Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor
Countries vary systematically with respect to the incentives of politicians to provide broad public goods, and to reduce poverty. Even in developing countries that are democracies, politicians often have incentives to divert resources to political...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/11/2815688/democracy-public-expenditures-poor http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17902 |
| id |
okr-10986-17902 |
|---|---|
| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| spelling |
okr-10986-179022021-04-23T14:03:40Z Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor Keefer, Philip Khemani, Stuti ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ADVERTISEMENTS AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES BENCHMARK CLINICS COMMODITIES DEBT DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DISCOUNT RATES DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPLOYMENT ENVIRONMENTAL SIGNALS EQUILIBRIUM EXPECTED VALUE EXTERNALITIES FISCAL POLICIES FOOD PRODUCTION GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES HEALTH CARE HEALTH SERVICES HEALTH WORKERS IMPERFECT INFORMATION INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCOME INCOME INEQUALITY INFORMATION ACCESS INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INFORMATION PROBLEMS INNOVATIONS LITERACY LOW INCOME MARGINAL UTILITY MARKET FAILURES MEDIA MEDIAN VOTERS OIL POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL SYSTEMS PRESENT VALUE PRODUCERS PROGRAMS PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SERVICES RADIO RECURRENT EXPENDITURES RESOURCE ALLOCATION SERVICE DELIVERY SOCIAL SERVICES SOCIAL WELFARE TAX REVENUE TAXATION TEACHER ABSENTEEISM TEACHER PERFORMANCE TEACHERS TELEVISION TRADEOFFS VOTERS WEALTH WELFARE GAINS DEMOCRACY POLITICAL FACTORS POVERTY REDUCTION PUBLIC GOODS VALUATION POVERTY REDUCTION PUBLIC SPENDING DIVERGENT THINKING PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PRIVATE TRANSFERS DISTORTION ELECTION ADMINISTRATION INFORMATION DISSEMINATION CREDIBILITY OF RULES SOCIAL ROLE POLICY REFORM WELFARE GAINS Countries vary systematically with respect to the incentives of politicians to provide broad public goods, and to reduce poverty. Even in developing countries that are democracies, politicians often have incentives to divert resources to political rents, and to private transfers that benefit a few citizens at the expense of many. These distortions can be traced to imperfections in political markets, that are greater in some countries than in others. The authors review the theory, and evidence on the impact of incomplete information of voters, the lack of credibility of political promises, and social polarization on political incentives. They argue that the effects of these imperfections are large, but that their implications are insufficiently integrated into the design of policy reforms aimed at improving the provision of public goods, and reducing poverty. 2014-04-17T17:26:20Z 2014-04-17T17:26:20Z 2003-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/11/2815688/democracy-public-expenditures-poor http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17902 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3164 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ADVERTISEMENTS AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES BENCHMARK CLINICS COMMODITIES DEBT DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DISCOUNT RATES DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPLOYMENT ENVIRONMENTAL SIGNALS EQUILIBRIUM EXPECTED VALUE EXTERNALITIES FISCAL POLICIES FOOD PRODUCTION GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES HEALTH CARE HEALTH SERVICES HEALTH WORKERS IMPERFECT INFORMATION INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCOME INCOME INEQUALITY INFORMATION ACCESS INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INFORMATION PROBLEMS INNOVATIONS LITERACY LOW INCOME MARGINAL UTILITY MARKET FAILURES MEDIA MEDIAN VOTERS OIL POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL SYSTEMS PRESENT VALUE PRODUCERS PROGRAMS PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SERVICES RADIO RECURRENT EXPENDITURES RESOURCE ALLOCATION SERVICE DELIVERY SOCIAL SERVICES SOCIAL WELFARE TAX REVENUE TAXATION TEACHER ABSENTEEISM TEACHER PERFORMANCE TEACHERS TELEVISION TRADEOFFS VOTERS WEALTH WELFARE GAINS DEMOCRACY POLITICAL FACTORS POVERTY REDUCTION PUBLIC GOODS VALUATION POVERTY REDUCTION PUBLIC SPENDING DIVERGENT THINKING PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PRIVATE TRANSFERS DISTORTION ELECTION ADMINISTRATION INFORMATION DISSEMINATION CREDIBILITY OF RULES SOCIAL ROLE POLICY REFORM WELFARE GAINS |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ADVERTISEMENTS AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES BENCHMARK CLINICS COMMODITIES DEBT DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DISCOUNT RATES DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPLOYMENT ENVIRONMENTAL SIGNALS EQUILIBRIUM EXPECTED VALUE EXTERNALITIES FISCAL POLICIES FOOD PRODUCTION GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES HEALTH CARE HEALTH SERVICES HEALTH WORKERS IMPERFECT INFORMATION INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCOME INCOME INEQUALITY INFORMATION ACCESS INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INFORMATION PROBLEMS INNOVATIONS LITERACY LOW INCOME MARGINAL UTILITY MARKET FAILURES MEDIA MEDIAN VOTERS OIL POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL SYSTEMS PRESENT VALUE PRODUCERS PROGRAMS PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SERVICES RADIO RECURRENT EXPENDITURES RESOURCE ALLOCATION SERVICE DELIVERY SOCIAL SERVICES SOCIAL WELFARE TAX REVENUE TAXATION TEACHER ABSENTEEISM TEACHER PERFORMANCE TEACHERS TELEVISION TRADEOFFS VOTERS WEALTH WELFARE GAINS DEMOCRACY POLITICAL FACTORS POVERTY REDUCTION PUBLIC GOODS VALUATION POVERTY REDUCTION PUBLIC SPENDING DIVERGENT THINKING PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PRIVATE TRANSFERS DISTORTION ELECTION ADMINISTRATION INFORMATION DISSEMINATION CREDIBILITY OF RULES SOCIAL ROLE POLICY REFORM WELFARE GAINS Keefer, Philip Khemani, Stuti Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3164 |
| description |
Countries vary systematically with
respect to the incentives of politicians to provide broad
public goods, and to reduce poverty. Even in developing
countries that are democracies, politicians often have
incentives to divert resources to political rents, and to
private transfers that benefit a few citizens at the expense
of many. These distortions can be traced to imperfections in
political markets, that are greater in some countries than
in others. The authors review the theory, and evidence on
the impact of incomplete information of voters, the lack of
credibility of political promises, and social polarization
on political incentives. They argue that the effects of
these imperfections are large, but that their implications
are insufficiently integrated into the design of policy
reforms aimed at improving the provision of public goods,
and reducing poverty. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Keefer, Philip Khemani, Stuti |
| author_facet |
Keefer, Philip Khemani, Stuti |
| author_sort |
Keefer, Philip |
| title |
Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor |
| title_short |
Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor |
| title_full |
Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor |
| title_fullStr |
Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor |
| title_sort |
democracy, public expenditures, and the poor |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/11/2815688/democracy-public-expenditures-poor http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17902 |
| _version_ |
1764438449407918080 |