Economic Development, Competition Policy, and the World Trade Organization
At the recent World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meeting in Doha, Qatar, WTO members called for the launch of negotiations on disciplines relating to competition based on explicit consensus on modalities to be agreed at the fifth WTO minist...
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/10/2055811/economic-development-competition-policy-world-trade-organization http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19221 |
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okr-10986-192212021-04-23T14:03:42Z Economic Development, Competition Policy, and the World Trade Organization Hoekman, Bernard Mavroidis, Petros C. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COMPETITION POLICY WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS NONDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS CARTELS COMPLIANCE TRANSACTION COSTS MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES ANTITRUST LAW CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS COLLUSION BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS PRICING LOW INCOME DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CONSUMER PROTECTION MARKET LIBERALIZATION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE NEGOTIATIONS INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION SPILLOVER EFFECTS TERMS OF TRADE MARKET ACCESS MERGERS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS & TRADE ANTIDUMPING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SERVICES INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS PRODUCT QUALITY PROCUREMENT AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS LINKAGES ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES ANTIDUMPING ANTIDUMPING CASES ANTIDUMPING DUTIES ANTITRUST AUTHORITIES ANTITRUST DISCIPLINES ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ANTITRUST LAW ANTITRUST LAWS ANTITRUST LEGISLATION ANTITRUST RULES BARRIERS TO COMPETITION BARRIERS TO ENTRY CARTEL CARTELS CLOSED ECONOMIES COLLUSION COMPETITION AUTHORITIES COMPETITION CRITERIA COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT COMPETITION LAWS COMPETITION LEGISLATION COMPETITION POLICIES COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITION PRINCIPLES COMPETITION REGIMES COMPETITIVE MARKETS COMPETITIVENESS COMPLIANCE COSTS CONCESSIONS CONSUMERS CONTESTABILITY COUNTRY MARKETS DEREGULATION DEVELOPING COUNTRY CONTEXT DIFFERENTIAL PRICING DISPUTE SETTLEMENT DOMESTIC COMPETITION DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DOMESTIC ORIGIN DOMESTIC PRODUCTS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIC WELFARE ECONOMIES OF SCALE ECONOMISTS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL STUDIES EXPLOITATION EXPORT CARTELS EXPORT MARKETS EXPORTS EXTERNALITIES FACTORS OF PRODUCTION FOREIGN COMPETITION FOREIGN FIRMS FOREIGN MARKETS FOREIGN PRODUCTS FOREIGN SUPPLIERS FREE TRADE GDP GLOBAL MARKET POWER GOVERNMENT REGULATION HARMONIZATION OF RULES HOME MARKET IMPERFECT COMPETITION IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT PENETRATION IMPORTS INCOME INCREASING RETURNS INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE INTERNATIONAL SPILLOVERS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION LEGISLATION ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES At the recent World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meeting in Doha, Qatar, WTO members called for the launch of negotiations on disciplines relating to competition based on explicit consensus on modalities to be agreed at the fifth WTO ministerial meeting in 2003. WTO discussions since 1997 have revealed little support for ambitious multilateral action. Proponents of the WTO antitrust disciplines currently propose an agreement that is limited to "core principles"-nondiscrimination, transparency, and provisions banning "hard core" cartels. The authors argue that an agreement along such lines will create compliance costs for developing countries without addressing the anticompetitive behavior of firms located in foreign jurisdictions. To be unambiguously beneficial to low-income countries, any WTO antitrust disciplines should recognize the capacity constraints that prevail in these economies, make illegal collusive business practices by firms with international operations that raise prices in developing country markets, and require competition authorities in high-income countries to take action against firms located in their jurisdictions to defend the interests of affected developing country consumers. More generally, a case is made that traditional liberalization commitments using existing WTO fora will be the most effective means of lowering prices and increasing access to an expanded variety of goods and services. 2014-08-01T19:40:08Z 2014-08-01T19:40:08Z 2002-10 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/10/2055811/economic-development-competition-policy-world-trade-organization http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19221 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2917 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
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Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English en_US |
topic |
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COMPETITION POLICY WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS NONDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS CARTELS COMPLIANCE TRANSACTION COSTS MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES ANTITRUST LAW CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS COLLUSION BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS PRICING LOW INCOME DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CONSUMER PROTECTION MARKET LIBERALIZATION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE NEGOTIATIONS INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION SPILLOVER EFFECTS TERMS OF TRADE MARKET ACCESS MERGERS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS & TRADE ANTIDUMPING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SERVICES INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS PRODUCT QUALITY PROCUREMENT AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS LINKAGES ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES ANTIDUMPING ANTIDUMPING CASES ANTIDUMPING DUTIES ANTITRUST AUTHORITIES ANTITRUST DISCIPLINES ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ANTITRUST LAW ANTITRUST LAWS ANTITRUST LEGISLATION ANTITRUST RULES BARRIERS TO COMPETITION BARRIERS TO ENTRY CARTEL CARTELS CLOSED ECONOMIES COLLUSION COMPETITION AUTHORITIES COMPETITION CRITERIA COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT COMPETITION LAWS COMPETITION LEGISLATION COMPETITION POLICIES COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITION PRINCIPLES COMPETITION REGIMES COMPETITIVE MARKETS COMPETITIVENESS COMPLIANCE COSTS CONCESSIONS CONSUMERS CONTESTABILITY COUNTRY MARKETS DEREGULATION DEVELOPING COUNTRY CONTEXT DIFFERENTIAL PRICING DISPUTE SETTLEMENT DOMESTIC COMPETITION DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DOMESTIC ORIGIN DOMESTIC PRODUCTS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIC WELFARE ECONOMIES OF SCALE ECONOMISTS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL STUDIES EXPLOITATION EXPORT CARTELS EXPORT MARKETS EXPORTS EXTERNALITIES FACTORS OF PRODUCTION FOREIGN COMPETITION FOREIGN FIRMS FOREIGN MARKETS FOREIGN PRODUCTS FOREIGN SUPPLIERS FREE TRADE GDP GLOBAL MARKET POWER GOVERNMENT REGULATION HARMONIZATION OF RULES HOME MARKET IMPERFECT COMPETITION IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT PENETRATION IMPORTS INCOME INCREASING RETURNS INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE INTERNATIONAL SPILLOVERS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION LEGISLATION ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES |
spellingShingle |
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COMPETITION POLICY WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS NONDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS CARTELS COMPLIANCE TRANSACTION COSTS MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES ANTITRUST LAW CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS COLLUSION BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS PRICING LOW INCOME DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CONSUMER PROTECTION MARKET LIBERALIZATION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE NEGOTIATIONS INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION SPILLOVER EFFECTS TERMS OF TRADE MARKET ACCESS MERGERS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS & TRADE ANTIDUMPING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SERVICES INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS PRODUCT QUALITY PROCUREMENT AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS LINKAGES ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES ANTIDUMPING ANTIDUMPING CASES ANTIDUMPING DUTIES ANTITRUST AUTHORITIES ANTITRUST DISCIPLINES ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ANTITRUST LAW ANTITRUST LAWS ANTITRUST LEGISLATION ANTITRUST RULES BARRIERS TO COMPETITION BARRIERS TO ENTRY CARTEL CARTELS CLOSED ECONOMIES COLLUSION COMPETITION AUTHORITIES COMPETITION CRITERIA COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT COMPETITION LAWS COMPETITION LEGISLATION COMPETITION POLICIES COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITION PRINCIPLES COMPETITION REGIMES COMPETITIVE MARKETS COMPETITIVENESS COMPLIANCE COSTS CONCESSIONS CONSUMERS CONTESTABILITY COUNTRY MARKETS DEREGULATION DEVELOPING COUNTRY CONTEXT DIFFERENTIAL PRICING DISPUTE SETTLEMENT DOMESTIC COMPETITION DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DOMESTIC ORIGIN DOMESTIC PRODUCTS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIC WELFARE ECONOMIES OF SCALE ECONOMISTS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL STUDIES EXPLOITATION EXPORT CARTELS EXPORT MARKETS EXPORTS EXTERNALITIES FACTORS OF PRODUCTION FOREIGN COMPETITION FOREIGN FIRMS FOREIGN MARKETS FOREIGN PRODUCTS FOREIGN SUPPLIERS FREE TRADE GDP GLOBAL MARKET POWER GOVERNMENT REGULATION HARMONIZATION OF RULES HOME MARKET IMPERFECT COMPETITION IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT PENETRATION IMPORTS INCOME INCREASING RETURNS INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE INTERNATIONAL SPILLOVERS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION LEGISLATION ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES Hoekman, Bernard Mavroidis, Petros C. Economic Development, Competition Policy, and the World Trade Organization |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2917 |
description |
At the recent World Trade Organization
(WTO) ministerial meeting in Doha, Qatar, WTO members called
for the launch of negotiations on disciplines relating to
competition based on explicit consensus on modalities to be
agreed at the fifth WTO ministerial meeting in 2003. WTO
discussions since 1997 have revealed little support for
ambitious multilateral action. Proponents of the WTO
antitrust disciplines currently propose an agreement that is
limited to "core principles"-nondiscrimination,
transparency, and provisions banning "hard core"
cartels. The authors argue that an agreement along such
lines will create compliance costs for developing countries
without addressing the anticompetitive behavior of firms
located in foreign jurisdictions. To be unambiguously
beneficial to low-income countries, any WTO antitrust
disciplines should recognize the capacity constraints that
prevail in these economies, make illegal collusive business
practices by firms with international operations that raise
prices in developing country markets, and require
competition authorities in high-income countries to take
action against firms located in their jurisdictions to
defend the interests of affected developing country
consumers. More generally, a case is made that traditional
liberalization commitments using existing WTO fora will be
the most effective means of lowering prices and increasing
access to an expanded variety of goods and services. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Hoekman, Bernard Mavroidis, Petros C. |
author_facet |
Hoekman, Bernard Mavroidis, Petros C. |
author_sort |
Hoekman, Bernard |
title |
Economic Development, Competition Policy, and the World Trade Organization |
title_short |
Economic Development, Competition Policy, and the World Trade Organization |
title_full |
Economic Development, Competition Policy, and the World Trade Organization |
title_fullStr |
Economic Development, Competition Policy, and the World Trade Organization |
title_full_unstemmed |
Economic Development, Competition Policy, and the World Trade Organization |
title_sort |
economic development, competition policy, and the world trade organization |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2014 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/10/2055811/economic-development-competition-policy-world-trade-organization http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19221 |
_version_ |
1764439592778334208 |