Lebanon : Teachers
In 2009, Lebanon spent 1.8 percent of Gross domestic product (GDP) on public education. In the same year, as a percentage of total government expenditure, Lebanon spent 7.2 percent on education. An important challenge for Lebanon is that its best-...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
Washington, DC
2014
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/01/18064243/saber-teacher-country-report-lebanon-2010 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17933 |
| Summary: | In 2009, Lebanon spent 1.8 percent of
Gross domestic product (GDP) on public education. In the
same year, as a percentage of total government expenditure,
Lebanon spent 7.2 percent on education. An important
challenge for Lebanon is that its best-trained people
migrate abroad or have to face low rates of return to
schooling domestically. Lebanon is experiencing an
over-supply of teachers, which provides an opportunity to be
more selective and raise the bar for entering teachers.
While some neighboring countries only screen teacher
candidates based on test scores in the secondary school
leaving examination (West Bank & Gaza, Jordan, and
Yemen), applicants for teacher education programs in Lebanon
are admitted based on two criteria: (i) test scores in the
secondary school leaving examination, and (ii) performance
in the compulsory entrance examination for teacher education
programs. While there are some mechanisms in place to hold
teachers accountable, their enforceability is limited.
Teachers are offered few financial incentives or
opportunities for public recognition to reward strong
performance. There is no probationary period prior to
awarding open-ended status. While the first years of
teaching are among the best available predictors of a
teacher's performance later on in their career, Lebanon
does not use this period to weed out the lowest-performing
teachers. Once a teacher has an open-ended appointment, weak
results in the performance evaluation process may not be
used to dismiss ineffective teachers. In fact, based on the
evaluation process, it appears to be difficult to identify
low-performers and high performers. Lebanon may look to the
experience of other countries in setting policies to remove
chronically low-performing teachers. The benefits of doing
so are twofold: first, such mechanisms protect students from
the detrimental and lasting effects of having poor teachers;
and second, they can give teachers a clear incentive to work
hard in order to avoid them. |
|---|