Military Expenditure : Threats, Aid, and Arms Races
Using global data for the period 1960-99, the authors estimate neighborhood arms races. They find that the level of military expenditure is strongly influenced by the expenditure of neighbors. The authors estimate an "arms race multiplier,&quo...
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2014
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/11/2075372/military-expenditure-threats-aid-arms-races http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19207 |
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okr-10986-192072021-04-23T14:03:42Z Military Expenditure : Threats, Aid, and Arms Races Collier, Paul Hoeffler, Anke ACTIONS ARMAMENTS ARMS ARMS RACE CIVIL CONFLICT CIVIL WAR CIVIL WARS COEFFICIENT OF POPULATION DISPERSION COLD WAR CONFLICT CONFLICT RISK CONFLICTS COUNTER-INSURGENCY DEFENSE DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DEMOCRATIZATION DETERRENCE DICTATORSHIP DISPUTES END OF WORLD WAR ETHNIC DOMINANCE ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION ETHNIC GROUP EXPENDITURE FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION INCOME PER CAPITA INCREASE IN RISK INDIGENOUS RELIGIONS INSURGENCY INTERNAL CONFLICT INTERNAL SECURITY INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL WAR LINGUISTIC DATA LINGUISTIC FRACTIONALIZATION LINGUISTIC FRACTIONALIZATION INDEX LINGUISTIC GROUP LOBBYING MILITARY ADVANTAGE MILITARY AIRCRAFT MILITARY BUDGETS MILITARY CAPABILITY MILITARY EQUIPMENT MILITARY EXPENDITURES MILITARY GOVERNMENT MILITARY POWER MILITARY SPENDING MOTIVATIONS NAVY PEACE PEACE PERIOD PEACE RESEARCH POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL POWER POST-CONFLICT REBEL RECRUITMENT REBELLION REBELLIONS RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION INDEX RISK OF CONFLICT RISK OF REBELLION SOCIAL COST SOCIAL FRACTIONALIZATION STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE TRADE AGREEMENTS WARFARE Using global data for the period 1960-99, the authors estimate neighborhood arms races. They find that the level of military expenditure is strongly influenced by the expenditure of neighbors. The authors estimate an "arms race multiplier," finding that an initial exogenous increase in military expenditure by one country is more than doubled in both the originating country and its neighbor. An implication is that military expenditure is, to an extent, a "regional public bad." Potentially, there is an offsetting public good effect if rebellions are deterred by military expenditure. However, instrumenting for military expenditure, the authors find no deterrence effect of military spending on the risk of internal conflict. So there appears to be no regional public good effect offsetting the public bad arising from a neighborhood arms race. 2014-08-01T18:37:00Z 2014-08-01T18:37:00Z 2002-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/11/2075372/military-expenditure-threats-aid-arms-races http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19207 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2927 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English en_US |
topic |
ACTIONS ARMAMENTS ARMS ARMS RACE CIVIL CONFLICT CIVIL WAR CIVIL WARS COEFFICIENT OF POPULATION DISPERSION COLD WAR CONFLICT CONFLICT RISK CONFLICTS COUNTER-INSURGENCY DEFENSE DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DEMOCRATIZATION DETERRENCE DICTATORSHIP DISPUTES END OF WORLD WAR ETHNIC DOMINANCE ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION ETHNIC GROUP EXPENDITURE FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION INCOME PER CAPITA INCREASE IN RISK INDIGENOUS RELIGIONS INSURGENCY INTERNAL CONFLICT INTERNAL SECURITY INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL WAR LINGUISTIC DATA LINGUISTIC FRACTIONALIZATION LINGUISTIC FRACTIONALIZATION INDEX LINGUISTIC GROUP LOBBYING MILITARY ADVANTAGE MILITARY AIRCRAFT MILITARY BUDGETS MILITARY CAPABILITY MILITARY EQUIPMENT MILITARY EXPENDITURES MILITARY GOVERNMENT MILITARY POWER MILITARY SPENDING MOTIVATIONS NAVY PEACE PEACE PERIOD PEACE RESEARCH POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL POWER POST-CONFLICT REBEL RECRUITMENT REBELLION REBELLIONS RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION INDEX RISK OF CONFLICT RISK OF REBELLION SOCIAL COST SOCIAL FRACTIONALIZATION STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE TRADE AGREEMENTS WARFARE |
spellingShingle |
ACTIONS ARMAMENTS ARMS ARMS RACE CIVIL CONFLICT CIVIL WAR CIVIL WARS COEFFICIENT OF POPULATION DISPERSION COLD WAR CONFLICT CONFLICT RISK CONFLICTS COUNTER-INSURGENCY DEFENSE DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DEMOCRATIZATION DETERRENCE DICTATORSHIP DISPUTES END OF WORLD WAR ETHNIC DOMINANCE ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION ETHNIC GROUP EXPENDITURE FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION INCOME PER CAPITA INCREASE IN RISK INDIGENOUS RELIGIONS INSURGENCY INTERNAL CONFLICT INTERNAL SECURITY INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL WAR LINGUISTIC DATA LINGUISTIC FRACTIONALIZATION LINGUISTIC FRACTIONALIZATION INDEX LINGUISTIC GROUP LOBBYING MILITARY ADVANTAGE MILITARY AIRCRAFT MILITARY BUDGETS MILITARY CAPABILITY MILITARY EQUIPMENT MILITARY EXPENDITURES MILITARY GOVERNMENT MILITARY POWER MILITARY SPENDING MOTIVATIONS NAVY PEACE PEACE PERIOD PEACE RESEARCH POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL POWER POST-CONFLICT REBEL RECRUITMENT REBELLION REBELLIONS RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION INDEX RISK OF CONFLICT RISK OF REBELLION SOCIAL COST SOCIAL FRACTIONALIZATION STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE TRADE AGREEMENTS WARFARE Collier, Paul Hoeffler, Anke Military Expenditure : Threats, Aid, and Arms Races |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2927 |
description |
Using global data for the period
1960-99, the authors estimate neighborhood arms races. They
find that the level of military expenditure is strongly
influenced by the expenditure of neighbors. The authors
estimate an "arms race multiplier," finding that
an initial exogenous increase in military expenditure by one
country is more than doubled in both the originating country
and its neighbor. An implication is that military
expenditure is, to an extent, a "regional public
bad." Potentially, there is an offsetting public good
effect if rebellions are deterred by military expenditure.
However, instrumenting for military expenditure, the authors
find no deterrence effect of military spending on the risk
of internal conflict. So there appears to be no regional
public good effect offsetting the public bad arising from a
neighborhood arms race. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Collier, Paul Hoeffler, Anke |
author_facet |
Collier, Paul Hoeffler, Anke |
author_sort |
Collier, Paul |
title |
Military Expenditure : Threats, Aid, and Arms Races |
title_short |
Military Expenditure : Threats, Aid, and Arms Races |
title_full |
Military Expenditure : Threats, Aid, and Arms Races |
title_fullStr |
Military Expenditure : Threats, Aid, and Arms Races |
title_full_unstemmed |
Military Expenditure : Threats, Aid, and Arms Races |
title_sort |
military expenditure : threats, aid, and arms races |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2014 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/11/2075372/military-expenditure-threats-aid-arms-races http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19207 |
_version_ |
1764439568910647296 |