Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America

The authors construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables the authors to provide theoretical predictions for the impact on the probability of renegotiation of a con...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Guasch, J. Luis, Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Straub, Stephane
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:	ACCOUNTING ADVERSE SELECTION AIRPORTS APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY ARBITRATION ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BOT CONCESSION CONCESSION CONTRACTS CONSENSUS CORRUPTION DEBT DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DIVESTITURE ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC SHOCKS ECONOMICS ELECTRICITY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL STUDIES ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM EQUILIBRIUM EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION INCOME INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS JUDGES MARGINAL COST MONOPOLY MORAL HAZARD MOTIVATIONS NATURAL MONOPOLY POLICY DECISIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICIANS PORTS POTENTIAL INVESTORS POVERTY ALLEVIATION PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND PRIVATE ENTERPRISES PRIVATE INFORMATION PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION PRODUCTIVITY PROVISION OF INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC FINANCING PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE REGULATOR REGULATORS REGULATORY BODY REGULATORY CAPTURE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS ROADS SECTOR RESTRUCTURING SOCIAL COST SOCIAL SECTORS SOCIAL WELFARE STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES TAX TAX SYSTEM TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRANSACTION COSTS UTILITIES CONCESSIONS; REGULATORY FRAMEWORK; CONTRACT NEGOTIATION; INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY; ECONOMIC SHOCKS; DATA ANALYSIS; TELECOMMUNICATIONS; ENERGY SECTOR; WATER SECTOR; TRANSPORT SECTOR; POLICY FORMATION UTILITIES CONCESSIONS
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/04/2210557/renegotiation-concession-contracts-latin-america http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18224

Description
Summary:	The authors construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables the authors to provide theoretical predictions for the impact on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, regulatory institutions, institutional features, economic shocks, and the characteristics of the concession contracts. Then they use a data set of nearly 1,000 concessions awarded in Latin America and the Caribbean countries from 1989 to 2000 covering the sectors of telecommunications, energy, transport, and water to test these predictions. Finally, the authors derive some policy implications of their theoretical and empirical work.

Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America

Similar Items