How Business Community Institutions Can Help Fight Corruption
This paper considers the possibility of collective action by the business community to counter corruption in the award of government licenses and contracts. The analogy is with contract enforcement institutions studied by economic historians and co...
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Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/06/19737972/business-community-institutions-can-help-fight-corruption http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19371 |
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okr-10986-193712021-04-23T14:03:51Z How Business Community Institutions Can Help Fight Corruption Dixit, Avinash ACCOUNTING ADJUDICATION ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS AUCTION BANKS BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES BUSINESS ASSOCIATION BUSINESS COMMUNITY BUSINESS LEADERSHIP BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES BUSINESSES CAPACITY BUILDING COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION COMPLAINT COMPLAINTS CONFIDENCE CONTACT INFORMATION CONVICTION CORRUPT CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPTION CRIME DOMAIN E-MAIL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EXTORTION FEASIBILITY FIGURES FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE GLOBALIZATION GOVERNANCE REFORM GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT POLICIES INNOVATION INNOVATIONS INSTITUTION INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL POLICY JOURNALISTS LAW ENFORCEMENT LEADERSHIP LEGAL SYSTEM LICENSE LICENSE FEE LICENSES MAFIA MALFEASANCE MARKETING MATERIAL MEDIA OFFENSE OPEN ACCESS PAYOFF PAYOFFS PDF PENALTIES PENALTY POLICE POLITICIANS PRISONERS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUNISHMENT RECONSTRUCTION REMEDIES RESULT RESULTS SANCTION SANCTIONS SCANDAL SCANDALS SECURITIES SOCIAL SCIENCE SUPPLIERS TAXONOMY TRANSPARENCY VICTIMS WEB WEB PAGE WHISTLE-BLOWING This paper considers the possibility of collective action by the business community to counter corruption in the award of government licenses and contracts. The analogy is with contract enforcement institutions studied by economic historians and contract law scholars. The institution in this context comprises a no-bribery norm, a community system to detect violations, and a multilateral ostracism penalty upon conviction in a community tribunal. The requirements such an institution must meet if it is to be effective are analyzed. It is shown that an institution of sufficient quality -- combining probability of correct detection and severity of punishment -- can eliminate bribery. If the private institution is not sufficiently good, then in conjunction with the state's formal apparatus it reduces the level of bribes demanded, but increases the probability of winning the license or contract through bribery. An improvement in the government's formal anti-corruption mechanism, holding the private institution constant, reduces both the level of bribes and the probability of success through bribery. The two institutions together are shown to achieve substantially better outcomes than either can on its own. 2014-08-15T17:14:38Z 2014-08-15T17:14:38Z 2014-06 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/06/19737972/business-community-institutions-can-help-fight-corruption http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19371 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6954 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
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Foreign Institution |
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Digital Repositories |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
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World Bank |
language |
English en_US |
topic |
ACCOUNTING ADJUDICATION ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS AUCTION BANKS BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES BUSINESS ASSOCIATION BUSINESS COMMUNITY BUSINESS LEADERSHIP BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES BUSINESSES CAPACITY BUILDING COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION COMPLAINT COMPLAINTS CONFIDENCE CONTACT INFORMATION CONVICTION CORRUPT CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPTION CRIME DOMAIN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EXTORTION FEASIBILITY FIGURES FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE GLOBALIZATION GOVERNANCE REFORM GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT POLICIES INNOVATION INNOVATIONS INSTITUTION INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL POLICY JOURNALISTS LAW ENFORCEMENT LEADERSHIP LEGAL SYSTEM LICENSE LICENSE FEE LICENSES MAFIA MALFEASANCE MARKETING MATERIAL MEDIA OFFENSE OPEN ACCESS PAYOFF PAYOFFS PENALTIES PENALTY POLICE POLITICIANS PRISONERS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUNISHMENT RECONSTRUCTION REMEDIES RESULT RESULTS SANCTION SANCTIONS SCANDAL SCANDALS SECURITIES SOCIAL SCIENCE SUPPLIERS TAXONOMY TRANSPARENCY VICTIMS WEB WEB PAGE WHISTLE-BLOWING |
spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTING ADJUDICATION ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS AUCTION BANKS BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES BUSINESS ASSOCIATION BUSINESS COMMUNITY BUSINESS LEADERSHIP BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES BUSINESSES CAPACITY BUILDING COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION COMPLAINT COMPLAINTS CONFIDENCE CONTACT INFORMATION CONVICTION CORRUPT CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPTION CRIME DOMAIN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EXTORTION FEASIBILITY FIGURES FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE GLOBALIZATION GOVERNANCE REFORM GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT POLICIES INNOVATION INNOVATIONS INSTITUTION INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL POLICY JOURNALISTS LAW ENFORCEMENT LEADERSHIP LEGAL SYSTEM LICENSE LICENSE FEE LICENSES MAFIA MALFEASANCE MARKETING MATERIAL MEDIA OFFENSE OPEN ACCESS PAYOFF PAYOFFS PENALTIES PENALTY POLICE POLITICIANS PRISONERS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUNISHMENT RECONSTRUCTION REMEDIES RESULT RESULTS SANCTION SANCTIONS SCANDAL SCANDALS SECURITIES SOCIAL SCIENCE SUPPLIERS TAXONOMY TRANSPARENCY VICTIMS WEB WEB PAGE WHISTLE-BLOWING Dixit, Avinash How Business Community Institutions Can Help Fight Corruption |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6954 |
description |
This paper considers the possibility of
collective action by the business community to counter
corruption in the award of government licenses and
contracts. The analogy is with contract enforcement
institutions studied by economic historians and contract law
scholars. The institution in this context comprises a
no-bribery norm, a community system to detect violations,
and a multilateral ostracism penalty upon conviction in a
community tribunal. The requirements such an institution
must meet if it is to be effective are analyzed. It is shown
that an institution of sufficient quality -- combining
probability of correct detection and severity of punishment
-- can eliminate bribery. If the private institution is not
sufficiently good, then in conjunction with the state's
formal apparatus it reduces the level of bribes demanded,
but increases the probability of winning the license or
contract through bribery. An improvement in the
government's formal anti-corruption mechanism, holding
the private institution constant, reduces both the level of
bribes and the probability of success through bribery. The
two institutions together are shown to achieve substantially
better outcomes than either can on its own. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Dixit, Avinash |
author_facet |
Dixit, Avinash |
author_sort |
Dixit, Avinash |
title |
How Business Community Institutions Can Help Fight Corruption |
title_short |
How Business Community Institutions Can Help Fight Corruption |
title_full |
How Business Community Institutions Can Help Fight Corruption |
title_fullStr |
How Business Community Institutions Can Help Fight Corruption |
title_full_unstemmed |
How Business Community Institutions Can Help Fight Corruption |
title_sort |
how business community institutions can help fight corruption |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2014 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/06/19737972/business-community-institutions-can-help-fight-corruption http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19371 |
_version_ |
1764443743045287936 |