Social Investment Funds : An Organizational Approach to Improved Development Assistance

Social Investment Funds : An Organizational Approach to Improved Development Assistance

This paper examines the design of social investment funds (SIFs) and explores the ways they affect agents incentives to propose, select, and implement good projects. Compared with other forms of decentralized service provision, SIFs possess featur...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Jack, William
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
en_US
Published: Washington, DC: World Bank 2014
Subjects:
ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION
ADVERSE SELECTION
AGENCY PROBLEMS
AUCTION
AUCTIONS
AUTONOMY
BENEFICIARIES
BRIBES
CAPACITY BUILDING
CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS
CIVIL SERVANTS
CIVIL SOCIETY
COLLUSION
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
COMPETITIVE BIDDING
CORRUPT
CORRUPTION
DECENTRALIZATION
DECONCENTRATION
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
DEVELOPMENT BANK
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
DEVOLUTION
DISCRETION
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
ECONOMICS RESEARCH
EMPLOYMENT
EXPENDITURE
EXPROPRIATION
EXTERNAL FUNDING
EXTERNALITIES
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
FINANCIAL SUPPORT
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
FISCAL FEDERALISM
FUNGIBLE
GOOD GOVERNANCE
GOVERNMENT GRANTS
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
HOUSING
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
HUMAN RESOURCES
INCOME INEQUALITY
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
INSTRUMENT
INSURANCE
INTERNATIONAL BANK
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
INVESTMENT FUND
INVESTMENT FUNDS
LOAN
LOCAL CAPACITY
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
LOCAL LEVEL
LOCAL OFFICIALS
MEDIA
MINISTERS
MINISTRIES OF FINANCE
MISAPPROPRIATION
MORAL HAZARD
MORAL HAZARDS
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
OPTIMAL CONTRACT
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES
PENALTIES
PERFECT INFORMATION
PERSONAL INCOME
PHYSICAL ASSETS
POLICE
POLICE OFFICER
POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
PORTFOLIO
POVERTY REDUCTION
PROCUREMENT
PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY
PROPERTY RIGHTS
PUBLIC
PUBLIC CHOICE
PUBLIC GOOD
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS
PUBLIC PROJECTS
PUBLIC SECTOR
PUBLIC SECTORS
PUBLIC SERVICES
PUBLIC SPENDING
PUBLIC WORKS
RATE OF RETURN
RETURN
RETURNS
RISK TAKING
SANCTIONS
SOCIAL CAPITAL
TAX
TAXATION
TRANSACTION
TRANSACTION COSTS
TRANSITION COUNTRIES
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
TRANSPORT
URBAN AREAS
URBAN DEVELOPMENT
URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE
USER CHARGES
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/03/17579929/social-investment-funds-organizational-approach-improved-development-assistance
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17130
Description
Summary:This paper examines the design of social investment funds (SIFs) and explores the ways they affect agents incentives to propose, select, and implement good projects. Compared with other forms of decentralized service provision, SIFs possess features of administratively delegated authority and deep political devolution. Where existing political institutions fail to deliver assistance to vulnerable groups, a well-designed SIF may represent a useful administrative alternative. This article reviews several features that provide incentives for both SIF staff and project beneficiaries and concludes with practical guidelines for designing and appraising social investment funds.

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