Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public Goods : The Role of Negotiation Mandates

In a one-period model, whether or not individual weights in the welfare function are based on initial endowments dictate who provides public goods. But with long-term public goods, banning wealth redistribution still allows for several equilibriums...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Lecocq, Franck, Hourcade, Jean-Charles
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:	ABATEMENT ABATEMENT COST FUNCTIONS ABATEMENT COSTS ATMOSPHERE BENCHMARK BIODIVERSITY CARBON CLIMATE CLIMATE CHANGE COST FUNCTIONS DAMAGES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DISCOUNT RATE DISCOUNT RATES DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS EMISSION EMISSION RIGHTS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS RIGHTS EMISSIONS TRADING ENGINEERING ENTITLEMENTS EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EXPENDITURES EXPERIMENTS EXTERNALITY FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE GDP GLOBAL WARMING GREENHOUSE GASES GROWTH RATE INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME LEVELS INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY MARGINAL ABATEMENT MARGINAL ABATEMENT COSTS MARGINAL BENEFITS MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTION MARGINAL DAMAGE FUNCTION MARGINAL UTILITY MULTIPLIERS NATIONAL INCOME OZONE OZONE LAYER PER CAPITA INCOME POLITICAL ECONOMY PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TEMPERATURE UNCERTAINTY UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY FUNCTIONS WEALTH WELFARE FUNCTION
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/12/5278693/equitable-provision-long-term-public-goods-role-negotiation-mandates http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17431

id	okr-10986-17431
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-174312021-04-23T14:03:37Z Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public Goods : The Role of Negotiation Mandates Lecocq, Franck Hourcade, Jean-Charles ABATEMENT ABATEMENT COST FUNCTIONS ABATEMENT COSTS ATMOSPHERE BENCHMARK BIODIVERSITY CARBON CLIMATE CLIMATE CHANGE COST FUNCTIONS DAMAGES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DISCOUNT RATE DISCOUNT RATES DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS EMISSION EMISSION RIGHTS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS RIGHTS EMISSIONS TRADING ENGINEERING ENTITLEMENTS EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EXPENDITURES EXPERIMENTS EXTERNALITY FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE GDP GLOBAL WARMING GREENHOUSE GASES GROWTH RATE INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME LEVELS INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY MARGINAL ABATEMENT MARGINAL ABATEMENT COSTS MARGINAL BENEFITS MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTION MARGINAL DAMAGE FUNCTION MARGINAL UTILITY MULTIPLIERS NATIONAL INCOME OZONE OZONE LAYER PER CAPITA INCOME POLITICAL ECONOMY PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TEMPERATURE UNCERTAINTY UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY FUNCTIONS WEALTH WELFARE FUNCTION In a one-period model, whether or not individual weights in the welfare function are based on initial endowments dictate who provides public goods. But with long-term public goods, banning wealth redistribution still allows for several equilibriums depending on Parties' willingness to acknowledge changes in negotiating powers over time, and on whether or not they care only for their own descendants. Adaptative and universal mandates lead to far more robust equilibrium. In all cases, a simple rule of thumb for allocating expenditures at first period emerges, independent of both the optimal level of public goods and the second-period distribution of expenditures. 2014-03-27T20:08:21Z 2014-03-27T20:08:21Z 2003-12 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/12/5278693/equitable-provision-long-term-public-goods-role-negotiation-mandates http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17431 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3180 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	ABATEMENT ABATEMENT COST FUNCTIONS ABATEMENT COSTS ATMOSPHERE BENCHMARK BIODIVERSITY CARBON CLIMATE CLIMATE CHANGE COST FUNCTIONS DAMAGES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DISCOUNT RATE DISCOUNT RATES DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS EMISSION EMISSION RIGHTS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS RIGHTS EMISSIONS TRADING ENGINEERING ENTITLEMENTS EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EXPENDITURES EXPERIMENTS EXTERNALITY FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE GDP GLOBAL WARMING GREENHOUSE GASES GROWTH RATE INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME LEVELS INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY MARGINAL ABATEMENT MARGINAL ABATEMENT COSTS MARGINAL BENEFITS MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTION MARGINAL DAMAGE FUNCTION MARGINAL UTILITY MULTIPLIERS NATIONAL INCOME OZONE OZONE LAYER PER CAPITA INCOME POLITICAL ECONOMY PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TEMPERATURE UNCERTAINTY UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY FUNCTIONS WEALTH WELFARE FUNCTION
spellingShingle	ABATEMENT ABATEMENT COST FUNCTIONS ABATEMENT COSTS ATMOSPHERE BENCHMARK BIODIVERSITY CARBON CLIMATE CLIMATE CHANGE COST FUNCTIONS DAMAGES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DISCOUNT RATE DISCOUNT RATES DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS EMISSION EMISSION RIGHTS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS RIGHTS EMISSIONS TRADING ENGINEERING ENTITLEMENTS EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EXPENDITURES EXPERIMENTS EXTERNALITY FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE GDP GLOBAL WARMING GREENHOUSE GASES GROWTH RATE INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME LEVELS INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY MARGINAL ABATEMENT MARGINAL ABATEMENT COSTS MARGINAL BENEFITS MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTION MARGINAL DAMAGE FUNCTION MARGINAL UTILITY MULTIPLIERS NATIONAL INCOME OZONE OZONE LAYER PER CAPITA INCOME POLITICAL ECONOMY PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TEMPERATURE UNCERTAINTY UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY FUNCTIONS WEALTH WELFARE FUNCTION Lecocq, Franck Hourcade, Jean-Charles Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public Goods : The Role of Negotiation Mandates
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3180
description	In a one-period model, whether or not individual weights in the welfare function are based on initial endowments dictate who provides public goods. But with long-term public goods, banning wealth redistribution still allows for several equilibriums depending on Parties' willingness to acknowledge changes in negotiating powers over time, and on whether or not they care only for their own descendants. Adaptative and universal mandates lead to far more robust equilibrium. In all cases, a simple rule of thumb for allocating expenditures at first period emerges, independent of both the optimal level of public goods and the second-period distribution of expenditures.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Lecocq, Franck Hourcade, Jean-Charles
author_facet	Lecocq, Franck Hourcade, Jean-Charles
author_sort	Lecocq, Franck
title	Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public Goods : The Role of Negotiation Mandates
title_short	Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public Goods : The Role of Negotiation Mandates
title_full	Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public Goods : The Role of Negotiation Mandates
title_fullStr	Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public Goods : The Role of Negotiation Mandates
title_full_unstemmed	Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public Goods : The Role of Negotiation Mandates
title_sort	equitable provision of long-term public goods : the role of negotiation mandates
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2014
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/12/5278693/equitable-provision-long-term-public-goods-role-negotiation-mandates http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17431
_version_	1764437027611213824

Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public Goods : The Role of Negotiation Mandates

Similar Items