Economic Development, Competition Policy, and the World Trade Organization

At the recent World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meeting in Doha, Qatar, WTO members called for the launch of negotiations on disciplines relating to competition based on explicit consensus on modalities to be agreed at the fifth WTO minist...

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Main Authors: Hoekman, Bernard, Mavroidis, Petros C.
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
GDP
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/10/2055811/economic-development-competition-policy-world-trade-organization
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19221
id okr-10986-19221
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-192212021-04-23T14:03:42Z Economic Development, Competition Policy, and the World Trade Organization Hoekman, Bernard Mavroidis, Petros C. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COMPETITION POLICY WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS NONDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS CARTELS COMPLIANCE TRANSACTION COSTS MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES ANTITRUST LAW CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS COLLUSION BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS PRICING LOW INCOME DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CONSUMER PROTECTION MARKET LIBERALIZATION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE NEGOTIATIONS INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION SPILLOVER EFFECTS TERMS OF TRADE MARKET ACCESS MERGERS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS & TRADE ANTIDUMPING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SERVICES INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS PRODUCT QUALITY PROCUREMENT AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS LINKAGES ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES ANTIDUMPING ANTIDUMPING CASES ANTIDUMPING DUTIES ANTITRUST AUTHORITIES ANTITRUST DISCIPLINES ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ANTITRUST LAW ANTITRUST LAWS ANTITRUST LEGISLATION ANTITRUST RULES BARRIERS TO COMPETITION BARRIERS TO ENTRY CARTEL CARTELS CLOSED ECONOMIES COLLUSION COMPETITION AUTHORITIES COMPETITION CRITERIA COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT COMPETITION LAWS COMPETITION LEGISLATION COMPETITION POLICIES COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITION PRINCIPLES COMPETITION REGIMES COMPETITIVE MARKETS COMPETITIVENESS COMPLIANCE COSTS CONCESSIONS CONSUMERS CONTESTABILITY COUNTRY MARKETS DEREGULATION DEVELOPING COUNTRY CONTEXT DIFFERENTIAL PRICING DISPUTE SETTLEMENT DOMESTIC COMPETITION DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DOMESTIC ORIGIN DOMESTIC PRODUCTS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIC WELFARE ECONOMIES OF SCALE ECONOMISTS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL STUDIES EXPLOITATION EXPORT CARTELS EXPORT MARKETS EXPORTS EXTERNALITIES FACTORS OF PRODUCTION FOREIGN COMPETITION FOREIGN FIRMS FOREIGN MARKETS FOREIGN PRODUCTS FOREIGN SUPPLIERS FREE TRADE GDP GLOBAL MARKET POWER GOVERNMENT REGULATION HARMONIZATION OF RULES HOME MARKET IMPERFECT COMPETITION IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT PENETRATION IMPORTS INCOME INCREASING RETURNS INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE INTERNATIONAL SPILLOVERS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION LEGISLATION ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES At the recent World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meeting in Doha, Qatar, WTO members called for the launch of negotiations on disciplines relating to competition based on explicit consensus on modalities to be agreed at the fifth WTO ministerial meeting in 2003. WTO discussions since 1997 have revealed little support for ambitious multilateral action. Proponents of the WTO antitrust disciplines currently propose an agreement that is limited to "core principles"-nondiscrimination, transparency, and provisions banning "hard core" cartels. The authors argue that an agreement along such lines will create compliance costs for developing countries without addressing the anticompetitive behavior of firms located in foreign jurisdictions. To be unambiguously beneficial to low-income countries, any WTO antitrust disciplines should recognize the capacity constraints that prevail in these economies, make illegal collusive business practices by firms with international operations that raise prices in developing country markets, and require competition authorities in high-income countries to take action against firms located in their jurisdictions to defend the interests of affected developing country consumers. More generally, a case is made that traditional liberalization commitments using existing WTO fora will be the most effective means of lowering prices and increasing access to an expanded variety of goods and services. 2014-08-01T19:40:08Z 2014-08-01T19:40:08Z 2002-10 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/10/2055811/economic-development-competition-policy-world-trade-organization http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19221 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2917 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
COMPETITION POLICY
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
NONDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS
CARTELS
COMPLIANCE
TRANSACTION COSTS
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
ANTITRUST LAW
CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS
COLLUSION
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
PRICING
LOW INCOME DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
CONSUMER PROTECTION
MARKET LIBERALIZATION
TRADE LIBERALIZATION
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
SPILLOVER EFFECTS
TERMS OF TRADE
MARKET ACCESS
MERGERS
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS & TRADE
ANTIDUMPING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
SERVICES
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
PRODUCT QUALITY
PROCUREMENT
AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS
LINKAGES ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
ANTIDUMPING
ANTIDUMPING CASES
ANTIDUMPING DUTIES
ANTITRUST AUTHORITIES
ANTITRUST DISCIPLINES
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
ANTITRUST LAW
ANTITRUST LAWS
ANTITRUST LEGISLATION
ANTITRUST RULES
BARRIERS TO COMPETITION
BARRIERS TO ENTRY
CARTEL
CARTELS
CLOSED ECONOMIES
COLLUSION
COMPETITION AUTHORITIES
COMPETITION CRITERIA
COMPETITION LAW
COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT
COMPETITION LAWS
COMPETITION LEGISLATION
COMPETITION POLICIES
COMPETITION POLICY
COMPETITION PRINCIPLES
COMPETITION REGIMES
COMPETITIVE MARKETS
COMPETITIVENESS
COMPLIANCE COSTS
CONCESSIONS
CONSUMERS
CONTESTABILITY
COUNTRY MARKETS
DEREGULATION
DEVELOPING COUNTRY CONTEXT
DIFFERENTIAL PRICING
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
DOMESTIC COMPETITION
DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
DOMESTIC ORIGIN
DOMESTIC PRODUCTS
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
ECONOMIC WELFARE
ECONOMIES OF SCALE
ECONOMISTS
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
EMPIRICAL STUDIES
EXPLOITATION
EXPORT CARTELS
EXPORT MARKETS
EXPORTS
EXTERNALITIES
FACTORS OF PRODUCTION
FOREIGN COMPETITION
FOREIGN FIRMS
FOREIGN MARKETS
FOREIGN PRODUCTS
FOREIGN SUPPLIERS
FREE TRADE
GDP
GLOBAL MARKET POWER
GOVERNMENT REGULATION
HARMONIZATION OF RULES
HOME MARKET
IMPERFECT COMPETITION
IMPORT COMPETITION
IMPORT PENETRATION
IMPORTS
INCOME
INCREASING RETURNS
INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE
INTERNATIONAL SPILLOVERS
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION
LEGISLATION
ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
spellingShingle ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
COMPETITION POLICY
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
NONDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS
CARTELS
COMPLIANCE
TRANSACTION COSTS
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
ANTITRUST LAW
CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS
COLLUSION
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
PRICING
LOW INCOME DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
CONSUMER PROTECTION
MARKET LIBERALIZATION
TRADE LIBERALIZATION
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
SPILLOVER EFFECTS
TERMS OF TRADE
MARKET ACCESS
MERGERS
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS & TRADE
ANTIDUMPING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
SERVICES
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
PRODUCT QUALITY
PROCUREMENT
AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS
LINKAGES ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
ANTIDUMPING
ANTIDUMPING CASES
ANTIDUMPING DUTIES
ANTITRUST AUTHORITIES
ANTITRUST DISCIPLINES
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
ANTITRUST LAW
ANTITRUST LAWS
ANTITRUST LEGISLATION
ANTITRUST RULES
BARRIERS TO COMPETITION
BARRIERS TO ENTRY
CARTEL
CARTELS
CLOSED ECONOMIES
COLLUSION
COMPETITION AUTHORITIES
COMPETITION CRITERIA
COMPETITION LAW
COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT
COMPETITION LAWS
COMPETITION LEGISLATION
COMPETITION POLICIES
COMPETITION POLICY
COMPETITION PRINCIPLES
COMPETITION REGIMES
COMPETITIVE MARKETS
COMPETITIVENESS
COMPLIANCE COSTS
CONCESSIONS
CONSUMERS
CONTESTABILITY
COUNTRY MARKETS
DEREGULATION
DEVELOPING COUNTRY CONTEXT
DIFFERENTIAL PRICING
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
DOMESTIC COMPETITION
DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
DOMESTIC ORIGIN
DOMESTIC PRODUCTS
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
ECONOMIC WELFARE
ECONOMIES OF SCALE
ECONOMISTS
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
EMPIRICAL STUDIES
EXPLOITATION
EXPORT CARTELS
EXPORT MARKETS
EXPORTS
EXTERNALITIES
FACTORS OF PRODUCTION
FOREIGN COMPETITION
FOREIGN FIRMS
FOREIGN MARKETS
FOREIGN PRODUCTS
FOREIGN SUPPLIERS
FREE TRADE
GDP
GLOBAL MARKET POWER
GOVERNMENT REGULATION
HARMONIZATION OF RULES
HOME MARKET
IMPERFECT COMPETITION
IMPORT COMPETITION
IMPORT PENETRATION
IMPORTS
INCOME
INCREASING RETURNS
INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE
INTERNATIONAL SPILLOVERS
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION
LEGISLATION
ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
Hoekman, Bernard
Mavroidis, Petros C.
Economic Development, Competition Policy, and the World Trade Organization
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2917
description At the recent World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meeting in Doha, Qatar, WTO members called for the launch of negotiations on disciplines relating to competition based on explicit consensus on modalities to be agreed at the fifth WTO ministerial meeting in 2003. WTO discussions since 1997 have revealed little support for ambitious multilateral action. Proponents of the WTO antitrust disciplines currently propose an agreement that is limited to "core principles"-nondiscrimination, transparency, and provisions banning "hard core" cartels. The authors argue that an agreement along such lines will create compliance costs for developing countries without addressing the anticompetitive behavior of firms located in foreign jurisdictions. To be unambiguously beneficial to low-income countries, any WTO antitrust disciplines should recognize the capacity constraints that prevail in these economies, make illegal collusive business practices by firms with international operations that raise prices in developing country markets, and require competition authorities in high-income countries to take action against firms located in their jurisdictions to defend the interests of affected developing country consumers. More generally, a case is made that traditional liberalization commitments using existing WTO fora will be the most effective means of lowering prices and increasing access to an expanded variety of goods and services.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Hoekman, Bernard
Mavroidis, Petros C.
author_facet Hoekman, Bernard
Mavroidis, Petros C.
author_sort Hoekman, Bernard
title Economic Development, Competition Policy, and the World Trade Organization
title_short Economic Development, Competition Policy, and the World Trade Organization
title_full Economic Development, Competition Policy, and the World Trade Organization
title_fullStr Economic Development, Competition Policy, and the World Trade Organization
title_full_unstemmed Economic Development, Competition Policy, and the World Trade Organization
title_sort economic development, competition policy, and the world trade organization
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2014
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/10/2055811/economic-development-competition-policy-world-trade-organization
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19221
_version_ 1764439592778334208