International Cartel Enforcement : Lessons from the 1990s
The enforcement record of the 1990s shows that private international cartels are not defunct--nor do they always fall quickly under the weight of their own incentive problems. Of a sample of 40 such cartels prosecuted by the United States and the E...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/09/1614730/international-cartel-enforcement-lessons-1990s http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19538 |
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okr-10986-195382021-04-23T14:03:43Z International Cartel Enforcement : Lessons from the 1990s Evenett, Simon J. Levenstein, Margaret C. Suslow, Valerie Y. ACTS ALLIANCES ANTITRUST LAWS AUTHORITY BANKRUPTCY BARRIERS TO ENTRY BENCHMARK BUSINESS CYCLES BUSINESS ECONOMICS CARTEL CARTELS COLLUSION COMPANY COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE COMPETITORS CONSUMERS CORPORATIONS DAMAGES DUMPING ECONOMIC FACTORS ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS LITERATURE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ENFORCEMENT REGIMES EUROPEAN UNION EXPORTS FAIR TRADE FAIR TRADING FINES FIRMS FOREIGN MARKETS IMMUNITY IMPORTS INTERNATIONAL MARKETS JOINT VENTURES LEGAL STATUS LEGISLATION MANUFACTURERS MARGINAL COSTS MARKET POWER MERCANTILISM MERGERS METALS OIL PRICE DECLINES PRICE FIXING PRODUCERS PRODUCTIVITY QUOTAS RESOURCE ALLOCATION RISK NEUTRAL SECRECY SHAREHOLDERS SUPPLIERS TRADE LIBERALIZATION VERTICAL RESTRAINTS WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO The enforcement record of the 1990s shows that private international cartels are not defunct--nor do they always fall quickly under the weight of their own incentive problems. Of a sample of 40 such cartels prosecuted by the United States and the European Union in the 1990s, 24 lasted at least four years. And for the 20 cartels in this sample where sales data are available, the annual worldwide turnover in affected products exceeded $30 billion. National competition policies address harm in domestic markets, and in some cases prohibit cartels without taking strong enforcement measures. The authors propose a series of reforms to national policies and steps to enhance international cooperation that will strengthen the deterrents against international cartelization. Furthermore, the authors argue that aggressive prosecution of cartels must be complemented by vigilance in other areas of competition policy. If not, firms will respond to the enhanced deterrents to cartelization by merging or by taking other measures that lessen competitive pressures. 2014-08-20T21:16:45Z 2014-08-20T21:16:45Z 2001-09 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/09/1614730/international-cartel-enforcement-lessons-1990s http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19538 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2680 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACTS ALLIANCES ANTITRUST LAWS AUTHORITY BANKRUPTCY BARRIERS TO ENTRY BENCHMARK BUSINESS CYCLES BUSINESS ECONOMICS CARTEL CARTELS COLLUSION COMPANY COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE COMPETITORS CONSUMERS CORPORATIONS DAMAGES DUMPING ECONOMIC FACTORS ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS LITERATURE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ENFORCEMENT REGIMES EUROPEAN UNION EXPORTS FAIR TRADE FAIR TRADING FINES FIRMS FOREIGN MARKETS IMMUNITY IMPORTS INTERNATIONAL MARKETS JOINT VENTURES LEGAL STATUS LEGISLATION MANUFACTURERS MARGINAL COSTS MARKET POWER MERCANTILISM MERGERS METALS OIL PRICE DECLINES PRICE FIXING PRODUCERS PRODUCTIVITY QUOTAS RESOURCE ALLOCATION RISK NEUTRAL SECRECY SHAREHOLDERS SUPPLIERS TRADE LIBERALIZATION VERTICAL RESTRAINTS WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO |
| spellingShingle |
ACTS ALLIANCES ANTITRUST LAWS AUTHORITY BANKRUPTCY BARRIERS TO ENTRY BENCHMARK BUSINESS CYCLES BUSINESS ECONOMICS CARTEL CARTELS COLLUSION COMPANY COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE COMPETITORS CONSUMERS CORPORATIONS DAMAGES DUMPING ECONOMIC FACTORS ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS LITERATURE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ENFORCEMENT REGIMES EUROPEAN UNION EXPORTS FAIR TRADE FAIR TRADING FINES FIRMS FOREIGN MARKETS IMMUNITY IMPORTS INTERNATIONAL MARKETS JOINT VENTURES LEGAL STATUS LEGISLATION MANUFACTURERS MARGINAL COSTS MARKET POWER MERCANTILISM MERGERS METALS OIL PRICE DECLINES PRICE FIXING PRODUCERS PRODUCTIVITY QUOTAS RESOURCE ALLOCATION RISK NEUTRAL SECRECY SHAREHOLDERS SUPPLIERS TRADE LIBERALIZATION VERTICAL RESTRAINTS WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO Evenett, Simon J. Levenstein, Margaret C. Suslow, Valerie Y. International Cartel Enforcement : Lessons from the 1990s |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2680 |
| description |
The enforcement record of the 1990s
shows that private international cartels are not
defunct--nor do they always fall quickly under the weight of
their own incentive problems. Of a sample of 40 such cartels
prosecuted by the United States and the European Union in
the 1990s, 24 lasted at least four years. And for the 20
cartels in this sample where sales data are available, the
annual worldwide turnover in affected products exceeded $30
billion. National competition policies address harm in
domestic markets, and in some cases prohibit cartels without
taking strong enforcement measures. The authors propose a
series of reforms to national policies and steps to enhance
international cooperation that will strengthen the
deterrents against international cartelization. Furthermore,
the authors argue that aggressive prosecution of cartels
must be complemented by vigilance in other areas of
competition policy. If not, firms will respond to the
enhanced deterrents to cartelization by merging or by taking
other measures that lessen competitive pressures. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Evenett, Simon J. Levenstein, Margaret C. Suslow, Valerie Y. |
| author_facet |
Evenett, Simon J. Levenstein, Margaret C. Suslow, Valerie Y. |
| author_sort |
Evenett, Simon J. |
| title |
International Cartel Enforcement : Lessons from the 1990s |
| title_short |
International Cartel Enforcement : Lessons from the 1990s |
| title_full |
International Cartel Enforcement : Lessons from the 1990s |
| title_fullStr |
International Cartel Enforcement : Lessons from the 1990s |
| title_full_unstemmed |
International Cartel Enforcement : Lessons from the 1990s |
| title_sort |
international cartel enforcement : lessons from the 1990s |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/09/1614730/international-cartel-enforcement-lessons-1990s http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19538 |
| _version_ |
1764439966200365056 |