How Business Community Institutions Can Help Fight Corruption

This paper considers the possibility of collective action by the business community to counter corruption in the award of government licenses and contracts. The analogy is with contract enforcement institutions studied by economic historians and co...

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Main Author: Dixit, Avinash
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/06/19737972/business-community-institutions-can-help-fight-corruption
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19371
id okr-10986-19371
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-193712021-04-23T14:03:51Z How Business Community Institutions Can Help Fight Corruption Dixit, Avinash ACCOUNTING ADJUDICATION ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS AUCTION BANKS BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES BUSINESS ASSOCIATION BUSINESS COMMUNITY BUSINESS LEADERSHIP BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES BUSINESSES CAPACITY BUILDING COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION COMPLAINT COMPLAINTS CONFIDENCE CONTACT INFORMATION CONVICTION CORRUPT CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPTION CRIME DOMAIN E-MAIL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EXTORTION FEASIBILITY FIGURES FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE GLOBALIZATION GOVERNANCE REFORM GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT POLICIES INNOVATION INNOVATIONS INSTITUTION INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL POLICY JOURNALISTS LAW ENFORCEMENT LEADERSHIP LEGAL SYSTEM LICENSE LICENSE FEE LICENSES MAFIA MALFEASANCE MARKETING MATERIAL MEDIA OFFENSE OPEN ACCESS PAYOFF PAYOFFS PDF PENALTIES PENALTY POLICE POLITICIANS PRISONERS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUNISHMENT RECONSTRUCTION REMEDIES RESULT RESULTS SANCTION SANCTIONS SCANDAL SCANDALS SECURITIES SOCIAL SCIENCE SUPPLIERS TAXONOMY TRANSPARENCY VICTIMS WEB WEB PAGE WHISTLE-BLOWING This paper considers the possibility of collective action by the business community to counter corruption in the award of government licenses and contracts. The analogy is with contract enforcement institutions studied by economic historians and contract law scholars. The institution in this context comprises a no-bribery norm, a community system to detect violations, and a multilateral ostracism penalty upon conviction in a community tribunal. The requirements such an institution must meet if it is to be effective are analyzed. It is shown that an institution of sufficient quality -- combining probability of correct detection and severity of punishment -- can eliminate bribery. If the private institution is not sufficiently good, then in conjunction with the state's formal apparatus it reduces the level of bribes demanded, but increases the probability of winning the license or contract through bribery. An improvement in the government's formal anti-corruption mechanism, holding the private institution constant, reduces both the level of bribes and the probability of success through bribery. The two institutions together are shown to achieve substantially better outcomes than either can on its own. 2014-08-15T17:14:38Z 2014-08-15T17:14:38Z 2014-06 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/06/19737972/business-community-institutions-can-help-fight-corruption http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19371 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6954 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic ACCOUNTING
ADJUDICATION
ANTI-CORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES
ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS
AUCTION
BANKS
BRIBE
BRIBERY
BRIBES
BUSINESS ASSOCIATION
BUSINESS COMMUNITY
BUSINESS LEADERSHIP
BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES
BUSINESSES
CAPACITY BUILDING
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY
COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION
COMPLAINT
COMPLAINTS
CONFIDENCE
CONTACT INFORMATION
CONVICTION
CORRUPT
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
CORRUPTION
CRIME
DOMAIN
E-MAIL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
EXTORTION
FEASIBILITY
FIGURES
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
GLOBALIZATION
GOVERNANCE REFORM
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GOVERNMENT POLICIES
INNOVATION
INNOVATIONS
INSTITUTION
INTEGRITY
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
INTERNATIONAL POLICY
JOURNALISTS
LAW ENFORCEMENT
LEADERSHIP
LEGAL SYSTEM
LICENSE
LICENSE FEE
LICENSES
MAFIA
MALFEASANCE
MARKETING
MATERIAL
MEDIA
OFFENSE
OPEN ACCESS
PAYOFF
PAYOFFS
PDF
PENALTIES
PENALTY
POLICE
POLITICIANS
PRISONERS
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUNISHMENT
RECONSTRUCTION
REMEDIES
RESULT
RESULTS
SANCTION
SANCTIONS
SCANDAL
SCANDALS
SECURITIES
SOCIAL SCIENCE
SUPPLIERS
TAXONOMY
TRANSPARENCY
VICTIMS
WEB
WEB PAGE
WHISTLE-BLOWING
spellingShingle ACCOUNTING
ADJUDICATION
ANTI-CORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES
ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS
AUCTION
BANKS
BRIBE
BRIBERY
BRIBES
BUSINESS ASSOCIATION
BUSINESS COMMUNITY
BUSINESS LEADERSHIP
BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES
BUSINESSES
CAPACITY BUILDING
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY
COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION
COMPLAINT
COMPLAINTS
CONFIDENCE
CONTACT INFORMATION
CONVICTION
CORRUPT
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
CORRUPTION
CRIME
DOMAIN
E-MAIL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
EXTORTION
FEASIBILITY
FIGURES
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
GLOBALIZATION
GOVERNANCE REFORM
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GOVERNMENT POLICIES
INNOVATION
INNOVATIONS
INSTITUTION
INTEGRITY
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
INTERNATIONAL POLICY
JOURNALISTS
LAW ENFORCEMENT
LEADERSHIP
LEGAL SYSTEM
LICENSE
LICENSE FEE
LICENSES
MAFIA
MALFEASANCE
MARKETING
MATERIAL
MEDIA
OFFENSE
OPEN ACCESS
PAYOFF
PAYOFFS
PDF
PENALTIES
PENALTY
POLICE
POLITICIANS
PRISONERS
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUNISHMENT
RECONSTRUCTION
REMEDIES
RESULT
RESULTS
SANCTION
SANCTIONS
SCANDAL
SCANDALS
SECURITIES
SOCIAL SCIENCE
SUPPLIERS
TAXONOMY
TRANSPARENCY
VICTIMS
WEB
WEB PAGE
WHISTLE-BLOWING
Dixit, Avinash
How Business Community Institutions Can Help Fight Corruption
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6954
description This paper considers the possibility of collective action by the business community to counter corruption in the award of government licenses and contracts. The analogy is with contract enforcement institutions studied by economic historians and contract law scholars. The institution in this context comprises a no-bribery norm, a community system to detect violations, and a multilateral ostracism penalty upon conviction in a community tribunal. The requirements such an institution must meet if it is to be effective are analyzed. It is shown that an institution of sufficient quality -- combining probability of correct detection and severity of punishment -- can eliminate bribery. If the private institution is not sufficiently good, then in conjunction with the state's formal apparatus it reduces the level of bribes demanded, but increases the probability of winning the license or contract through bribery. An improvement in the government's formal anti-corruption mechanism, holding the private institution constant, reduces both the level of bribes and the probability of success through bribery. The two institutions together are shown to achieve substantially better outcomes than either can on its own.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Dixit, Avinash
author_facet Dixit, Avinash
author_sort Dixit, Avinash
title How Business Community Institutions Can Help Fight Corruption
title_short How Business Community Institutions Can Help Fight Corruption
title_full How Business Community Institutions Can Help Fight Corruption
title_fullStr How Business Community Institutions Can Help Fight Corruption
title_full_unstemmed How Business Community Institutions Can Help Fight Corruption
title_sort how business community institutions can help fight corruption
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2014
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/06/19737972/business-community-institutions-can-help-fight-corruption
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19371
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