMOCRACY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES DICTATORS ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC THEORIES EFFICIENT REGULATION ELASTICITY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPLOYMENT ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EXCISE TAXES EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS EXTERNALITIES FINANCIAL SECTOR FISCAL FOREIGN OWNERSHIP FOREIGN TRADE FREE PRESS GDP GDP PER CAPITA GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HEALTH OUTCOMES INCOME INCOME GROUPS INCOME LEVEL INCOME LEVELS JUDICIARY LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKET REGULATIONS LABOR MARKETS LAWS LAWYER LEGAL ORIGIN LEGAL REQUIREMENTS LEGISLATURE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL TAX MARKET COMPETITION MARKET POWER NATIONALS OPPORTUNITY COST PER CAPITA INCOME POLICY OUTCOMES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICIANS POLLUTION POLLUTION LEVELS PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOODS QUALITY STANDARDS REGULATORY CAPTURE REGULATORY SYSTEMS REPUBLICS SAFETY SCREENING SOCIAL OUTCOMES SOCIAL SECURITY SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS TAX TAX AUTHORITIES TAX COLLECTION TAX REVENUES TOTAL COSTS UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY WATER POLLUTION |
| spellingShingle |
AIR AIR POLLUTION AUTHORITY BARRIERS TO ENTRY BUREAUCRATIC DELAYS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CITIZEN COMPETITIVENESS CONSUMERS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION LEVELS COUNTRY DATA DEMOCRACY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES DICTATORS ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC THEORIES EFFICIENT REGULATION ELASTICITY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPLOYMENT ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EXCISE TAXES EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS EXTERNALITIES FINANCIAL SECTOR FISCAL FOREIGN OWNERSHIP FOREIGN TRADE FREE PRESS GDP GDP PER CAPITA GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HEALTH OUTCOMES INCOME INCOME GROUPS INCOME LEVEL INCOME LEVELS JUDICIARY LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKET REGULATIONS LABOR MARKETS LAWS LAWYER LEGAL ORIGIN LEGAL REQUIREMENTS LEGISLATURE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL TAX MARKET COMPETITION MARKET POWER NATIONALS OPPORTUNITY COST PER CAPITA INCOME POLICY OUTCOMES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICIANS POLLUTION POLLUTION LEVELS PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOODS QUALITY STANDARDS REGULATORY CAPTURE REGULATORY SYSTEMS REPUBLICS SAFETY SCREENING SOCIAL OUTCOMES SOCIAL SECURITY SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS TAX TAX AUTHORITIES TAX COLLECTION TAX REVENUES TOTAL COSTS UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY WATER POLLUTION Djankov, Simeon La Porta, Rafael Lopez de Silanes, Florencio Shleifer, Andrei The Regulation of Entry |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2661 |
| description |
The authors present new data on the
regulation of the entry of start-up firms in 85 countries.
The data cover the number if procedures, official time, and
official costs that a start-up firm must bear before it can
operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely
high in most countries. Countries that regulate entry more
heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial
economics, but not better quality goods (public or private).
Countries with more democratic and limited governments
regulate entry more lightly. The evidence is inconsistent
with public interest theories of regulations, but supports
the public choice view that regulating entry benefits
politicians and bureaucrats. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Djankov, Simeon La Porta, Rafael Lopez de Silanes, Florencio Shleifer, Andrei |
| author_facet |
Djankov, Simeon La Porta, Rafael Lopez de Silanes, Florencio Shleifer, Andrei |
| author_sort |
Djankov, Simeon |
| title |
The Regulation of Entry |
| title_short |
The Regulation of Entry |
| title_full |
The Regulation of Entry |
| title_fullStr |
The Regulation of Entry |
| title_full_unstemmed |
The Regulation of Entry |
| title_sort |
regulation of entry |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/08/1561501/regulation-entry http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19564 |
| _version_ |
1764440020799717376 |