The Regulation of Entry
The authors present new data on the regulation of the entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data cover the number if procedures, official time, and official costs that a start-up firm must bear before it can operate legally. The official cos...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/08/1561501/regulation-entry http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19564 |
| Summary: | The authors present new data on the
regulation of the entry of start-up firms in 85 countries.
The data cover the number if procedures, official time, and
official costs that a start-up firm must bear before it can
operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely
high in most countries. Countries that regulate entry more
heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial
economics, but not better quality goods (public or private).
Countries with more democratic and limited governments
regulate entry more lightly. The evidence is inconsistent
with public interest theories of regulations, but supports
the public choice view that regulating entry benefits
politicians and bureaucrats. |
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