Electoral Accountability and Local Government Spending in Indonesia
This paper takes advantage of the exogenous phasing of direct elections in districts and applies the double-difference estimator to measure impacts on (i) human development outcomes and (ii) the pattern of public spending and revenue generation at...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/02/19006608/electoral-accountability-local-government-spending-indonesia http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17326 |
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okr-10986-17326 |
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oai_dc |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BANK POLICY BLOCK GRANTS BUDGET ALLOCATION BUDGET DATA BUDGET DEFICIT BUDGET SURPLUS BUSINESS CYCLE BUSINESS CYCLES CANDIDATES CASH RESERVES CASH TRANSFER CATEGORIES OF EXPENDITURE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL TRANSFERS CHECKS CITIZEN NEEDS CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SERVICE COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM CONSUMER PRICE INDEX DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC SPENDING DISTRICT DISTRICT BUDGET DISTRICT GOVERNMENT DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS DISTRICT GOVERNOR DISTRICT HEALTH DISTRICT LEVEL DISTRICT LEVELS DISTRICT OFFICIALS DISTRICT REVENUES DISTRICT-LEVEL DISTRICTS ECONOMIC CLASSIFICATION ECONOMIC POLICY EFFICIENT ALLOCATION EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES ELECTION ELECTION DATA ELECTION TIME ELECTIONS ELECTORAL INFORMATION ELECTORATE EQUIPMENT EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE CATEGORIES EXPENDITURE DATA EXPENDITURE PATTERNS EXPENDITURES EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA FAIR ELECTIONS FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL INFORMATION SYSTEM FISCAL BALANCE FISCAL CAPACITY FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL EXPENDITURE FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL OUTCOMES FISCAL POLICY FISCAL SYSTEM FISCAL VARIABLES GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT FINANCING GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES GOVERNOR GOVERNORS HEALTH EXPENDITURES HEALTH INSURANCE HEALTH SPENDING HOLDING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IMMUNIZATION INTEREST PAYMENTS INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS INTERNATIONAL BANK LAWS LEGAL OBLIGATION LEGISLATORS LOCAL ELECTIONS LOCAL EXPENDITURES LOCAL FINANCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL TAXES MAYOR MAYORS METROPOLITAN AREA MINISTRY OF FINANCE MISTRUST MUNICIPALITIES MUNICIPALITY NATIONAL INTERESTS NATIONAL POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS NATIONAL STATISTICS NATURAL DISASTERS NATURAL RESOURCES OBJECTIVE OF POVERTY REDUCTION OIL PRICES OUTCOME MEASURES PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY PARLIAMENTS PARTY DISCIPLINE PATTERN OF PUBLIC SPENDING POLICY CHANGES POLICY CHOICES POLICY OUTCOMES POLICY REFORMS POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL AUTONOMY POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL POWERS POLITICAL REFORM POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICIANS POVERTY RATE POVERTY REDUCTION PRICE INDEX PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM OUTCOMES PROGRAMS PROVINCE PROVINCES PROVINCIAL CAPITAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE REVIEW PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HOUSING PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC REVENUE PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC SPENDING PUBLIC WORKS QUALITY OF SERVICES REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTATIVES REVENUE BASE REVENUE MOBILIZATION REVENUE PER CAPITA REVENUE SHARING SANITARY FACILITIES SANITATION SEPARATION OF POWERS SERVICE DELIVERY SERVICE PROVIDERS SIZE OF GOVERNMENT SOCIAL ASSISTANCE SOCIAL PROTECTION SUB-NATIONAL SUB-NATIONAL EXPENDITURES SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS TAX TAX SHARING TAXATION TOTAL EXPENDITURES VILLAGE VILLAGES |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BANK POLICY BLOCK GRANTS BUDGET ALLOCATION BUDGET DATA BUDGET DEFICIT BUDGET SURPLUS BUSINESS CYCLE BUSINESS CYCLES CANDIDATES CASH RESERVES CASH TRANSFER CATEGORIES OF EXPENDITURE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL TRANSFERS CHECKS CITIZEN NEEDS CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SERVICE COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM CONSUMER PRICE INDEX DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC SPENDING DISTRICT DISTRICT BUDGET DISTRICT GOVERNMENT DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS DISTRICT GOVERNOR DISTRICT HEALTH DISTRICT LEVEL DISTRICT LEVELS DISTRICT OFFICIALS DISTRICT REVENUES DISTRICT-LEVEL DISTRICTS ECONOMIC CLASSIFICATION ECONOMIC POLICY EFFICIENT ALLOCATION EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES ELECTION ELECTION DATA ELECTION TIME ELECTIONS ELECTORAL INFORMATION ELECTORATE EQUIPMENT EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE CATEGORIES EXPENDITURE DATA EXPENDITURE PATTERNS EXPENDITURES EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA FAIR ELECTIONS FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL INFORMATION SYSTEM FISCAL BALANCE FISCAL CAPACITY FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL EXPENDITURE FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL OUTCOMES FISCAL POLICY FISCAL SYSTEM FISCAL VARIABLES GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT FINANCING GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES GOVERNOR GOVERNORS HEALTH EXPENDITURES HEALTH INSURANCE HEALTH SPENDING HOLDING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IMMUNIZATION INTEREST PAYMENTS INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS INTERNATIONAL BANK LAWS LEGAL OBLIGATION LEGISLATORS LOCAL ELECTIONS LOCAL EXPENDITURES LOCAL FINANCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL TAXES MAYOR MAYORS METROPOLITAN AREA MINISTRY OF FINANCE MISTRUST MUNICIPALITIES MUNICIPALITY NATIONAL INTERESTS NATIONAL POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS NATIONAL STATISTICS NATURAL DISASTERS NATURAL RESOURCES OBJECTIVE OF POVERTY REDUCTION OIL PRICES OUTCOME MEASURES PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY PARLIAMENTS PARTY DISCIPLINE PATTERN OF PUBLIC SPENDING POLICY CHANGES POLICY CHOICES POLICY OUTCOMES POLICY REFORMS POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL AUTONOMY POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL POWERS POLITICAL REFORM POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICIANS POVERTY RATE POVERTY REDUCTION PRICE INDEX PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM OUTCOMES PROGRAMS PROVINCE PROVINCES PROVINCIAL CAPITAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE REVIEW PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HOUSING PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC REVENUE PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC SPENDING PUBLIC WORKS QUALITY OF SERVICES REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTATIVES REVENUE BASE REVENUE MOBILIZATION REVENUE PER CAPITA REVENUE SHARING SANITARY FACILITIES SANITATION SEPARATION OF POWERS SERVICE DELIVERY SERVICE PROVIDERS SIZE OF GOVERNMENT SOCIAL ASSISTANCE SOCIAL PROTECTION SUB-NATIONAL SUB-NATIONAL EXPENDITURES SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS TAX TAX SHARING TAXATION TOTAL EXPENDITURES VILLAGE VILLAGES Skoufias, Emmanuel Narayan, Ambar Dasgupta, Basab Kaiser, Kai Electoral Accountability and Local Government Spending in Indonesia |
| geographic_facet |
East Asia and Pacific Indonesia |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6782 |
| description |
This paper takes advantage of the
exogenous phasing of direct elections in districts and
applies the double-difference estimator to measure impacts
on (i) human development outcomes and (ii) the pattern of
public spending and revenue generation at the district
level. The analysis reveals that four years after the switch
to direct elections, there have been no significant effects
on human development outcomes. However, the estimates of the
impact of Pilkada on health expenditures at the district
level suggest that directly elected district officials may
have become more responsive to local needs at least in the
area of health. The composition of district expenditures
changes considerably during the year and sometimes the year
before the elections, shifting toward expenditure categories
that allow incumbent district heads running as candidates in
the direct elections to "buy" voter support.
Electoral reforms did not lead to higher revenue generation
from own sources and had no effect on the budget surplus of
districts with directly elected heads. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Skoufias, Emmanuel Narayan, Ambar Dasgupta, Basab Kaiser, Kai |
| author_facet |
Skoufias, Emmanuel Narayan, Ambar Dasgupta, Basab Kaiser, Kai |
| author_sort |
Skoufias, Emmanuel |
| title |
Electoral Accountability and Local Government Spending in Indonesia |
| title_short |
Electoral Accountability and Local Government Spending in Indonesia |
| title_full |
Electoral Accountability and Local Government Spending in Indonesia |
| title_fullStr |
Electoral Accountability and Local Government Spending in Indonesia |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Electoral Accountability and Local Government Spending in Indonesia |
| title_sort |
electoral accountability and local government spending in indonesia |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/02/19006608/electoral-accountability-local-government-spending-indonesia http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17326 |
| _version_ |
1764436878428209152 |
| spelling |
okr-10986-173262021-04-23T14:03:37Z Electoral Accountability and Local Government Spending in Indonesia Skoufias, Emmanuel Narayan, Ambar Dasgupta, Basab Kaiser, Kai ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BANK POLICY BLOCK GRANTS BUDGET ALLOCATION BUDGET DATA BUDGET DEFICIT BUDGET SURPLUS BUSINESS CYCLE BUSINESS CYCLES CANDIDATES CASH RESERVES CASH TRANSFER CATEGORIES OF EXPENDITURE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL TRANSFERS CHECKS CITIZEN NEEDS CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SERVICE COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM CONSUMER PRICE INDEX DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC SPENDING DISTRICT DISTRICT BUDGET DISTRICT GOVERNMENT DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS DISTRICT GOVERNOR DISTRICT HEALTH DISTRICT LEVEL DISTRICT LEVELS DISTRICT OFFICIALS DISTRICT REVENUES DISTRICT-LEVEL DISTRICTS E-MAIL ECONOMIC CLASSIFICATION ECONOMIC POLICY EFFICIENT ALLOCATION EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES ELECTION ELECTION DATA ELECTION TIME ELECTIONS ELECTORAL INFORMATION ELECTORATE EQUIPMENT EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE CATEGORIES EXPENDITURE DATA EXPENDITURE PATTERNS EXPENDITURES EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA FAIR ELECTIONS FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL INFORMATION SYSTEM FISCAL BALANCE FISCAL CAPACITY FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL EXPENDITURE FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL OUTCOMES FISCAL POLICY FISCAL SYSTEM FISCAL VARIABLES GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT FINANCING GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES GOVERNOR GOVERNORS HEALTH EXPENDITURES HEALTH INSURANCE HEALTH SPENDING HOLDING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IMMUNIZATION INTEREST PAYMENTS INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS INTERNATIONAL BANK LAWS LEGAL OBLIGATION LEGISLATORS LOCAL ELECTIONS LOCAL EXPENDITURES LOCAL FINANCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL TAXES MAYOR MAYORS METROPOLITAN AREA MINISTRY OF FINANCE MISTRUST MUNICIPALITIES MUNICIPALITY NATIONAL INTERESTS NATIONAL POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS NATIONAL STATISTICS NATURAL DISASTERS NATURAL RESOURCES OBJECTIVE OF POVERTY REDUCTION OIL PRICES OUTCOME MEASURES PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY PARLIAMENTS PARTY DISCIPLINE PATTERN OF PUBLIC SPENDING POLICY CHANGES POLICY CHOICES POLICY OUTCOMES POLICY REFORMS POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL AUTONOMY POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL POWERS POLITICAL REFORM POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICIANS POVERTY RATE POVERTY REDUCTION PRICE INDEX PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM OUTCOMES PROGRAMS PROVINCE PROVINCES PROVINCIAL CAPITAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE REVIEW PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HOUSING PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC REVENUE PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC SPENDING PUBLIC WORKS QUALITY OF SERVICES REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTATIVES REVENUE BASE REVENUE MOBILIZATION REVENUE PER CAPITA REVENUE SHARING SANITARY FACILITIES SANITATION SEPARATION OF POWERS SERVICE DELIVERY SERVICE PROVIDERS SIZE OF GOVERNMENT SOCIAL ASSISTANCE SOCIAL PROTECTION SUB-NATIONAL SUB-NATIONAL EXPENDITURES SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS TAX TAX SHARING TAXATION TOTAL EXPENDITURES VILLAGE VILLAGES This paper takes advantage of the exogenous phasing of direct elections in districts and applies the double-difference estimator to measure impacts on (i) human development outcomes and (ii) the pattern of public spending and revenue generation at the district level. The analysis reveals that four years after the switch to direct elections, there have been no significant effects on human development outcomes. However, the estimates of the impact of Pilkada on health expenditures at the district level suggest that directly elected district officials may have become more responsive to local needs at least in the area of health. The composition of district expenditures changes considerably during the year and sometimes the year before the elections, shifting toward expenditure categories that allow incumbent district heads running as candidates in the direct elections to "buy" voter support. Electoral reforms did not lead to higher revenue generation from own sources and had no effect on the budget surplus of districts with directly elected heads. 2014-03-18T21:12:36Z 2014-03-18T21:12:36Z 2014-02 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/02/19006608/electoral-accountability-local-government-spending-indonesia http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17326 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6782 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research East Asia and Pacific Indonesia |