Vouchers for Basic Education in Developing Countries : A Principal-Agent Perspective
Voucher programs consist of three simultaneous reforms: (1) allowing parents to choose schools, (2) creating intense incentives for schools to increase enrollment, and (3) granting schools management autonomy to respond to demand. As a result, vouc...
Main Authors: | , |
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Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/03/2191892/vouchers-basic-education-developing-countries-principal-agent-perspective http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18306 |
Summary: | Voucher programs consist of three
simultaneous reforms: (1) allowing parents to choose
schools, (2) creating intense incentives for schools to
increase enrollment, and (3) granting schools management
autonomy to respond to demand. As a result, voucher
advocates and critics tend to talk past each other. A
principal-agent framework clarifies the argument for
education vouchers. Central findings from the literature,
including issues related to variance in the performance
measure, risk aversion, the productivity of more effort,
multiple tasks, and the value of monitoring are found
relevant for an analysis of vouchers. An assessment of
findings on voucher programs in industrial countries, as
well as a review of voucher or quasi-voucher experiences in
Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, and the
Czech Republic support the usefulness of the analytic
framework. The authors conclude that vouchers for basic
education in developing countries can enhance outcomes when
they are limited to modest numbers of poor students in urban
settings, particularly in conjunction with existing private
schools with surplus capacity. The success of more ambitious
voucher programs depends on an institutional infrastructure
challenging to industrial and developing countries alike. |
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