Temporary Sequestration Credits : An Instrument for Carbon Bears
Temporary crediting of carbon storage is a proposed instrument that allows entities with emissions reductions obligations to defer some obligations for a fixed period of time. This instrument provides a means of guaranteeing the environmental integ...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/12/2859419/temporary-sequestration-credits-instrument-carbon-bears http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17430 |
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okr-10986-174302021-04-23T14:03:37Z Temporary Sequestration Credits : An Instrument for Carbon Bears Kenneth M. Chomitz Franck Lecocq CARBON REDUCTION STRATEGIES SULPHUR DIOXIDE PLANTATIONS AGROFORESTRY SEQUESTRATION FUTURES MARKETS COST EFFECTIVENESS ABATEMENT ACCOUNTING ALLOWANCE MARKETS ATMOSPHERE BANKRUPTCY CALCULATION CARBON CARBON ACCUMULATION CARBON CREDIT CARBON CREDITS CARBON EMISSIONS CARBON LIABILITIES CARBON MARKETS CARBON PRICES CARBON PROJECTS CARBON SEQUESTRATION CARBON STORAGE CERTIFICATION PROCESS CLEAN AIR CLIMATE CLIMATE CHANGE CLIMATE POLICY CO2 DEFORESTATION DISCOUNT RATES DIVERGENCE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EMISSION EMISSION REDUCTION EMISSION REDUCTIONS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS CREDITS EMISSIONS OFFSETS EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS OBLIGATIONS ENERGY EFFICIENCY ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY EQUILIBRIUM FOREST MANAGEMENT FORESTRY FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE GREENHOUSE GAS INCOME INSURANCE LAND USE MARGINAL ABATEMENT MARGINAL ABATEMENT COST MARKET VALUE NATURAL FORESTS OVERHEAD COSTS POLLUTION PP PROFITABILITY RISK ASSESSMENT SINK SO2 SULFUR SULFUR DIOXIDE SULFUR DIOXIDE ALLOWANCES TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE TRANSACTION COSTS URBANIZATION WOOD PRODUCTS Temporary crediting of carbon storage is a proposed instrument that allows entities with emissions reductions obligations to defer some obligations for a fixed period of time. This instrument provides a means of guaranteeing the environmental integrity of a carbon sequestration project. But because the user of the temporary credit takes on the liability of renewing it, or replacing it with a permanent credit, the temporary credit must sell at a discount compared with a permanent credit. The authors show that this discount depends on the expected change in price of a permanent credit. Temporary credits have value only if restrictions on carbon emissions are not expected to tighten substantially. The intuition is illustrated by assessing the value of a hypothetical temporary sulfur dioxide sequestration credit using historical data on actual sulfur dioxide allowance prices. 2014-03-27T20:05:01Z 2014-03-27T20:05:01Z 2003-12 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/12/2859419/temporary-sequestration-credits-instrument-carbon-bears http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17430 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3181 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
CARBON REDUCTION STRATEGIES SULPHUR DIOXIDE PLANTATIONS AGROFORESTRY SEQUESTRATION FUTURES MARKETS COST EFFECTIVENESS ABATEMENT ACCOUNTING ALLOWANCE MARKETS ATMOSPHERE BANKRUPTCY CALCULATION CARBON CARBON ACCUMULATION CARBON CREDIT CARBON CREDITS CARBON EMISSIONS CARBON LIABILITIES CARBON MARKETS CARBON PRICES CARBON PROJECTS CARBON SEQUESTRATION CARBON STORAGE CERTIFICATION PROCESS CLEAN AIR CLIMATE CLIMATE CHANGE CLIMATE POLICY CO2 DEFORESTATION DISCOUNT RATES DIVERGENCE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EMISSION EMISSION REDUCTION EMISSION REDUCTIONS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS CREDITS EMISSIONS OFFSETS EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS OBLIGATIONS ENERGY EFFICIENCY ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY EQUILIBRIUM FOREST MANAGEMENT FORESTRY FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE GREENHOUSE GAS INCOME INSURANCE LAND USE MARGINAL ABATEMENT MARGINAL ABATEMENT COST MARKET VALUE NATURAL FORESTS OVERHEAD COSTS POLLUTION PP PROFITABILITY RISK ASSESSMENT SINK SO2 SULFUR SULFUR DIOXIDE SULFUR DIOXIDE ALLOWANCES TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE TRANSACTION COSTS URBANIZATION WOOD PRODUCTS |
| spellingShingle |
CARBON REDUCTION STRATEGIES SULPHUR DIOXIDE PLANTATIONS AGROFORESTRY SEQUESTRATION FUTURES MARKETS COST EFFECTIVENESS ABATEMENT ACCOUNTING ALLOWANCE MARKETS ATMOSPHERE BANKRUPTCY CALCULATION CARBON CARBON ACCUMULATION CARBON CREDIT CARBON CREDITS CARBON EMISSIONS CARBON LIABILITIES CARBON MARKETS CARBON PRICES CARBON PROJECTS CARBON SEQUESTRATION CARBON STORAGE CERTIFICATION PROCESS CLEAN AIR CLIMATE CLIMATE CHANGE CLIMATE POLICY CO2 DEFORESTATION DISCOUNT RATES DIVERGENCE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EMISSION EMISSION REDUCTION EMISSION REDUCTIONS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS CREDITS EMISSIONS OFFSETS EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS OBLIGATIONS ENERGY EFFICIENCY ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY EQUILIBRIUM FOREST MANAGEMENT FORESTRY FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE GREENHOUSE GAS INCOME INSURANCE LAND USE MARGINAL ABATEMENT MARGINAL ABATEMENT COST MARKET VALUE NATURAL FORESTS OVERHEAD COSTS POLLUTION PP PROFITABILITY RISK ASSESSMENT SINK SO2 SULFUR SULFUR DIOXIDE SULFUR DIOXIDE ALLOWANCES TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE TRANSACTION COSTS URBANIZATION WOOD PRODUCTS Kenneth M. Chomitz Franck Lecocq Temporary Sequestration Credits : An Instrument for Carbon Bears |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3181 |
| description |
Temporary crediting of carbon storage is
a proposed instrument that allows entities with emissions
reductions obligations to defer some obligations for a fixed
period of time. This instrument provides a means of
guaranteeing the environmental integrity of a carbon
sequestration project. But because the user of the temporary
credit takes on the liability of renewing it, or replacing
it with a permanent credit, the temporary credit must sell
at a discount compared with a permanent credit. The authors
show that this discount depends on the expected change in
price of a permanent credit. Temporary credits have value
only if restrictions on carbon emissions are not expected to
tighten substantially. The intuition is illustrated by
assessing the value of a hypothetical temporary sulfur
dioxide sequestration credit using historical data on actual
sulfur dioxide allowance prices. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Kenneth M. Chomitz Franck Lecocq |
| author_facet |
Kenneth M. Chomitz Franck Lecocq |
| author_sort |
Kenneth M. Chomitz |
| title |
Temporary Sequestration Credits : An Instrument for Carbon Bears |
| title_short |
Temporary Sequestration Credits : An Instrument for Carbon Bears |
| title_full |
Temporary Sequestration Credits : An Instrument for Carbon Bears |
| title_fullStr |
Temporary Sequestration Credits : An Instrument for Carbon Bears |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Temporary Sequestration Credits : An Instrument for Carbon Bears |
| title_sort |
temporary sequestration credits : an instrument for carbon bears |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/12/2859419/temporary-sequestration-credits-instrument-carbon-bears http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17430 |
| _version_ |
1764437023560564736 |