Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture : How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies

As a symptom of fundamental institutional weaknesses, corruption needs to be viewed within a broader governance framework. It thrives where the state is unable to reign over its bureaucracy, to protect property and contractual rights, or to provide...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Hellman, Joel S., Jones, Geraint, Kaufmann, Daniel, Schankerman, Mark
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/04/437919/measuring-governance-corruption-state-capture-firms-bureaucrats-shape-business-environment-transition-economies
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18832
id okr-10986-18832
recordtype oai_dc
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
BRIBERY
BRIBES
BUREAUCRACY
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
CITIZENS
CIVIL SOCIETY
COMMUNIST
COMPARISONS ACROSS COUNTRIES
CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS
CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
CORPORATE SECTOR
CORPORATE STRATEGIES
CORRUPTION
CORRUPTION INDICATORS
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX
COUNTRY COVERAGE
CRIME
DECREES
DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNANCE
DISCRETIONARY POWER
DISCRIMINATION
ECONOMIC POLICY
EXCHANGE OF IDEAS
EXCHANGE RATE
FINANCIAL SERVICES
FOREIGN INVESTORS
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP
GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES
GOVERNANCE ISSUES
GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS
GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS
GRAFT
GRAND CORRUPTION
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES
INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
INVESTMENT CLIMATE
JUDICIARY
LAWS
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
LEGAL SYSTEM
LEGISLATION
LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE
MACROECONOMIC CRISIS
MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT
MEASURING GOVERNANCE
MISGOVERNANCE
NATIONAL GOVERNANCE
NATIONAL LEVEL
PARLIAMENT
PERCEPTIONS INDEX
PETTY CORRUPTION
POLICY ADVICE
POLICY MAKING
POLICY RESEARCH
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM
POLITICAL INFLUENCE
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
PRIVATISATION
PUBLIC AGENCIES
PUBLIC GOODS
PUBLIC HEALTH
PUBLIC HEALTH CARE
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
PUBLIC SERVICES
QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE
QUALITY OF PUBLIC
RULE OF LAW
STATE AGENCY
STATE INSTITUTIONS
STATE INTERVENTION
STATE OWNERSHIP
STATE SECTOR
SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS
SYSTEMATIC PATTERN
TELEPHONE LINES
TRANSITION COUNTRIES
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
TRANSPARENCY
spellingShingle AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
BRIBERY
BRIBES
BUREAUCRACY
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
CITIZENS
CIVIL SOCIETY
COMMUNIST
COMPARISONS ACROSS COUNTRIES
CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS
CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
CORPORATE SECTOR
CORPORATE STRATEGIES
CORRUPTION
CORRUPTION INDICATORS
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX
COUNTRY COVERAGE
CRIME
DECREES
DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNANCE
DISCRETIONARY POWER
DISCRIMINATION
ECONOMIC POLICY
EXCHANGE OF IDEAS
EXCHANGE RATE
FINANCIAL SERVICES
FOREIGN INVESTORS
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP
GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES
GOVERNANCE ISSUES
GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS
GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS
GRAFT
GRAND CORRUPTION
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES
INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
INVESTMENT CLIMATE
JUDICIARY
LAWS
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
LEGAL SYSTEM
LEGISLATION
LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE
MACROECONOMIC CRISIS
MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT
MEASURING GOVERNANCE
MISGOVERNANCE
NATIONAL GOVERNANCE
NATIONAL LEVEL
PARLIAMENT
PERCEPTIONS INDEX
PETTY CORRUPTION
POLICY ADVICE
POLICY MAKING
POLICY RESEARCH
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM
POLITICAL INFLUENCE
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
PRIVATISATION
PUBLIC AGENCIES
PUBLIC GOODS
PUBLIC HEALTH
PUBLIC HEALTH CARE
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
PUBLIC SERVICES
QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE
QUALITY OF PUBLIC
RULE OF LAW
STATE AGENCY
STATE INSTITUTIONS
STATE INTERVENTION
STATE OWNERSHIP
STATE SECTOR
SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS
SYSTEMATIC PATTERN
TELEPHONE LINES
TRANSITION COUNTRIES
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
TRANSPARENCY
Hellman, Joel S.
Jones, Geraint
Kaufmann, Daniel
Schankerman, Mark
Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture : How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies
geographic_facet Europe
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2312
description As a symptom of fundamental institutional weaknesses, corruption needs to be viewed within a broader governance framework. It thrives where the state is unable to reign over its bureaucracy, to protect property and contractual rights, or to provide institutions that support the rule off law. Furthermore, governance failures at the national level cannot be isolated from the interface between the corporate and state sectors, in particular from the heretofore under-emphasized influence that firms may exert on the state. Under certain conditions, corporate strategies may exacerbate mis-governance at the national level. An in-depth empirical assessment of the links between corporate behavior and national governance can thus provide particular insights. The 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) - the transition economies component of the ongoing World Business Environment Survey - assesses in detail the various dimensions of governance from the perspective of about 3,000 firms in 20 countries. After introducing the survey framework and measurement approach, the authors present the survey results, focusing on governance, corruption, and state capture. By unbundling governance into its many dimensions, BEEPS permits an in-depth empirical assessment. The authors pay special attention to certain forms of grand corruption, notably state capture by parts of the corporate sector - that is, the propensity of firms to shape the underlying rules of the game by "purchasing" decrees, legislation, and influence at the central bank, which is found to be prevalent in a number of transition economies. The survey also measures other dimensions of grand corruption, including those associated with public procurement, and quantifies the more traditional ("prettier") forms of corruption. Cross-country surveys may suffer from bias if firms tend to systematically over- or underestimate the extent of problems within their country. The authors provide a new test of this potential bias, finding little evidence of country perception bias in BEEPS.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Hellman, Joel S.
Jones, Geraint
Kaufmann, Daniel
Schankerman, Mark
author_facet Hellman, Joel S.
Jones, Geraint
Kaufmann, Daniel
Schankerman, Mark
author_sort Hellman, Joel S.
title Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture : How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies
title_short Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture : How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies
title_full Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture : How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies
title_fullStr Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture : How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies
title_full_unstemmed Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture : How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies
title_sort measuring governance, corruption, and state capture : how firms and bureaucrats shape the business environment in transition economies
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2014
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/04/437919/measuring-governance-corruption-state-capture-firms-bureaucrats-shape-business-environment-transition-economies
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18832
_version_ 1764441571519889408
spelling okr-10986-188322021-04-23T14:03:46Z Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture : How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies Hellman, Joel S. Jones, Geraint Kaufmann, Daniel Schankerman, Mark AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRACY BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZENS CIVIL SOCIETY COMMUNIST COMPARISONS ACROSS COUNTRIES CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS CORPORATE BEHAVIOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE SECTOR CORPORATE STRATEGIES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION INDICATORS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX COUNTRY COVERAGE CRIME DECREES DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNANCE DISCRETIONARY POWER DISCRIMINATION ECONOMIC POLICY EXCHANGE OF IDEAS EXCHANGE RATE FINANCIAL SERVICES FOREIGN INVESTORS FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES GOVERNANCE ISSUES GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GRAFT GRAND CORRUPTION INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT CLIMATE JUDICIARY LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL SYSTEM LEGISLATION LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE MACROECONOMIC CRISIS MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT MEASURING GOVERNANCE MISGOVERNANCE NATIONAL GOVERNANCE NATIONAL LEVEL PARLIAMENT PERCEPTIONS INDEX PETTY CORRUPTION POLICY ADVICE POLICY MAKING POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM POLITICAL INFLUENCE PRIVATE OWNERSHIP PRIVATISATION PUBLIC AGENCIES PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH CARE PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PUBLIC SERVICES QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE QUALITY OF PUBLIC RULE OF LAW STATE AGENCY STATE INSTITUTIONS STATE INTERVENTION STATE OWNERSHIP STATE SECTOR SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS SYSTEMATIC PATTERN TELEPHONE LINES TRANSITION COUNTRIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY As a symptom of fundamental institutional weaknesses, corruption needs to be viewed within a broader governance framework. It thrives where the state is unable to reign over its bureaucracy, to protect property and contractual rights, or to provide institutions that support the rule off law. Furthermore, governance failures at the national level cannot be isolated from the interface between the corporate and state sectors, in particular from the heretofore under-emphasized influence that firms may exert on the state. Under certain conditions, corporate strategies may exacerbate mis-governance at the national level. An in-depth empirical assessment of the links between corporate behavior and national governance can thus provide particular insights. The 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) - the transition economies component of the ongoing World Business Environment Survey - assesses in detail the various dimensions of governance from the perspective of about 3,000 firms in 20 countries. After introducing the survey framework and measurement approach, the authors present the survey results, focusing on governance, corruption, and state capture. By unbundling governance into its many dimensions, BEEPS permits an in-depth empirical assessment. The authors pay special attention to certain forms of grand corruption, notably state capture by parts of the corporate sector - that is, the propensity of firms to shape the underlying rules of the game by "purchasing" decrees, legislation, and influence at the central bank, which is found to be prevalent in a number of transition economies. The survey also measures other dimensions of grand corruption, including those associated with public procurement, and quantifies the more traditional ("prettier") forms of corruption. Cross-country surveys may suffer from bias if firms tend to systematically over- or underestimate the extent of problems within their country. The authors provide a new test of this potential bias, finding little evidence of country perception bias in BEEPS. 2014-06-30T17:21:33Z 2014-06-30T17:21:33Z 2000-04 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/04/437919/measuring-governance-corruption-state-capture-firms-bureaucrats-shape-business-environment-transition-economies http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18832 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2312 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Europe