Greed and Grievance in Civil War
The authors compare two contrasting motivations for rebellion: greed and grievance. Most rebellions are ostensibly in pursuit of a cause, supported by a narrative of grievance. But since grievance assuagement through rebellion is a public good that...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/05/437634/greed-grievance-civil-war http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18853 |
| Summary: | The authors compare two contrasting
motivations for rebellion: greed and grievance. Most
rebellions are ostensibly in pursuit of a cause, supported
by a narrative of grievance. But since grievance assuagement
through rebellion is a public good that a government will
not supply, economists predict such rebellions would be
rare. Empirically, many rebellions appear to be linked to
the capture of resources (such as diamonds in Angola, and
Sierra Leone, drugs in Colombia, and timber in Cambodia).
The authors set up a simple rational choice model of
greed-rebellion, and contrasts its predictions with those of
a simple grievance model. Some countries return to conflict
repeatedly. Are they conflict-prone, or is there a feedback
effect whereby conflict generates grievance, which in turn
generates further conflict? The authors show why such a
feedback effect might be present in both greed-motivated and
grievance rebellions. The authors' results contrast
with conventional beliefs, about the causes of conflict. A
stylized version of conventional beliefs would be that
grievance begets conflict, which begets grievance, which
begets further conflict. With such a model, the only point
at which to intervene is to reduce the level of objective
grievance. The authors' model suggests that what
actually happens is that opportunities for predation
(controlling primary commodity exports) cause conflict, and
the grievances this generates induce diasporas to finance
further conflict. The point of policy intervention here is
to reduce the absolute, and relative attraction of primary
commodity predation, and to reduce the ability of diasporas
to fund rebel movements. |
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