The Environmental Implications of Russia's Accession to the World Trade Organization
This report investigates the environmental impacts of Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization. A 10-region, 30-sector model of the Russian economy is developed. The model is innovative and more accurate empirically in that it contai...
Main Authors: | , , , |
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Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank Group, Washington, DC
2014
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/06/19750328/environmental-implications-russias-accession-world-trade-organization http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19365 |
Summary: | This report investigates the
environmental impacts of Russia's accession to the
World Trade Organization. A 10-region, 30-sector model of
the Russian economy is developed. The model is innovative
and more accurate empirically in that it contains foreign
direct investment, imperfectly competitive sectors, and
endogenous productivity effects triggered by World Trade
Organization accession along with environmental emissions
data in Russia for seven pollutants that are tracked for all
30 sectors in each of the 10 regions. The decomposition
analysis shows that despite the fact that World Trade
Organization accession allows Russia to import better
technologies and reduce pollution from the "technique
effect," on balance World Trade Organization accession
alone will increase environmental pollution in Russia
through a shift toward dirty industries (the
"composition effect") and the expansion of output
with its associated increase in pollution ("scale
effect"). The paper assesses the costs of three types
of environmental regulations to reduce carbon dioxide
emissions by 20 percent. The paper simultaneously implements
a central case scenario with each of the carbon dioxide
emission reduction policy initiatives. The analysis finds
that the welfare gains of World Trade Organization accession
are large enough to pay for the costs of any of the three
environmental abatement policies, while leaving a net
welfare gain. But the political economy implications are
that the non-market-based policies are more costly and the
command and control policy, which is not well targeted, is
very costly. Based on a constant returns to scale model, the
estimated welfare gains are insufficient to finance the
costs of environmental regulation. |
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