Military Expenditure : Threats, Aid, and Arms Races

Using global data for the period 1960-99, the authors estimate neighborhood arms races. They find that the level of military expenditure is strongly influenced by the expenditure of neighbors. The authors estimate an "arms race multiplier,&quo...

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Main Authors: Collier, Paul, Hoeffler, Anke
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/11/2075372/military-expenditure-threats-aid-arms-races
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19207
id okr-10986-19207
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-192072021-04-23T14:03:42Z Military Expenditure : Threats, Aid, and Arms Races Collier, Paul Hoeffler, Anke ACTIONS ARMAMENTS ARMS ARMS RACE CIVIL CONFLICT CIVIL WAR CIVIL WARS COEFFICIENT OF POPULATION DISPERSION COLD WAR CONFLICT CONFLICT RISK CONFLICTS COUNTER-INSURGENCY DEFENSE DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DEMOCRATIZATION DETERRENCE DICTATORSHIP DISPUTES END OF WORLD WAR ETHNIC DOMINANCE ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION ETHNIC GROUP EXPENDITURE FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION INCOME PER CAPITA INCREASE IN RISK INDIGENOUS RELIGIONS INSURGENCY INTERNAL CONFLICT INTERNAL SECURITY INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL WAR LINGUISTIC DATA LINGUISTIC FRACTIONALIZATION LINGUISTIC FRACTIONALIZATION INDEX LINGUISTIC GROUP LOBBYING MILITARY ADVANTAGE MILITARY AIRCRAFT MILITARY BUDGETS MILITARY CAPABILITY MILITARY EQUIPMENT MILITARY EXPENDITURES MILITARY GOVERNMENT MILITARY POWER MILITARY SPENDING MOTIVATIONS NAVY PEACE PEACE PERIOD PEACE RESEARCH POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL POWER POST-CONFLICT REBEL RECRUITMENT REBELLION REBELLIONS RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION INDEX RISK OF CONFLICT RISK OF REBELLION SOCIAL COST SOCIAL FRACTIONALIZATION STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE TRADE AGREEMENTS WARFARE Using global data for the period 1960-99, the authors estimate neighborhood arms races. They find that the level of military expenditure is strongly influenced by the expenditure of neighbors. The authors estimate an "arms race multiplier," finding that an initial exogenous increase in military expenditure by one country is more than doubled in both the originating country and its neighbor. An implication is that military expenditure is, to an extent, a "regional public bad." Potentially, there is an offsetting public good effect if rebellions are deterred by military expenditure. However, instrumenting for military expenditure, the authors find no deterrence effect of military spending on the risk of internal conflict. So there appears to be no regional public good effect offsetting the public bad arising from a neighborhood arms race. 2014-08-01T18:37:00Z 2014-08-01T18:37:00Z 2002-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/11/2075372/military-expenditure-threats-aid-arms-races http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19207 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2927 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic ACTIONS
ARMAMENTS
ARMS
ARMS RACE
CIVIL CONFLICT
CIVIL WAR
CIVIL WARS
COEFFICIENT OF POPULATION DISPERSION
COLD WAR
CONFLICT
CONFLICT RISK
CONFLICTS
COUNTER-INSURGENCY
DEFENSE
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIC REGIMES
DEMOCRATIZATION
DETERRENCE
DICTATORSHIP
DISPUTES
END OF WORLD WAR
ETHNIC DOMINANCE
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION
ETHNIC GROUP
EXPENDITURE
FINANCIAL RESOURCES
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION
INCOME PER CAPITA
INCREASE IN RISK
INDIGENOUS RELIGIONS
INSURGENCY
INTERNAL CONFLICT
INTERNAL SECURITY
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
INTERNATIONAL WAR
LINGUISTIC DATA
LINGUISTIC FRACTIONALIZATION
LINGUISTIC FRACTIONALIZATION INDEX
LINGUISTIC GROUP
LOBBYING
MILITARY ADVANTAGE
MILITARY AIRCRAFT
MILITARY BUDGETS
MILITARY CAPABILITY
MILITARY EQUIPMENT
MILITARY EXPENDITURES
MILITARY GOVERNMENT
MILITARY POWER
MILITARY SPENDING
MOTIVATIONS
NAVY
PEACE
PEACE PERIOD
PEACE RESEARCH
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
POLITICAL POWER
POST-CONFLICT
REBEL RECRUITMENT
REBELLION
REBELLIONS
RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION
RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION INDEX
RISK OF CONFLICT
RISK OF REBELLION
SOCIAL COST
SOCIAL FRACTIONALIZATION
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
TRADE AGREEMENTS
WARFARE
spellingShingle ACTIONS
ARMAMENTS
ARMS
ARMS RACE
CIVIL CONFLICT
CIVIL WAR
CIVIL WARS
COEFFICIENT OF POPULATION DISPERSION
COLD WAR
CONFLICT
CONFLICT RISK
CONFLICTS
COUNTER-INSURGENCY
DEFENSE
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIC REGIMES
DEMOCRATIZATION
DETERRENCE
DICTATORSHIP
DISPUTES
END OF WORLD WAR
ETHNIC DOMINANCE
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION
ETHNIC GROUP
EXPENDITURE
FINANCIAL RESOURCES
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION
INCOME PER CAPITA
INCREASE IN RISK
INDIGENOUS RELIGIONS
INSURGENCY
INTERNAL CONFLICT
INTERNAL SECURITY
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
INTERNATIONAL WAR
LINGUISTIC DATA
LINGUISTIC FRACTIONALIZATION
LINGUISTIC FRACTIONALIZATION INDEX
LINGUISTIC GROUP
LOBBYING
MILITARY ADVANTAGE
MILITARY AIRCRAFT
MILITARY BUDGETS
MILITARY CAPABILITY
MILITARY EQUIPMENT
MILITARY EXPENDITURES
MILITARY GOVERNMENT
MILITARY POWER
MILITARY SPENDING
MOTIVATIONS
NAVY
PEACE
PEACE PERIOD
PEACE RESEARCH
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
POLITICAL POWER
POST-CONFLICT
REBEL RECRUITMENT
REBELLION
REBELLIONS
RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION
RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION INDEX
RISK OF CONFLICT
RISK OF REBELLION
SOCIAL COST
SOCIAL FRACTIONALIZATION
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
TRADE AGREEMENTS
WARFARE
Collier, Paul
Hoeffler, Anke
Military Expenditure : Threats, Aid, and Arms Races
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2927
description Using global data for the period 1960-99, the authors estimate neighborhood arms races. They find that the level of military expenditure is strongly influenced by the expenditure of neighbors. The authors estimate an "arms race multiplier," finding that an initial exogenous increase in military expenditure by one country is more than doubled in both the originating country and its neighbor. An implication is that military expenditure is, to an extent, a "regional public bad." Potentially, there is an offsetting public good effect if rebellions are deterred by military expenditure. However, instrumenting for military expenditure, the authors find no deterrence effect of military spending on the risk of internal conflict. So there appears to be no regional public good effect offsetting the public bad arising from a neighborhood arms race.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Collier, Paul
Hoeffler, Anke
author_facet Collier, Paul
Hoeffler, Anke
author_sort Collier, Paul
title Military Expenditure : Threats, Aid, and Arms Races
title_short Military Expenditure : Threats, Aid, and Arms Races
title_full Military Expenditure : Threats, Aid, and Arms Races
title_fullStr Military Expenditure : Threats, Aid, and Arms Races
title_full_unstemmed Military Expenditure : Threats, Aid, and Arms Races
title_sort military expenditure : threats, aid, and arms races
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2014
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/11/2075372/military-expenditure-threats-aid-arms-races
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19207
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