Boondoogles and Expropriation : Rent-seeking and Policy Distortion when Property Rights are Insecure

Most analyses of property rights and economic development point to the negative influence of insecure property rights on private investment. The authors focus instead on the largely unexamined effects of insecure property rights on government polic...

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Main Authors:	Keefer, Philip, Knack, Stephen
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:	EXPROPRIATION RENT-SEEKING RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR PROPERTY RIGHTS PRIVATE INVESTMENTS GOVERNMENT POLICY TAX REVENUES INCENTIVES RULE OF LAW FISCAL MANAGEMENT FISCAL POLICY BUREAUCRACY & CORRUPT PRACTICES EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE ELECTIONS EXECUTIVE POWER GROWTH-REDUCING POLICIES AGENTS AUTHORITY BUREAUCRACY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZENS CLOSED ECONOMY COMPETITIVENESS CORRUPTION DECISION MAKERS DECISION MAKING DECISION MAKING AUTHORITY DEMOCRACY DISCOUNT RATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EXPENDITURE FISCAL GDP GOVERNMENT ACTION GOVERNMENT DECISION GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT EXPROPRIATION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT SPENDING GROWTH RATE HOUSEHOLDS HUMAN CAPITAL INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES INVESTMENT CLIMATE LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURES LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MACROECONOMICS MARGINAL UTILITY NATIONAL INCOME NATIONALIZATION POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICIANS PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTIVITY PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC INVESTMENTS PUBLIC PROPERTY PUBLIC SPENDING RENTS ROADS SECURE PROPERTY RIGHTS STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES TAX TAX POLICY TAX RATE TAX REVENUE TAXATION UTILITY FUNCTION VETO VOTERS
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/10/2040837/boondoogles-expropriation-rent-sseking-policy-distortion-property-rights-insecure http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19219

id	okr-10986-19219
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-192192021-04-23T14:03:42Z Boondoogles and Expropriation : Rent-seeking and Policy Distortion when Property Rights are Insecure Keefer, Philip Knack, Stephen EXPROPRIATION RENT-SEEKING RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR PROPERTY RIGHTS PRIVATE INVESTMENTS GOVERNMENT POLICY TAX REVENUES INCENTIVES RULE OF LAW FISCAL MANAGEMENT FISCAL POLICY BUREAUCRACY & CORRUPT PRACTICES EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE ELECTIONS EXECUTIVE POWER GROWTH-REDUCING POLICIES AGENTS AUTHORITY BUREAUCRACY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZENS CLOSED ECONOMY COMPETITIVENESS CORRUPTION DECISION MAKERS DECISION MAKING DECISION MAKING AUTHORITY DEMOCRACY DISCOUNT RATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EXPENDITURE FISCAL FISCAL POLICY GDP GOVERNMENT ACTION GOVERNMENT DECISION GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT EXPROPRIATION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT POLICY GOVERNMENT SPENDING GROWTH RATE HOUSEHOLDS HUMAN CAPITAL INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES INVESTMENT CLIMATE LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURES LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MACROECONOMICS MARGINAL UTILITY NATIONAL INCOME NATIONALIZATION POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICIANS PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC INVESTMENTS PUBLIC PROPERTY PUBLIC SPENDING RENTS ROADS SECURE PROPERTY RIGHTS STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES TAX TAX POLICY TAX RATE TAX REVENUE TAX REVENUES TAXATION UTILITY FUNCTION VETO VOTERS Most analyses of property rights and economic development point to the negative influence of insecure property rights on private investment. The authors focus instead on the largely unexamined effects of insecure property rights on government policy choices. They identify one significant anomaly-dramatically higher public investment in countries with insecure property rights-and use it to make the following broad claims about insecure property rights; 1) They increase rent-seeking. 2) They may reduce the incentives of governments to use tax revenues for productive purposes, such as public investment. 3) They do so whether one regards the principal problem of insecure property rights as the maintenance of law and order, which government spending can potentially remedy, or as the threat of expropriation by government itself, and therefore not remediable by government spending. The authors present substantial empirical evidence to support these claims. 2014-08-01T19:22:47Z 2014-08-01T19:22:47Z 2002-10 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/10/2040837/boondoogles-expropriation-rent-sseking-policy-distortion-property-rights-insecure http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19219 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2910 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	EXPROPRIATION RENT-SEEKING RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR PROPERTY RIGHTS PRIVATE INVESTMENTS GOVERNMENT POLICY TAX REVENUES INCENTIVES RULE OF LAW FISCAL MANAGEMENT FISCAL POLICY BUREAUCRACY & CORRUPT PRACTICES EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE ELECTIONS EXECUTIVE POWER GROWTH-REDUCING POLICIES AGENTS AUTHORITY BUREAUCRACY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZENS CLOSED ECONOMY COMPETITIVENESS CORRUPTION DECISION MAKERS DECISION MAKING DECISION MAKING AUTHORITY DEMOCRACY DISCOUNT RATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EXPENDITURE FISCAL FISCAL POLICY GDP GOVERNMENT ACTION GOVERNMENT DECISION GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT EXPROPRIATION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT POLICY GOVERNMENT SPENDING GROWTH RATE HOUSEHOLDS HUMAN CAPITAL INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES INVESTMENT CLIMATE LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURES LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MACROECONOMICS MARGINAL UTILITY NATIONAL INCOME NATIONALIZATION POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICIANS PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC INVESTMENTS PUBLIC PROPERTY PUBLIC SPENDING RENTS ROADS SECURE PROPERTY RIGHTS STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES TAX TAX POLICY TAX RATE TAX REVENUE TAX REVENUES TAXATION UTILITY FUNCTION VETO VOTERS
spellingShingle	EXPROPRIATION RENT-SEEKING RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR PROPERTY RIGHTS PRIVATE INVESTMENTS GOVERNMENT POLICY TAX REVENUES INCENTIVES RULE OF LAW FISCAL MANAGEMENT FISCAL POLICY BUREAUCRACY & CORRUPT PRACTICES EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE ELECTIONS EXECUTIVE POWER GROWTH-REDUCING POLICIES AGENTS AUTHORITY BUREAUCRACY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZENS CLOSED ECONOMY COMPETITIVENESS CORRUPTION DECISION MAKERS DECISION MAKING DECISION MAKING AUTHORITY DEMOCRACY DISCOUNT RATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EXPENDITURE FISCAL FISCAL POLICY GDP GOVERNMENT ACTION GOVERNMENT DECISION GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT EXPROPRIATION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT POLICY GOVERNMENT SPENDING GROWTH RATE HOUSEHOLDS HUMAN CAPITAL INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES INVESTMENT CLIMATE LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURES LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MACROECONOMICS MARGINAL UTILITY NATIONAL INCOME NATIONALIZATION POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICIANS PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC INVESTMENTS PUBLIC PROPERTY PUBLIC SPENDING RENTS ROADS SECURE PROPERTY RIGHTS STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES TAX TAX POLICY TAX RATE TAX REVENUE TAX REVENUES TAXATION UTILITY FUNCTION VETO VOTERS Keefer, Philip Knack, Stephen Boondoogles and Expropriation : Rent-seeking and Policy Distortion when Property Rights are Insecure
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2910
description	Most analyses of property rights and economic development point to the negative influence of insecure property rights on private investment. The authors focus instead on the largely unexamined effects of insecure property rights on government policy choices. They identify one significant anomaly-dramatically higher public investment in countries with insecure property rights-and use it to make the following broad claims about insecure property rights; 1) They increase rent-seeking. 2) They may reduce the incentives of governments to use tax revenues for productive purposes, such as public investment. 3) They do so whether one regards the principal problem of insecure property rights as the maintenance of law and order, which government spending can potentially remedy, or as the threat of expropriation by government itself, and therefore not remediable by government spending. The authors present substantial empirical evidence to support these claims.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Keefer, Philip Knack, Stephen
author_facet	Keefer, Philip Knack, Stephen
author_sort	Keefer, Philip
title	Boondoogles and Expropriation : Rent-seeking and Policy Distortion when Property Rights are Insecure
title_short	Boondoogles and Expropriation : Rent-seeking and Policy Distortion when Property Rights are Insecure
title_full	Boondoogles and Expropriation : Rent-seeking and Policy Distortion when Property Rights are Insecure
title_fullStr	Boondoogles and Expropriation : Rent-seeking and Policy Distortion when Property Rights are Insecure
title_full_unstemmed	Boondoogles and Expropriation : Rent-seeking and Policy Distortion when Property Rights are Insecure
title_sort	boondoogles and expropriation : rent-seeking and policy distortion when property rights are insecure
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2014
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/10/2040837/boondoogles-expropriation-rent-sseking-policy-distortion-property-rights-insecure http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19219
_version_	1764439451989180416

Boondoogles and Expropriation : Rent-seeking and Policy Distortion when Property Rights are Insecure

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