Bank Supervision and Corporate Finance
The authors examine the impact of bank supervision on the financing obstacles faced by almost 5,000 corporations across 49 countries. They find that firms in countries with strong official supervisory agencies that directly monitor banks tend to fa...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/05/2340134/bank-supervision-corporate-finance http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18209 |
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okr-10986-182092021-04-23T14:03:41Z Bank Supervision and Corporate Finance Beck, Thorsten Demirguc-Kunt, Asli Levine, Ross ACCOUNTING ALLOCATION OF CAPITAL AUTHORITY BANK ASSETS BANK DEPOSITS BANK LIABILITIES BANK MANAGEMENT BANK SUPERVISION BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEM BANKS CAPITAL ALLOCATION CAPITALIZATION COMPETITIVENESS CORPORATE CONTROL CORPORATE FINANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORRUPTION DEBT DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS ECONOMIC GROWTH EMPLOYMENT EXTERNAL AUDITORS FAVORITISM FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL PLANNING FINANCING CONSTRAINTS FOREIGN ENTITIES FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP INFLATION INFORMATION DISCLOSURE INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES LAWS LEGAL PROTECTION LEGAL SYSTEMS LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT MACROECONOMIC STABILITY MARKET DISCIPLINE MORAL HAZARD POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICIANS PREDICTIONS PUBLIC POLICY RESERVE REQUIREMENT SAVINGS SECURITIES SENSITIVITY ANALYSES SHAREHOLDERS SOCIAL WELFARE STATE OWNERSHIP SUBORDINATED DEBT SUPERVISORY AGENCIES SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES TRANSACTION COSTS VETO BANKING SYSTEMS BANK SUPERVISION CORPORATE FINANCE BANKING REGULATION MONITORING CRITERIA FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FINANCING OPTIONS EXTERNAL FINANCE POLICY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY FRAMEWORK BANKING SYSTEMS The authors examine the impact of bank supervision on the financing obstacles faced by almost 5,000 corporations across 49 countries. They find that firms in countries with strong official supervisory agencies that directly monitor banks tend to face greater financing obstacles. Moreover, powerful official supervision tends to increase firm reliance on special connections and corruption in raising external finance, which is consistent with political and regulatory capture theories. Creating a supervisory agency that is independent of the government and banks mitigates the adverse consequences of powerful supervision. Finally, the authors find that bank supervisory agencies that force accurate information disclosure by banks and enhance private monitoring tend to ease the financing obstacles faced by firms. 2014-05-09T18:23:17Z 2014-05-09T18:23:17Z 2003-05 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/05/2340134/bank-supervision-corporate-finance http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18209 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3042 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCOUNTING ALLOCATION OF CAPITAL AUTHORITY BANK ASSETS BANK DEPOSITS BANK LIABILITIES BANK MANAGEMENT BANK SUPERVISION BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEM BANKS CAPITAL ALLOCATION CAPITALIZATION COMPETITIVENESS CORPORATE CONTROL CORPORATE FINANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORRUPTION DEBT DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS ECONOMIC GROWTH EMPLOYMENT EXTERNAL AUDITORS FAVORITISM FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL PLANNING FINANCING CONSTRAINTS FOREIGN ENTITIES FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP INFLATION INFORMATION DISCLOSURE INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES LAWS LEGAL PROTECTION LEGAL SYSTEMS LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT MACROECONOMIC STABILITY MARKET DISCIPLINE MORAL HAZARD POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICIANS PREDICTIONS PUBLIC POLICY RESERVE REQUIREMENT SAVINGS SECURITIES SENSITIVITY ANALYSES SHAREHOLDERS SOCIAL WELFARE STATE OWNERSHIP SUBORDINATED DEBT SUPERVISORY AGENCIES SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES TRANSACTION COSTS VETO BANKING SYSTEMS BANK SUPERVISION CORPORATE FINANCE BANKING REGULATION MONITORING CRITERIA FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FINANCING OPTIONS EXTERNAL FINANCE POLICY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY FRAMEWORK BANKING SYSTEMS |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTING ALLOCATION OF CAPITAL AUTHORITY BANK ASSETS BANK DEPOSITS BANK LIABILITIES BANK MANAGEMENT BANK SUPERVISION BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEM BANKS CAPITAL ALLOCATION CAPITALIZATION COMPETITIVENESS CORPORATE CONTROL CORPORATE FINANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORRUPTION DEBT DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS ECONOMIC GROWTH EMPLOYMENT EXTERNAL AUDITORS FAVORITISM FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL PLANNING FINANCING CONSTRAINTS FOREIGN ENTITIES FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP INFLATION INFORMATION DISCLOSURE INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES LAWS LEGAL PROTECTION LEGAL SYSTEMS LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT MACROECONOMIC STABILITY MARKET DISCIPLINE MORAL HAZARD POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICIANS PREDICTIONS PUBLIC POLICY RESERVE REQUIREMENT SAVINGS SECURITIES SENSITIVITY ANALYSES SHAREHOLDERS SOCIAL WELFARE STATE OWNERSHIP SUBORDINATED DEBT SUPERVISORY AGENCIES SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES TRANSACTION COSTS VETO BANKING SYSTEMS BANK SUPERVISION CORPORATE FINANCE BANKING REGULATION MONITORING CRITERIA FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FINANCING OPTIONS EXTERNAL FINANCE POLICY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY FRAMEWORK BANKING SYSTEMS Beck, Thorsten Demirguc-Kunt, Asli Levine, Ross Bank Supervision and Corporate Finance |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3042 |
| description |
The authors examine the impact of bank
supervision on the financing obstacles faced by almost 5,000
corporations across 49 countries. They find that firms in
countries with strong official supervisory agencies that
directly monitor banks tend to face greater financing
obstacles. Moreover, powerful official supervision tends to
increase firm reliance on special connections and corruption
in raising external finance, which is consistent with
political and regulatory capture theories. Creating a
supervisory agency that is independent of the government and
banks mitigates the adverse consequences of powerful
supervision. Finally, the authors find that bank supervisory
agencies that force accurate information disclosure by banks
and enhance private monitoring tend to ease the financing
obstacles faced by firms. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Beck, Thorsten Demirguc-Kunt, Asli Levine, Ross |
| author_facet |
Beck, Thorsten Demirguc-Kunt, Asli Levine, Ross |
| author_sort |
Beck, Thorsten |
| title |
Bank Supervision and Corporate Finance |
| title_short |
Bank Supervision and Corporate Finance |
| title_full |
Bank Supervision and Corporate Finance |
| title_fullStr |
Bank Supervision and Corporate Finance |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Bank Supervision and Corporate Finance |
| title_sort |
bank supervision and corporate finance |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/05/2340134/bank-supervision-corporate-finance http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18209 |
| _version_ |
1764439139311157248 |