Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor
Countries vary systematically with respect to the incentives of politicians to provide broad public goods, and to reduce poverty. Even in developing countries that are democracies, politicians often have incentives to divert resources to political...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/11/2815688/democracy-public-expenditures-poor http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17902 |
| Summary: | Countries vary systematically with
respect to the incentives of politicians to provide broad
public goods, and to reduce poverty. Even in developing
countries that are democracies, politicians often have
incentives to divert resources to political rents, and to
private transfers that benefit a few citizens at the expense
of many. These distortions can be traced to imperfections in
political markets, that are greater in some countries than
in others. The authors review the theory, and evidence on
the impact of incomplete information of voters, the lack of
credibility of political promises, and social polarization
on political incentives. They argue that the effects of
these imperfections are large, but that their implications
are insufficiently integrated into the design of policy
reforms aimed at improving the provision of public goods,
and reducing poverty. |
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