Institutional Arrangements for Public Debt Management
This paper analyzes institutional arrangements for public debt management by reviewing the experience of OECD countries during the late 1980s and 1990s. It discusses principal-agent issues arising from the delegation of authority from the Minister...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/04/2329619/institutional-arrangements-public-debt-management http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18226 |
| Summary: | This paper analyzes institutional
arrangements for public debt management by reviewing the
experience of OECD countries during the late 1980s and
1990s. It discusses principal-agent issues arising from the
delegation of authority from the Minister of Finance to the
debt management office and describes how countries have
designed governance structures and control and monitoring
mechanisms to deal with these issues. The paper also
discusses what lessons emerging market countries and
transition countries can draw from the experience of
advanced OECD countries. The OECD experience clearly
indicates that-regardless of whether the debt management
office is located inside or outside the Ministry of
Finance-four issues are of vital importance: 1) Giving
priority to strategic public policy objectives rather than
tactical trading objectives. 2) Strengthening the
institutional capacity to deal with financial portfolio
management and with the public policy aspects of debt
management. 3) Modernizing debt management. 4) Creating
mechanisms to ensure successful delegation and
accountability to the Ministry of Finance and Parliament. |
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