Governance of Public Pension Funds : Lessons from Corporate Governance and International Evidence
An understanding of corporate governance theory can promote the adoption of appropriate governance tools to limit agency problems in public pension fund management. The absence of a market for corporate control hinders the translation of lessons fr...
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/08/2495953/governance-public-pension-funds-lessons-corporate-governance-international-evidence http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18125 |
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okr-10986-181252021-04-23T14:03:41Z Governance of Public Pension Funds : Lessons from Corporate Governance and International Evidence Hess, David Impavido, Gregorio ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ADVERSE SELECTION AGENCY PROBLEMS ASSET DIVERSIFICATION ASSETS AUDITS AUTHORITY BANK DEPOSITS BANKRUPTCY BANKS CIVIL SERVICE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPETITIVENESS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM CORRUPTION COST OF LIVING COST OF LIVING ADJUSTMENTS CREDIT RATINGS DECISION-MAKERS DECISION-MAKING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIES OF SCALE EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EXTERNAL AUDITORS FINANCIAL HEALTH FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FINANCIAL INTERESTS FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE FINANCIAL SECTOR FOREIGN MARKETS GOVERNMENT BONDS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT SERVICES HOUSING INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCOME INFLATION INSOLVENCY INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSURANCE INSURANCE PREMIUMS INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES INTERNAL AUDIT INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION INTERNAL CONTROLS LABOR MARKET LARGE SHAREHOLDERS LAWS LEGISLATION LIQUIDITY LOCAL GOVERNMENT MANDATES MORAL HAZARD MOTIVATIONS MUNICIPAL BONDS NATIONAL PENSIONS POLITICAL INTERFERENCE PROPERTY VALUES PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOVERNANCE REPRESENTATIVES RESOURCE ALLOCATION RETIREMENT RETURN ON ASSETS RISK AVERSION SAVINGS SAVINGS ACCOUNTS SHAREHOLDERS SOCIAL SECURITY STATE TRUSTEES UNEMPLOYMENT WEALTH GOVERNANCE CAPACITY PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEMS PENSION FUNDS ADMINISTRATION CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRIVATE SECTOR MANAGEMENT REGULATORY BODIES REGULATORY CONTROL WEALTH GOVERNANCE CAPACITY An understanding of corporate governance theory can promote the adoption of appropriate governance tools to limit agency problems in public pension fund management. The absence of a market for corporate control hinders the translation of lessons from the private sector corporate world to public pension governance. The establishment of a fit, and proper governing body for public pension funds, thus may be even more important than the maintenance of a comparable body for private sector corporations. In particular, behavioral controls should be carefully designed. 2014-04-30T20:30:44Z 2014-04-30T20:30:44Z 2003-08 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/08/2495953/governance-public-pension-funds-lessons-corporate-governance-international-evidence http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18125 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3110 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English en_US |
topic |
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ADVERSE SELECTION AGENCY PROBLEMS ASSET DIVERSIFICATION ASSETS AUDITS AUTHORITY BANK DEPOSITS BANKRUPTCY BANKS CIVIL SERVICE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPETITIVENESS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM CORRUPTION COST OF LIVING COST OF LIVING ADJUSTMENTS CREDIT RATINGS DECISION-MAKERS DECISION-MAKING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIES OF SCALE EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EXTERNAL AUDITORS FINANCIAL HEALTH FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FINANCIAL INTERESTS FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE FINANCIAL SECTOR FOREIGN MARKETS GOVERNMENT BONDS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT SERVICES HOUSING INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCOME INFLATION INSOLVENCY INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSURANCE INSURANCE PREMIUMS INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES INTERNAL AUDIT INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION INTERNAL CONTROLS LABOR MARKET LARGE SHAREHOLDERS LAWS LEGISLATION LIQUIDITY LOCAL GOVERNMENT MANDATES MORAL HAZARD MOTIVATIONS MUNICIPAL BONDS NATIONAL PENSIONS POLITICAL INTERFERENCE PROPERTY VALUES PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOVERNANCE REPRESENTATIVES RESOURCE ALLOCATION RETIREMENT RETURN ON ASSETS RISK AVERSION SAVINGS SAVINGS ACCOUNTS SHAREHOLDERS SOCIAL SECURITY STATE TRUSTEES UNEMPLOYMENT WEALTH GOVERNANCE CAPACITY PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEMS PENSION FUNDS ADMINISTRATION CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRIVATE SECTOR MANAGEMENT REGULATORY BODIES REGULATORY CONTROL WEALTH GOVERNANCE CAPACITY |
spellingShingle |
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ADVERSE SELECTION AGENCY PROBLEMS ASSET DIVERSIFICATION ASSETS AUDITS AUTHORITY BANK DEPOSITS BANKRUPTCY BANKS CIVIL SERVICE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPETITIVENESS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM CORRUPTION COST OF LIVING COST OF LIVING ADJUSTMENTS CREDIT RATINGS DECISION-MAKERS DECISION-MAKING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIES OF SCALE EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EXTERNAL AUDITORS FINANCIAL HEALTH FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FINANCIAL INTERESTS FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE FINANCIAL SECTOR FOREIGN MARKETS GOVERNMENT BONDS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT SERVICES HOUSING INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCOME INFLATION INSOLVENCY INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSURANCE INSURANCE PREMIUMS INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES INTERNAL AUDIT INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION INTERNAL CONTROLS LABOR MARKET LARGE SHAREHOLDERS LAWS LEGISLATION LIQUIDITY LOCAL GOVERNMENT MANDATES MORAL HAZARD MOTIVATIONS MUNICIPAL BONDS NATIONAL PENSIONS POLITICAL INTERFERENCE PROPERTY VALUES PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOVERNANCE REPRESENTATIVES RESOURCE ALLOCATION RETIREMENT RETURN ON ASSETS RISK AVERSION SAVINGS SAVINGS ACCOUNTS SHAREHOLDERS SOCIAL SECURITY STATE TRUSTEES UNEMPLOYMENT WEALTH GOVERNANCE CAPACITY PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEMS PENSION FUNDS ADMINISTRATION CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRIVATE SECTOR MANAGEMENT REGULATORY BODIES REGULATORY CONTROL WEALTH GOVERNANCE CAPACITY Hess, David Impavido, Gregorio Governance of Public Pension Funds : Lessons from Corporate Governance and International Evidence |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3110 |
description |
An understanding of corporate governance
theory can promote the adoption of appropriate governance
tools to limit agency problems in public pension fund
management. The absence of a market for corporate control
hinders the translation of lessons from the private sector
corporate world to public pension governance. The
establishment of a fit, and proper governing body for public
pension funds, thus may be even more important than the
maintenance of a comparable body for private sector
corporations. In particular, behavioral controls should be
carefully designed. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Hess, David Impavido, Gregorio |
author_facet |
Hess, David Impavido, Gregorio |
author_sort |
Hess, David |
title |
Governance of Public Pension Funds : Lessons from Corporate Governance and International Evidence |
title_short |
Governance of Public Pension Funds : Lessons from Corporate Governance and International Evidence |
title_full |
Governance of Public Pension Funds : Lessons from Corporate Governance and International Evidence |
title_fullStr |
Governance of Public Pension Funds : Lessons from Corporate Governance and International Evidence |
title_full_unstemmed |
Governance of Public Pension Funds : Lessons from Corporate Governance and International Evidence |
title_sort |
governance of public pension funds : lessons from corporate governance and international evidence |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2014 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/08/2495953/governance-public-pension-funds-lessons-corporate-governance-international-evidence http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18125 |
_version_ |
1764438919461470208 |