Hospital Governance and Incentive Design : The Case of Corporatized Public Hospitals in Lebanon
There are three potential levels of government activity in the health sector: regulation, finance, and direct provision of services, with the government owning and managing hospitals and primary care clinics. Eid focuses on service provision. In re...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/11/1643372/hospital-governance-incentive-design-case-corporatized-public-hospitals-lebanon http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19424 |
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okr-10986-194242021-04-23T14:03:43Z Hospital Governance and Incentive Design : The Case of Corporatized Public Hospitals in Lebanon Eid, Florence ACCOUNTING BASIC HEALTH CARE BENCHMARKS BOARDS OF DIRECTORS CADRES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CIVIL SERVICE CLINICS CONSTITUTIONS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS DECENTRALIZATION DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY DECREE DECREES DOCTORS EMPLOYMENT EQUILIBRIUM FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL RISK FISCAL HEALTH CARE HEALTH INSURANCE HEALTH PLANS HEALTH POLICY HEALTH REFORM HEALTH SECTOR HEALTH SYSTEM HOSPITAL AUTONOMY HOSPITAL CARE HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT HOSPITAL SERVICES HOSPITALS INCENTIVE SCHEMES INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS INNOVATION INSOLVENCY INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE INSURANCE INTERNAL SECURITY INTERVENTION LAWS LEGAL STRUCTURE LEGISLATION LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MANAGED CARE MANAGERIAL AUTONOMY MANAGERS MANDATES MEDICAL CARE MEDICAL SERVICES MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY MEDICINE MINISTRY OF FINANCE MOTIVATION NATIONAL LEVEL PATIENTS PHYSICIANS PRIMARY CARE PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATIZATION PROCUREMENT PUBLIC AGENCY PUBLIC ENTERPRISES PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH CARE PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURES PUBLIC HOSPITALS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION PURCHASING QUALITATIVE RESEARCH QUALITY CONTROL QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE RATIONALIZATION REGULATORY AUTHORITY REPRESENTATIVES SCHOOLS SERVICE DELIVERY TRANSACTION COSTS USER FEES VOTING WAGES There are three potential levels of government activity in the health sector: regulation, finance, and direct provision of services, with the government owning and managing hospitals and primary care clinics. Eid focuses on service provision. In recent years corporatization has been introduced as an institutional design for public hospitals-as a means of improving efficiency and reducing transfers in a publicly owned, decentralized health system. Eid treats decentralization as a reallocation of decision rights to lower levels of the public sector. She shows how such a strategy creates new needs for monitoring and control of decentralized units. To improve the understanding of the role of governance and incentives in corporatized hospitals, Eid explores the design of corporate boards of public hospitals, the institutional linchpin of such systems. She shows how principal-agent theory, particularly the multitasking and common agency approaches, can provide a useful analytical lens in understanding hospital board design in the case of Lebanon. She also shows the implications of corporatization for health policy and management. 2014-08-19T16:58:02Z 2014-08-19T16:58:02Z 2001-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/11/1643372/hospital-governance-incentive-design-case-corporatized-public-hospitals-lebanon http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19424 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2727 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Middle East and North Africa Lebanon |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCOUNTING BASIC HEALTH CARE BENCHMARKS BOARDS OF DIRECTORS CADRES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CIVIL SERVICE CLINICS CONSTITUTIONS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS DECENTRALIZATION DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY DECREE DECREES DOCTORS EMPLOYMENT EQUILIBRIUM FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL RISK FISCAL HEALTH CARE HEALTH INSURANCE HEALTH PLANS HEALTH POLICY HEALTH REFORM HEALTH SECTOR HEALTH SYSTEM HOSPITAL AUTONOMY HOSPITAL CARE HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT HOSPITAL SERVICES HOSPITALS INCENTIVE SCHEMES INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS INNOVATION INSOLVENCY INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE INSURANCE INTERNAL SECURITY INTERVENTION LAWS LEGAL STRUCTURE LEGISLATION LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MANAGED CARE MANAGERIAL AUTONOMY MANAGERS MANDATES MEDICAL CARE MEDICAL SERVICES MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY MEDICINE MINISTRY OF FINANCE MOTIVATION NATIONAL LEVEL PATIENTS PHYSICIANS PRIMARY CARE PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATIZATION PROCUREMENT PUBLIC AGENCY PUBLIC ENTERPRISES PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH CARE PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURES PUBLIC HOSPITALS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION PURCHASING QUALITATIVE RESEARCH QUALITY CONTROL QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE RATIONALIZATION REGULATORY AUTHORITY REPRESENTATIVES SCHOOLS SERVICE DELIVERY TRANSACTION COSTS USER FEES VOTING WAGES |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTING BASIC HEALTH CARE BENCHMARKS BOARDS OF DIRECTORS CADRES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CIVIL SERVICE CLINICS CONSTITUTIONS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS DECENTRALIZATION DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY DECREE DECREES DOCTORS EMPLOYMENT EQUILIBRIUM FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL RISK FISCAL HEALTH CARE HEALTH INSURANCE HEALTH PLANS HEALTH POLICY HEALTH REFORM HEALTH SECTOR HEALTH SYSTEM HOSPITAL AUTONOMY HOSPITAL CARE HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT HOSPITAL SERVICES HOSPITALS INCENTIVE SCHEMES INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS INNOVATION INSOLVENCY INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE INSURANCE INTERNAL SECURITY INTERVENTION LAWS LEGAL STRUCTURE LEGISLATION LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MANAGED CARE MANAGERIAL AUTONOMY MANAGERS MANDATES MEDICAL CARE MEDICAL SERVICES MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY MEDICINE MINISTRY OF FINANCE MOTIVATION NATIONAL LEVEL PATIENTS PHYSICIANS PRIMARY CARE PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATIZATION PROCUREMENT PUBLIC AGENCY PUBLIC ENTERPRISES PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH CARE PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURES PUBLIC HOSPITALS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION PURCHASING QUALITATIVE RESEARCH QUALITY CONTROL QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE RATIONALIZATION REGULATORY AUTHORITY REPRESENTATIVES SCHOOLS SERVICE DELIVERY TRANSACTION COSTS USER FEES VOTING WAGES Eid, Florence Hospital Governance and Incentive Design : The Case of Corporatized Public Hospitals in Lebanon |
| geographic_facet |
Middle East and North Africa Lebanon |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2727 |
| description |
There are three potential levels of
government activity in the health sector: regulation,
finance, and direct provision of services, with the
government owning and managing hospitals and primary care
clinics. Eid focuses on service provision. In recent years
corporatization has been introduced as an institutional
design for public hospitals-as a means of improving
efficiency and reducing transfers in a publicly owned,
decentralized health system. Eid treats decentralization as
a reallocation of decision rights to lower levels of the
public sector. She shows how such a strategy creates new
needs for monitoring and control of decentralized units. To
improve the understanding of the role of governance and
incentives in corporatized hospitals, Eid explores the
design of corporate boards of public hospitals, the
institutional linchpin of such systems. She shows how
principal-agent theory, particularly the multitasking and
common agency approaches, can provide a useful analytical
lens in understanding hospital board design in the case of
Lebanon. She also shows the implications of corporatization
for health policy and management. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Eid, Florence |
| author_facet |
Eid, Florence |
| author_sort |
Eid, Florence |
| title |
Hospital Governance and Incentive Design : The Case of Corporatized Public Hospitals in Lebanon |
| title_short |
Hospital Governance and Incentive Design : The Case of Corporatized Public Hospitals in Lebanon |
| title_full |
Hospital Governance and Incentive Design : The Case of Corporatized Public Hospitals in Lebanon |
| title_fullStr |
Hospital Governance and Incentive Design : The Case of Corporatized Public Hospitals in Lebanon |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Hospital Governance and Incentive Design : The Case of Corporatized Public Hospitals in Lebanon |
| title_sort |
hospital governance and incentive design : the case of corporatized public hospitals in lebanon |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/11/1643372/hospital-governance-incentive-design-case-corporatized-public-hospitals-lebanon http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19424 |
| _version_ |
1764439830067937280 |